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It is said that success has many mothers, but failure is an orphan. If this Annexation Handbook 
for Cities and Towns in Tennessee II is a success, it truly does have many mothers. If it is 
a failure, I am its sole “mother.”
It is typical for the last breath of an acknowledgment to pay tribute to its typist. But the typist 
in this case is Armintha Loveday. To those who know her, nothing more need be said. For those 
who do not, simple justice demands that her name appear first. She nursed and pampered and 
cajoled the Handbook...II into existence and sharpened its image; without her, it would still be 
in the birthing stage.
Gene Puett, longtime MTAS attorney and a true lawyer’s lawyer, wrote Annexation Handbook 
for Cities and Towns in Tennessee [1989], MTAS’s first true annexation handbook. It was so 
comprehensive that the only reason a new one was needed was that Public Acts 1998, Chapter 
1101, made significant changes in Tennessee’s annexation law. Had that not occurred, it is 
likely that his handbook would have gone on forever, with only updates to reflect new cases. In 
fact, much of Chapters 9, 10 and 12 in Handbook...II reflect, with little change, material from 
his original. It may seem presumptuous of me to have appropriated the title of Gene’s book and 
simply tacked on “II” to distinguish the two publications, but that was done in tribute to his 
work; the “II” means added to, not better than.
While he was employed at MTAS, Jim Finane, in response to Chapter 1101, created an outline 
of a new annexation handbook. I took over the job from him when he left MTAS and borrowed 
extensively from his outline. It is difficult to calculate the time his outline saved me. I also 
borrowed liberally from two MTAS publications: Pat Hardy’s Annexation Guidelines: How to 
Reduce Negative Impacts [2002], and Harold Yungmeyer’s Doing an Annexation Study: A How 
to Guide [April 1992, Revised October 1997], both of which still contain valuable advice and 
information on how to successfully accomplish annexations.
Many MTAS consultants reviewed Handbook…II and made many valuable, and in some cases, 
critical, suggestions. Worthy of particular mention in that regard are Mike Tallent, Dennis 
Huffer, and Ron Darden. In addition, Dan Hawk and his staff in the Tennessee State Planning 
Office made a significant contribution in that area.
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puRpOSE
The annexation law of Tennessee consists of Article 
XI, Section 9, of the Tennessee Constitution (“The 
General Assembly shall by general law provide the 
exclusive methods by which municipalities may be 
created, merged, consolidated and dissolved and 
by which municipal boundaries may be altered.”); 
Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101, the still current 
statutory annexation law that existed before 1998; 
and case law interpreting and applying Tennessee’s 
annexation and incorporation statutes. Chapter 
1101 is the product of the angry annexation battles 
between cities and targets of annexation, between 
cities and counties, and even between cities and 
cities, that mark the last 25 or so years. It reflects 
the greatest change in Tennessee’s annexation 
and incorporation laws in more than 50 years. 
There have been surprisingly few substantive 
cases interpreting and applying the annexation 
law found in Chapter 1101, but many of the 
pre-1998 annexation cases are still pertinent 
to present annexations.
This handbook has two primary purposes. First, 
to help municipalities determine whether 
a contemplated annexation makes sense from 
a number of related perspectives: present and future 
city growth and development, political, economic, 
and legal. Second, to blend the “old and the new” 
annexation law so that its readers will have 
an accurate picture of annexation law in Tennessee 
today. Annexation activity is expected to accelerate 
now that cities have had several years to acclimate 
themselves to Chapter 1101. If that expectation 
is realized, new legislation and court cases can be 
expected to clarify and change the annexation law. 
This publication will be kept current to reflect those 
clarifications and changes.
OuTLINE OF ANNEXATION HANDBOOK
This handbook is divided into 13 chapters, each of 
which addresses a discrete subject in the area of 
annexation. Following those chapters are a number 
of appendices that contain a joint MTAS-CTAS 
publication on how comprehensive growth plans are 
amended, sample forms useful to successfully meet 
the procedural requirements in the annexation law 
for annexing territory by ordinance and referendum, 
and documents that might be useful in providing 
an annexing municipality guidance in taking over 
services inside the annexed area. 
CHApTER 1, INTRODuCTION TO ANNEXATION 
HANDBOOK, explains the purpose of the handbook, 
briefly details the sources of annexation law in 
Tennessee, and provides a quick review of what 
each chapter in the handbook contains. 
CHApTER 2, CHApTER 1101, covers the basics 
of Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101, which is the most 
recent comprehensive amendment to the annexation 
laws of Tennessee and other statutes related to 
annexation, including the laws governing the 
incorporation of new municipalities.
CHApTER 3, THE RIGHT ANNEXATION DONE 
RIGHT, gives a city contemplating an annexation 
the arguments for and against annexation, and 
a “checklist” for making sure that it touches all the 
bases that make the annexation both legally and 
practically sound before and after its effective date.
CHApTER 1
Introduction to Annexation Handbook II
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CHApTER 4, TAX AND REvENuE IMpLICATIONS 
OF ANNEXATION, speaks to the “money” issues 
in annexation, both in terms of what an annexing 
municipality loses as well as what it gains.
CHApTERS 5 AND 6, ANNEXATION By ORDINANCE 
and ANNEXATION By REFERENDuM, respectively, 
discuss the legal and practical nuts and bolts of 
annexation, both by ordinance and by referendum. 
Those nuts and bolts hold the annexation machine 
together. If any of them fall out of the annexation 
machine, it may grind to a halt before or after the 
annexation is complete.
CHApTER 7, pLAN OF SERvICES, discusses the law 
that now requires both annexation by ordinance 
and annexation by referendum to be accompanied 
by a plan of services. That law is much stricter than 
was the pre-Chapter 1101 plan of services law.
CHApTER 8, “pOpuLATION BRACKETS” CONTAINED 
IN THE ANNEXATION LAW, is a mind-bending 
analysis of the statutes in the annexation law 
that by population (and sometimes other) brackets 
exempt certain municipalities from, or include 
certain municipalities within, various provisions 
of the annexation law. Many of those population 
brackets probably have limited application after 
Chapter 1101 was adopted, and others appear to 
have limited practical application, but they are 
still a part of the annexation law and any city 
considering an annexation should determine 
whether any of those brackets potentially apply 
to the city.
CHApTER 9, ANNEXATION ORDINANCE AND pLAN 
OF SERvICES puBLIC NOTICE AND HEARING 
ISSuES, considers both the statutory hearing 
requirements and the cases that have arisen under 
those requirements. It is separate from the chapters 
dealing with the annexation and plan of services 
because of the common incidence of procedural 
errors in the annexation and plan of services hearing 
processes, errors that are generally avoidable by 
the use of a calendar and common sense by the 
annexing city.
CHApTER 10, REASONABLENESS OF ANNEXATION, 
generally deals first with what appears to be 
the alternative burdens of proof under Chapter 
1101, § 12, only one of which may involve the 
“reasonableness” of the annexation as the courts 
generally broadly applied that term before Chapter 
1101. It deals, second, with the case law that has 
interpreted the requirement in the pre-Chapter 1101 
annexation law that the annexation be “reasonable.” 
That case law undoubtedly still has application to at 
least some challenges against an annexation on the 
ground that it is unreasonable.
CHApTER 11, “pROBLEM” ANNEXATIONS, as its 
title implies, discusses categories of annexations 
that stand out as particularly troublesome in  
Tennessee. Those categories are corridor annexa-
tions, donut annexations and annexation by 
acquiescence. This chapter also discusses the legal 
issues associated with annexation challenges based 
on constitutional grounds rather than on the ground 
of reasonableness.
CHApTER 12, EFFECT OF ANNEXATION ON OTHER 
GOvERNMENTS, outlines the statutes and cases 
governing the rights of annexing municipalities 
to provide service in the annexed territory, and 
the limitations under federal and state law 
limiting that right, particularly with respect to 
certain utility services.
 
CHApTER 13, “DEANNEXATION” AND OTHER 
BOuNDARy ADJuSTMENTS, deals with the laws 
governing how municipalities “deannex” territory 
and make boundary adjustments by contract. It 
also discusses municipal mergers.
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FOOTNOTES AND CASE AND 
STATuTORy REFERENCES 
Footnotes are used sparingly in this publication, 
and infra and supra and other esoteric references 
to cases and statutes not at all. This publication is 
designed to put statutory and case citations at the 
fingertips of the reader without him or her being 
required to travel forward and backward through it.
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COuNTyWIDE COMpREHENSIvE 
GROWTH pLAN
Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101, codified in 
T.C.A. § 6-58-101 et seq., provides for 
a comprehensive growth policy plan in each 
county that is, in theory, supposed to guide 
and direct new development in the county 
during the next 20 years. But it is probably 
accurate to say that in most counties the critical 
issue in the formation of the comprehensive 
growth plan was where municipalities could—
and could not—annex territory during that period.
In each county a coordinating committee whose 
members included representatives from the county, 
cities, utilities, schools, chambers of commerce, soil 
conservation districts, and other entities formulated 
the initial draft of the growth plan. The county 
and the cities in the county proposed boundaries 
for inclusion in the plan. After the growth plan 
was developed, the committee conducted public 
hearings and submitted the plan to the county and 
city governments for ratification. The committee 
could revise the plan upon objection from any one 
of these local governments. If the governmental 
entities could not agree on a plan, any one of them 
could petition the secretary of state to appoint 
a dispute resolution panel of administrative law 
judges to settle the conflict. Once adopted by 
the July 1, 2001, deadline, a plan could not be 
amended for three years except in extraordinary 
circumstances. All counties but one have adopted 
a growth plan as required by Chapter 1101.
The countywide growth plan identifies three distinct 
areas in the county:
• Urban Growth Boundaries (UGB)—areas that 
contain the corporate limits of a municipality 
and the adjoining territory where growth  
is expected;
• Planned Growth Areas—areas outside 
incorporated municipalities where growth is 
expected and where new incorporations may 
occur; and 
• Rural Areas—territory not within one of the  
other two categories that is to be preserved 
for agriculture, recreation, forest, wildlife, and 
uses other than high-density commercial or 
residential development. [T.C.A. § 6-58-101.]
The three-year period during which growth plans 
could not be amended except in extraordinary 
circumstances has passed, and growth plan 
amendment activity has occurred in some counties 
and will likely occur in others. The amendment of 
comprehensive growth plans is accomplished in 
the same way the original comprehensive growth 
plans were adopted. A detailed explanation of that 
process is found in Amending Comprehensive Growth 
Plans, 2005 (see Appendix A), a joint CTAS-MTAS 
publication by David Connor and Dennis Huffer.
CHApTER 2
Chapter 1101
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ANNEXATION By ORDINANCE AND 
REFERENDuM pRESERvED
Section 3 of Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101, 
expressly recognizes annexation as a legitimate 
municipal growth tool.
With this act, the General Assembly intends to 
establish a comprehensive growth policy for this 
state that:
1. Eliminates annexation or incorporation out  
of fear;
2. Establishes incentives to annex or incorporate 
where appropriate.
Section 12 of that act also preserves the same 
methods of annexation that existed before 
1998: ordinance and referendum. It authorizes 
municipalities to annex by ordinance and 
referendum territory within their urban growth 
boundaries established under Section 7, and 
authorizes municipalities to annex territory by 
referendum outside their urban growth boundaries. 
However, Public Acts 2005, Chapter 246, amended 
T.C.A. § 6-58-111, effective January 1, 2006, to 
prohibit municipalities from annexing outside 
their urban growth boundaries by referendum 
except in planned growth areas and rural areas.
Pre-Chapter 1101 pronouncements about the 
purpose of annexation appear generally consistent 
with Chapter 1101. In State ex rel Collier v. City of 
Pigeon Forge, 599 S.W.2d 456 (Tenn. 1980), the 
Tennessee Supreme Court said: 
The whole theory of annexation is that it is  
a device by which a municipal corporation 
may plan for its orderly growth and 
development. Heavily involved in this is 
control of fringe area developments [the 
court’s emphasis] and zoning measures to 
the end that areas of unsafe, unsanitary  
and substandard housing may not “ring”  
the City to the detriment of the City as  
a whole. In a word, annexation gives a city 
some control over its own destiny [the court’s 
emphasis.]…The failure of a city to extend 
its boundaries to embrace contiguous areas 
of growth and development is an abdication 
of responsibility. The time to annex is in 
the incipient stage of growth, lest the basic 
purpose of annexation be frustrated and the 
public interest suffer by the annexation of 
substandard areas. [At 547.] 
The court in Senff v. Columbia, 343 S.W.2d 888 
(1961) said this earlier about another annexation:
 
The City of Columbia like so many other 
municipalities in the United States for 
the past twenty years had undergone 
an extensive growth. The metropolitan 
community which included Columbia and 
its industrial and residential environs had 
approximately doubled in population. As  
a result, the area within the corporate limits 
of the city had for residential purposes 
and incidental business, become saturated, 
compelling its growing population to seek 
residential sites outside of corporate limits. 
The great majority of these people and the 
breadwinners thereof worked in the City of 
Columbia and used its facilities. The City 
of Columbia likewise had to expand its 
waterworks and other facilities. Thus due to 
all the things that are imaginable that might 
be placed upon a city that had doubled in 
population in this length of time, the city 
fathers decided that it was best to annex 
many of these suburban areas. [At 889.]
Annexation is a critical tool for most incorporated 
municipalities. It is their most effective method of 
controlling, managing, and directing the growth 
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of urbanized areas. For various reasons, Tennessee 
counties and special districts generally have 
difficulty either managing development or providing 
most urban services, such as police, fire, parks, 
utilities and refuse collection to urbanized areas 
outside of city boundaries. Urban areas that exhibit 
the worst problems of uncontrolled growth, such as 
poor roads, traffic congestion, water pollution from 
septic tanks, strip commercial development, and 
overcrowded public facilities, are frequently those 
where the central city has not implemented an 
effective, long-range, annexation policy.
ANNEXATION EASIER FOR CITIES 
uNDER CHApTER 1101? 
 At first glance, Section 12 of Chapter 1101 also 
procedurally made annexation easier for cities by:
• Imposing on the person challenging the 
annexation the burden of proving that the 
annexation is unreasonable or that the health, 
safety, and welfare of the citizens and property 
owners of the municipality and territory will 
not be materially retarded in the absence of the 
annexation. Prior to Chapter 1101, the burden 
was on the city to prove that the annexation 
was reasonable.
• Shifting from the jury to the judge the duty to 
resolve the question of whether the annexation 
meets the above standards.
However, Section 12 appears to have created 
alternative burdens of proof, so that if the 
opponent of the annexation carries either one 
of them, the annexation will be defeated. In 
that respect, it may have made annexation more 
difficult. [See Chapter 5, Annexation by Ordinance, 
Trial and Burden of Proof]
OTHER RESTRICTIONS ON ANNEXATION
Chapter 1101 also imposes some serious restrictions 
on annexation. Sections 19 and 21 increase plans of 
service requirements on the part of cities annexing 
territory. Under Section 24, certain tax revenues 
generated in annexed territories may go to the 
county for long periods. Section 13 of that act also 
restricts the incorporation of new cities to territory 
designated in the county growth plan as planned 
growth areas and requires the approval of the county 
governing body before an incorporation election can 
be held. It also imposes certain tax consequences 
and other limitations on such incorporations that in 
some cases will be a deterrent to new incorporations 
on the fringes of existing cities. Other provisions 
of Chapter 1101 are designed to make annexation 
a more thoughtful process on the part of municipal 
governments and to foster economic cooperation 
between cities and counties.
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ARGuMENTS FOR AND AGAINST 
THE ANNEXATION
This chapter summarizes some of the most common 
arguments both for and against annexation. Not 
all of these arguments arise in every annexation, 
but the experience of a number of Tennessee cities 
forms the basis for them.
ARGuMENTS FOR ANNEXATION
1. Following annexation, the new citizens of the 
city generally receive a broader range of services 
or better services—or both—than they did 
when the territory was part of only the county. 
Some of these services are police, fire, water, 
wastewater, transit, emergency medical services, 
and storm drainage.
2. More efficient service often can be obtained less 
expensively by spreading the delivery and cost of 
municipal services over a larger area. This helps 
citizens of the newly annexed area as much as it 
helps the citizens of the existing city.
3. When the relationship between the city and the 
fringe area is close, there is a need for unified 
planning and zoning. By annexing territory,  
a city’s zoning rules can be extended to adjacent 
areas in a logical way, helping assure orderly 
growth and improved quality of life for the 
entire area.
4. Annexation can protect or enhance a city’s tax 
base, while at the same time guaranteeing that 
the county will continue to receive important 
revenues from the area for the next 15 years. 
The increased property value of the city will 
increase its bonding capacity.
5. Annexation increases a city’s land area and 
population, enhancing its ability to attract 
further commercial development and  
possibly qualify for more state and federal  
grant assistance.
6. Annexation may facilitate the location of new 
industries and businesses in the city, creating 
jobs, income, and city revenues.
7. Annexation may result in lower utility rates 
by reducing surcharges to noncity residents. 
It also can reduce home insurance premiums 
by providing a higher level of fire protection. 
Having municipal fire departments and water 
systems almost always results in a lower ISO 
rating for city residential property compared  
to the surrounding unincorporated areas.
8. Annexation gives suburban area residents  
a voice in the government of the larger 
community in which they probably work, bank, 
and shop. County residents are often directly 
affected by action of the central city but have 
no say in its decisions. Annexation provides 
opportunities for both direct and indirect 
participation for new residents.
9. Annexation can help rationalize the city/county 
boundary and clarify which unit of government 
provides services to a particular area.
CHApTER 3
The Right Annexation Done Right1
____________________
1For references to sample forms useful in accomplishing the successful adoption of an annexation ordinance (resolution in the case of annexation 
by referendum) and a plan of services, see the appropriate chapters on those subjects.
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ARGuMENTS AGAINST ANNEXATION
1. Annexation may be thought unnecessary if the 
annexed area’s needs or the city’s ability to 
provide services are limited.
2. Residents, industries and businesses may  
argue that they choose to live outside the  
city to avoid taxes for services they do not  
want or need.
3. The increase, or apparent increase, in taxes after 
annexation may be perceived as not worth the 
services to be received.
4. There is a necessary waiting period for 
improvements to a new neighborhood of  
the city.
5. The city’s police regulations, zoning ordinances, 
and other regulations may be either too strict  
or not strict enough.
6. Fringe area residents may distrust the 
government and the politics of the  
annexing city.
7. A larger municipal government may be less 
accessible to people in a lower population 
county area.
8. Interest in annexation may be limited to  
a select group, and not have general support.
ANNEXATION STuDy
ESSENTIAL TO DETERMINING WHETHER 
ANNEXATION MAKES SENSE
Before proceeding with any annexation, a city 
should carefully examine the long-term costs 
and revenues that will be generated by the 
newly annexed area. This is not simply optional 
information; it is required if the city is to properly 
design and implement the plan of services as 
required by law. [See Chapter 7, Plan of Services] 
The potential net cost of a planned annexation 
should be a major factor in deciding whether to 
proceed, modify, postpone, or abandon the action.
This process is commonly referred to as an 
“annexation study,” and it is crucial to the 
annexation decision process. Following is 
an outline of how to collect and organize 
this information. It also covers what to expect 
in tax revenues from an annexation. The law on 
that subject was drastically changed by 
Chapter 1101 and is now considerably less 
favorable to annexing cities. 
COSTS: WATER, SEWER, STORMWATER, 
AND ELECTRIC uTILITIES
If a newly annexed area is not already served by 
the city or a utility district, water and sewer 
utilities are likely to consist of individual wells 
and septic tank systems. Frequently, one of the 
major expenses of designing and fulfilling a plan 
of services for an annexed area involves installing 
new or updated water and sewer mains and 
distribution lines, in the latter case to replace 
septic tanks and fields. Even if the city already 
provides water and wastewater services to the area, 
water lines may be inadequate to support adequate 
fire protection, including fire hydrants. Additional 
demands on both water and wastewater treatment 
capacity should also be a factor in evaluating costs.
Federal and state stormwater regulations are 
becoming more intense and may be an immediate 
city problem in the annexed area. Storm drainage 
plans will have to be coordinated with decisions 
on street standards, construction, or reconstruction.
If the annexed area is served by an electric co-op 
or another municipality’s electric system and the 
city operates its own municipal electric system, the 
city electric system can either buy out the other 
system’s facilities in the annexed area or grant it 
a franchise to continue to operate in the city.
COSTS: STREETS AND STREET LIGHTING
The city’s standards for street design and 
construction could well exceed what may be the 
norm for the surrounding county. Decisions will need 
to be made regarding expansion of right of way, 
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pavement upgrades, and replacement of rural 
ditch lines and culverts with curb, gutter, storm 
drains, and sidewalks. Most counties provide no 
street lighting, so the city will have to make 
decisions about upgrading street lighting to 
the city’s standards.
 
COSTS: pOLICE AND FIRE
Police and fire costs to serve an annexed area 
often are the largest general fund expense 
associated with an annexation. The city will 
need to examine its police and fire staffing and 
equipment. The fire department will need to 
see that its equipment is redeployed to provide 
a response time to the annexed areas that is 
comparable to that in the rest of the city. Additional 
staffing and equipment may be necessary in both 
police and fire services.
COSTS: RECREATION
If the city provides recreation services, it will 
need to consider the recreation needs of any newly 
annexed population. Usually, newly annexed areas 
do not contain a large existing population, so 
estimating recreation expenditures will become 
a matter of planning for future growth. At 
a minimum, the city should consider the 
impact that any recreation usage by newly 
annexed residents will have on existing facilities 
and programs.
COSTS: CODES ENFORCEMENT; 
ANIMAL CONTROL
If the city provides utility, building, and property 
maintenance code enforcement, those costs 
should be estimated for the newly annexed area. 
Such services can be more costly than anticipated 
because they can involve determined and extended 
enforcement activity for long periods in collective 
and individual cases. Code enforcement also can 
be difficult to initiate in the newly annexed areas 
where the surrounding county had less stringent 
laws or enforcement practices in these areas. 
The same thing is true of animal control. 
Regulatory fees in these areas often do not 
equal actual expenditures.
COSTS: SOLID WASTE COLLECTION
If the city provides either residential or commercial 
solid waste collection and has no monthly solid 
waste collection fees to pay for that service, any 
new customers will result in a net cost increase and 
a corresponding impact on the general fund budget.
puBLIC INFORMATION CAMpAIGN 
FOR AN ANNEXATION
Annexation is feared by many county residents 
just outside the city limits. For that reason, it is 
important that any city undertaking an annexation 
do its best to communicate to residents in the 
annexation area the reasons for the annexation 
and the facts supporting them. Frequently, 
misinformation or rumor about the city’s plans  
and the cost of city taxes and future services in  
the area to be annexed needs to be corrected.  
Some of the information the city should produce  
and disseminate, and methods for communicating 
it, include:
• Schedule neighborhood meetings with residents 
of the proposed area to be annexed to explain 
why the city is pursuing this annexation. Be 
prepared with facts and figures, and expect some 
difficult questions that may require additional 
research. Get back to residents when that 
research is done.
• Fire insurance rates for the residents will 
decrease when the city extends its fire coverage. 
Be prepared to estimate how much and when by 
checking with local insurance agents.
• Point out the difference in cost and service level 
for residential waste collection. Most county 
residents must either haul their garbage to  
a drop-off center or pay a company monthly to 
pick it up curbside. The city’s costs and service 
level may compare favorably.
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• If the new residents are paying “outside” city 
water and sewer rates, tell them how much they 
will save when they are city residents.
• Contrast the level of police protection they will 
receive from the city compared to what they 
receive from the county sheriff’s department. The 
city will almost always provide a significantly 
higher level of service, both in numbers of 
officers and response time.
• Discuss the value of zoning, code enforcement, 
and animal control, and be specific as to 
precisely what problems those municipal  
controls will address. 
• If city facilities, such as golf courses, meeting 
rooms, swimming pools, and parks, give use 
preferences or price breaks to city residents, 
point this out.
• Most of all, be aggressive in putting the 
correct facts about an annexation before the 
public. Consider producing fact sheets, cost 
comparisons, or other information to be mailed 
directly to every resident of the proposed 
annexation area. Use the local newspaper to 
get the city’s message out, either through 
explanatory feature articles or even through 
purchase of advertising space.
COMMON MISTAKES TO AvOID 
IN ANNEXATIONS
Most failed annexations result from poor planning by 
the city, annexing for reasons other than legitimate 
management of future growth, or procedural errors 
caused by not carefully following the requirements 
of the law. Here are a few pointers:
• Do not violate the Tennessee Open Meeting Law.
• Make sure that the city publishes public notice 
of the required hearings well in advance of the 
date required by law.
• Make sure that the map published with the 
annexation/plan of services notice is accurate. 
A mistake in describing the area to be annexed 
could doom the annexation or significantly  
delay it.
• Make a good effort to accurately compile 
and distribute the costs and benefits of an 
annexation to both your own residents and the 
residents of the proposed annexation.
• Be realistic and accurate when developing 
the plan of services. The city should not make 
promises that the city knows or suspects that  
it cannot deliver. Remember, if a court finds  
the city out of compliance with a plan of 
services, it must fulfill all the commitments it 
made in the plan of services before it can annex 
additional territory.
• The plan of services should recognize that the 
new residents, and the courts, will expect the 
city to provide services in the new annexation 
that are comparable to the services provided 
in the rest of the city. In some cases, unequal 
treatment of newly annexed residents might 
provide grounds for a court to void the plan  
of services.
• Even with an approved UGB, be conservative 
and methodical when planning annexations. 
While the city may have the authority to annex 
a large amount of territory, a person challenging 
an annexation may be able to show that the 
annexation is unreasonable or that it does not 
promote the health, safety, and welfare of the 
citizens and property. 
• The timing of an annexation can make  
a significant difference in the future revenue 
to the city from sales and beer taxes in the 
area. If the annexation can be completed four 
months before any new taxable businesses begin 
operation in the area, the city can avoid paying 
the “annexation date revenue” to the county 
for the next 15 years. [See Chapter 4, Tax and 
Revenue Implications of Annexation.]
SuGGESTED SCHEDuLE 
FOR ANNEXATION 
ANNEXATION By ORDINANCE  
This schedule is also a checklist and proposed 
schedule for making sure that the annexation 
“touches all the bases” related to annexation by 
ANNEXATION HANDBOOK • MuNICIpAL TECHNICAL ADvISORy SERvICE 13
ordinance. It is no substitute for ensuring that the 
city doing the annexation reads all of the material 
in the handbook related to the particular base 
to which the checklist points. For example, with 
respect to the first two actions below, the law 
related to the map that must accompany the notice 
of the hearing on annexation is covered in detail in 
Chapter 5, Annexation by Ordinance. With respect 
to the third action, below, the law related to the 
plan of services that is required for both annexation 
by ordinance and by referendum is covered in detail 
in Chapter 7, Plan of Services. Cross references 
in those chapters also refer the reader to any other 
chapters, or even particular provisions of chapters, 
related to those bases. The same is true of any 
other action in the Suggested Schedule for 
Annexation by Ordinance.
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ENTER SuGGESTED OR
REquIRED DATES ACTION
________________ Obtain appropriate property and topographic maps.
________________ Tour annexation areas. Determine boundaries of annexation areas. Develop accurate 
maps of the areas.
________________ Draft a plan of services.
________________ Estimate the costs of serving the annexed area based on the plan of services. 
________________ Estimate any additional revenues from the annexed area.
________________ Prepare an annexation study and report to the city council. Council reviews report, 
decides whether to proceed, determines the boundaries of the annexation, and modifies 
the plan of services as necessary.
________________ City council refers plan of services to planning commission and passes a resolution 
authorizing placing a newspaper notice of public hearing on both the annexation 
ordinance and the plan of services. The notice for the plan of services must include 
three locations where the plan can be examined.
________________ Publish the newspaper notice of public hearings on annexation and the plan of  
services. Notice for the annexation ordinance must be published at least seven days  
in advance of the hearing and must include a map that meets the requirements of  
T.C.A. § 6-51-101(3); notice for the plan of services must be published at least 15 days 
before the scheduled hearing. (Both notices can be published at the same time.) 
________________ Planning commission reports in writing to the city council on the plan of services 
(within 90 days of receipt of the plan of services, unless city council grants a longer 
time by resolution).
________________ Hold public hearing on the annexation and the plan of services (may be held together 
or separately).
 
________________ Council passes a resolution adopting the plan of services after making any changes.
________________ First reading of the annexation ordinance.
________________ Second and third readings of the annexation ordinance (if required by the  
city’s charter).
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________________ Start of the 30-day appeal period.
________________ Notify the county mayor in the county in which the annexed property is located of the 
annexation. Include a copy of the annexation ordinance and a map of the area annexed.
________________ Notify the emergency communications district of the portion of the plan of services 
dealing with emergency services, and include a map of the annexed area. The map must 
contain the information required in T.C.A. § 6-51-119. If the annexation is contested 
and the city plans to immediately begin providing emergency services in the annexed 
territory, the city must notify the emergency communications district when the 
annexation becomes final. 
________________ Last day of the 30-day appeal period. If a quo warranto suit is filed within the 30-day 
period, the annexation is suspended and the case is heard by the court according to the 
annexation law. (The city must also notify the county mayor of the city’s appeal of  
a decision in a quo warranto suit and of the outcome of litigation in a quo warranto suit 
contesting a proposed annexation.)
________________ Notify the state Department of Revenue before July 1 of the annexation and its 
boundaries so that the department can calculate the “annexation date revenue” due the 
county and reallocate local option sales tax collections accordingly after July 1.
 ________________ Notify beer wholesalers selling beer in the annexed area of the name of each beer 
retailer in the annexed area to ensure payment of wholesale beer taxes to the city 
rather than the county, per T.C.A. § 57-6-106(i).
________________ Notify franchise holders for city services and other users of formerly county roads that 
such roads are now municipal streets.
________________ Take a census of the annexed area in accordance with the regulations of the State 
Planning Office and submit the results to that office before June 1.
________________ State Planning Office checks the census figures and certifies the count to the state 
Department of Revenue for shared taxes purposes.
January 1 Annexed property is placed on the city’s tax roll on the January 1 assessment date 
following the annexation.
July 1 Date of recalculation of total Tennessee municipal population for purposes of allocating 
taxes shared on a per capita basis.
July 1 The city begins to receive its share of local option sales taxes and wholesale beer taxes 
generated in the annexed area.
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ANNEXATION By REFERENDuM
This schedule is also a checklist and proposed 
schedule for making sure that the annexation 
“touches all the bases” related to annexation by 
referendum. It is no substitute for ensuring that 
the city doing the annexation understands all of the 
material in the handbook related to the particular 
base to which the checklist points. For example, 
with respect to the first two actions below, the law 
related to the map that must accompany the notice 
of the hearing on annexation is covered in detail in 
Chapter 6, Annexation by Referendum. With respect 
to the third action, below, the law related to the 
plan of services that is required for both annexation 
by ordinance and by referendum is covered in detail 
in Chapter 7, Plan of Services. Cross references in 
those chapters also refer the reader to any other 
chapters, or even particular provisions of chapters, 
related to that base. The same is true of any other 
action herein.
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ENTER SuGGESTED OR
REquIRED DATES ACTION
________________ Obtain appropriate property and topographic maps.
________________ Tour annexation areas. Determine boundaries of annexation areas. Develop accurate 
maps of the areas.
________________ Draft a plan of services.
________________ Estimate the costs of serving the annexed area based on the plan of services. 
________________ Estimate any additional revenues from the annexed area.
________________ Prepare an annexation study and report to the city council. Council reviews report, 
decides whether to proceed, determines the boundaries of the annexation, modifies plan 
of services as necessary.
 City has the option of referring the plan of services to the planning commission. The 
planning commission must “expeditiously” make a study of the annexation and report it 
to the governing body. 
________________ Council passes a resolution authorizing a referendum on the annexation. The resolution 
must include a map of the areas proposed for annexation that meets the requirements of 
T.C.A. § 6-51-101(3) and the plan of services.
 The resolution must be posted in three locations in the city and three locations in the 
area to be annexed, and it must be published at or about the same time in a newspaper 
of general circulation, if there is one, within the city.  
________________ Within 30 to 60 days of the publication, the county election commission holds an 
election on the question for qualified voters living within the annexation area.  
A majority vote carries.
              OR
 
________________ Within 30 to 60 days of the publication, the county election commission holds an 
election on the question for qualified voters living within the annexation area and, at 
the city’s request, an election on the question for existing city residents. A majority 
vote of each group is required to carry.
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________________ After the certification of the referendum by the county election commission, notify the 
county mayor in the county in which the annexed property is located of the annexation. 
Include a copy of the annexation ordinance and a map of the area annexed.
 [The following notice requirement may apply only to annexations by ordinance. However, 
it is not a burdensome requirement and from precautionary and practical standpoints, 
should be given.] 
 Notify the emergency communications district of the portion of the plan of services 
dealing with emergency services, and include a map of the annexed area. The map must 
contain the information required in T.C.A. § 6-51-119. If the annexation is contested 
and the city plans to immediately begin providing emergency services in the annexed 
territory, the city must notify the emergency communications district when the 
annexation becomes final. 
________________ After a 30-day waiting period, the annexation is final.
 Notify the state Department of Revenue before July 1 of the annexation and its 
boundaries so that the department can calculate the “annexation date revenue” due the 
county and reallocate local option sales tax collections accordingly after July 1.
________________ Notify beer wholesalers selling beer in the annexed area of the name of each beer 
retailer in the annexed area to ensure payment of wholesale beer taxes to the city rather 
than the county, per T.C.A. § 57-6-106(i).
________________ Take a census of the annexed area in accordance with the regulations of the State 
Planning Office and submit the results to that office before June 1.
________________ State Planning Office checks the census figures and certifies the count to the state 
Department of Revenue for shared taxes purposes.
January 1 Annexed property is placed on the city’s tax roll on the January 1 assessment date 
following the annexation.
July 1 Date of recalculation of total Tennessee municipal population for purposes of allocating 
taxes shared on a per capita basis.
July 1 The city begins to receive its share of local option sales taxes and wholesale beer taxes 
generated in the annexed area.
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OFFICIALS AND AGENCIES TO NOTIFy AFTER 
EFFECTIvE DATE OF ANNEXATION
 1. Obtain a listing (names and addresses) of beer 
 wholesalers from the annexed beer retailers. All 
 wholesalers should be mailed an affidavit 
 describing the area annexed and the effective 
 date of the annexation.
 2. Send a list of the businesses (names and 
 addresses) in the newly annexed area subject 
 to the local option sales tax and notification of 
 the effective date of the annexation to:
  Director
  Sales and Use Tax Division
  Tennessee Department of Revenue
  Andrew Jackson State Office Building
  500 Deaderick Street
  Nashville, Tennessee 37242
 3. Send a certified copy of the annexation 
 ordinance and map showing streets, water 
 mains, valves, and hydrants in the newly 
 annexed area to the Insurance Services Office:
  Insurance Services Office, Inc.
  Community Mitigation Division
  4 B Eves Drive, Suite 200
  Marlton, New Jersey 08053
  (856) 985-5600, Ext. 430
 This will support the city’s expectation that 
 the city’s ISO classification will be extended to 
 the annexed properties.
 4. Send a certified copy of the annexation 
 ordinance (or resolution and referendum 
 certification) and a map to the Tennessee 
 Department of Transportation:
  Chief of Cartography
  Cartography Section
  Suite 700
  James K. Polk Building
  505 Deaderick Street
  Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0349
 5. Send a certified copy of the annexation 
 ordinance (or resolution and referendum 
 certification) to the county tax assessor. This 
 will allow the county to include the annexed 
 properties as part of the city for future 
 assessment and tax rolls. The city should check 
 to ensure that the new corporate boundary lines 
 are properly located on the county tax maps.
 6. Send a certified copy of the annexation 
 ordinance (or resolution and referendum 
 certification) and a map to the county election 
 commission. This will help the election 
 commission correct its voter registration lists.
 7. Send a certified copy of the annexation 
 ordinance (or resolution and referendum 
 certification) and a map to:
  Supervisor of Income Tax
  Tennessee Department of Revenue
  Andrew Jackson State Office Building
  500 Deaderick Street
  Nashville, Tennessee 37242
 This will ensure that the city receives its share 
 of the Hall income tax paid by annexed residents 
 who did not designate the city as their place of 
 residence on their tax returns.
 8. Notify businesses subject to the business tax 
 in the annexed area that they are now within 
 the city and must immediately pay the 
 appropriate business taxes. When the due 
 date for that type of business comes around, 
 the businesses will pay the appropriate tax on 
 sales for the portion of the tax year that they 
 have been inside the city. 
 9. Ensure that the State Local Planning Office has 
 certified the revised population count for the 
 city, including the annexed area. This 
 certification must be made before July 1 
 following the annexation for the additional 
 population to be included for state shared 
 tax purposes. 
10. Send to the appropriate emergency 
 communications district all the notices required 
 by T.C.A. § 6-51-119. Provide the district with 
 any additional information that will help it 
 change the addresses of the newly annexed 
 residents to reflect their city residences for 
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COuNTy ENTITLEMENT TO 
ANNEXATION DATE REvENuE
ENTITLEMENT LASTS 15 yEARS 
When a city annexes territory, the county is “held 
harmless” for 15 years for the loss of certain tax 
revenues that the county was receiving from the 
territory on the date of its annexation: 
• Local option sales taxes authorized by 
 T.C.A. § 67-6-702; 
• Wholesale beer taxes authorized by 
 T.C.A. § 57-3-103; and
• Income tax on dividends authorized by 
 T.C.A. § 67-2-102 (Hall income tax). 
That “annexation date revenue” continues to 
go to the county for 15 years after the date of 
the annexation. The annexing municipality 
retains any increases in these revenues generated 
in the annexed area. (Note that this does not affect 
the distribution of the first half of the local option 
sales tax, which continues to go to education 
funding.) If commercial activity in the annexed 
area decreases due to business closures or 
relocations, a city may petition the Department 
of Revenue to adjust the payments it makes to 
the county. T.C.A. § 6-51-115.
CALCuLATING “ANNEXATION DATE REvENuES”
Any business annexed into a city that produced 
either local option sales tax revenue or wholesale 
beer tax revenue is subject to the hold harmless 
provision for counties. Generally, the county is 
guaranteed the amount of taxes received in the 
12 most recent months prior to the effective date 
of the annexation, which is termed the “annexation 
date revenue.” The method of calculation varies, 
depending on how long the business has been 
paying these taxes.
• If the business paid taxes for the full 12 months 
 preceding the annexation date, then the hold 
 harmless figure is the 12-month total.
• If the business was operating for at least 
 one month but less than 12 months preceding 
 the annexation date, the county is due 12 times 
 the average monthly revenue for the months the 
 business operated.
• If a business operated for less than one month 
 before, or started operations within three 
 months after the annexation date, the county 
 is due 12 times the average of the first three full 
 months that the business operated.
• With both wholesale beer taxes and local option 
 sales taxes, the county is entitled to this annual 
 amount for 15 years following an annexation. 
 This means that for the first 15 years, the city 
 will receive only the tax receipts from the 
 annexed businesses that exceed the county’s 
 hold harmless payment, the “annexation 
 date revenue.” 
Effective July 1, 2005, when the amount of the 
local option sales tax cannot be determined from 
the sales tax returns filed by the businesses in the 
annexed area, the Tennessee Department of Revenue 
may determine the amount to be distributed for 
the term of 15 years based on the best information 
available, including information from business 
CHApTER 4
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tax returns or additional information from the 
businesses involved.
To facilitate the proper distribution of the local 
option sales tax, the city is required to notify 
the state Department of Revenue in advance 
of the effective date of any annexation. 
T.C.A. § 6-51-115(a)(2).
The county is responsible for reporting a list of 
taxpaying businesses in the annexed area to the  
Department of Revenue. T.C.A. § 6-51-115(d)(1).
The city is responsible for collecting and 
distributing the wholesale beer tax from businesses 
in the annexed area, which is collected directly by 
the city from beer distributors. The city is required 
to remit the proper amount to the county annually.
Effective July 1, 2005, the introductory paragraph 
of T.C.A. § 6-51-115(a), provides that:
Notwithstanding any provision of law 
to the contrary, except that § 67-6-716 
shall control the effective date of local 
jurisdictional boundary changes for sales and 
use tax purposes, whenever a municipality 
extends its boundaries by annexation, 
the county or counties in which the 
municipality is located shall continue to 
receive the revenue from all state and local 
taxes distributed on the bases of situs of 
collection, generated within the annexation 
area, until July 1 following the annexation 
unless the annexation takes effect on July 1. 
T.C.A. § 67-6-716 provides that with respect to sales 
and use taxes, local jurisdictional boundary changes 
“shall become effective on the first day of calendar 
quarter and no sooner than sixty-one (61) days after 
the commissioner has made a reasonable effort to 
notify dealers of the new tax change in the rate…” 
(The failure of the dealer or purchaser to receive 
notice does not relieve them of any tax obligation.)
JANuARy 1 TAX DATE IMpACT 
ON ANNEXATION TIMING
The timing of annexation is important. 
An annexation ordinance becomes operational 
30 days after its final passage in the absence 
of a lawsuit challenging the annexation. 
An annexation by referendum becomes effective 
30 days after certification of the election results.
Two dates should be kept in mind in planning 
the effective date of an annexation ordinance 
or referendum, taking into account the 30-day 
waiting period: 
1. January 1 is the assessment date for property 
 to be placed on the tax rolls, and June 30 is the 
 deadline for qualifying for state shared taxes in 
 the ensuing fiscal year.
2. The deadline for certifying a special census is 
 June 30. Time must be allowed for taking, 
 holding, and certifying that census. Failure to 
 meet this deadline will result in the loss of state 
 shared taxes for the added residents for an 
 entire year.
A city can influence the property tax impact 
on an annexation by scheduling it before or after 
the assessment date of January 1. Before that 
date, property taxes for that year will be payable 
by property owners in the annexed areas; after 
that date, property owners will not be liable for 
the property tax until the following year. If a 
lawsuit against an annexation occurs or is expected, 
the timing of the effective date of the annexation 
may be less significant. Such lawsuits are often 
characterized by many delays, which make that 
date unpredictable. But in some cases, the city’s 
agreement to a delay in the effective date of the 
annexation with its corresponding delay in when 
property taxes become due in the annexed property 
might be helpful in settling the lawsuit in the 
city’s favor.
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With respect to annexation by ordinance, cities 
apparently have the authority to fix the “operative” 
or effective date of an annexation in the ordinance. 
In Bastnagel v. Memphis, 457 S.W.2d 532 (1970), 
on October 28, 1968, the city of Memphis adopted 
an annexation ordinance on final reading. The 
ordinance fixed the day the annexation would 
actually take place as December 31, 1969. On 
December 15, 1969, the plaintiff filed a suit 
challenging the reasonableness of the annexation. 
He argued that the “operative” date of the 
annexation under T.C.A. § 6-309-310 [now 
T.C.A. § 6-51-102-103] was December 31, 1969, 
and that he had 30 days before the operative date 
to challenge the ordinance. The city argued that 
the “operative” date of the annexation date under 
those statutes was 30 days after the final passage 
of the ordinance on October 28, 1968. The court 
agreed with the city, holding that the challenge to 
the annexation had not been made within 30 days 
following October 28, 1968.
SpECIAL CENSuS AND  
STATE SHARED TAXES
SpECIAL CENSuS AFTER ANNEXATION
In the event any area is annexed to any 
municipality, the municipality may have a special 
census and in any county having a population of not 
less than 276,000 nor more than 277,000 according 
to the 1970 or any subsequent federal census, the 
municipality shall have such special census within 
the annexed area taken by the Federal Bureau of the 
Census or in a manner directed by and satisfactory 
to the Tennessee State Planning Office, in which 
case the population of such municipality shall be 
changed and revised so as to include the population 
of the annexed area as shown by the supplemental 
census. The population of the municipality as so 
changed and revised shall be its population for 
the purpose of computing the municipalities’ share 
of all funds and monies distributed by the state 
of Tennessee among the municipalities of the 
state on a population basis. The population of the 
municipality as so revised shall be used to compute 
the aggregate population of all municipalities of 
the state, effective on the first day of the next 
July following the certification of the supplemental 
census results to the commissioner of finance and 
administration. T.C.A. § 6-51-114.
STATE SHARED TAXES
The deadline of June 30 to certify a special census 
of an annexed area in order to secure state shared 
taxes during the ensuing fiscal year (July 1 to 
June 30) has already been mentioned. After an 
annexation is finally effective, a city should make 
certain that certification is made on time. If time 
is short, the census could be taken before the final 
effective date so that the results will be available 
for certification immediately thereafter.
Two agencies can certify a special census: the 
Federal Bureau of the Census and the Local Planning 
Assistance Office of the Tennessee Department  
of Economic and Community Development. The 
former will assume full responsibility for supervising 
and conducting the census, but the request  
usually must be submitted well in advance of  
the desired completion date. Full information  
and an estimate of costs must be obtained from  
the Director of the Census, Department of Commerce, 
Washington, DC 20333. Upon completion, the  
city should make certain that a copy of the results  
is sent to the Local Planning Assistance Office of  
the Tennessee Department of Economic and 
Community Development.
Under the other method a city must arrange to 
take the census with its own forces or personnel 
employed locally in the manner prescribed by the 
Local Planning Assistance Office. After completion, 
the staff of that office will spot check the census 
then certify the results to the state. Instructions 
and an estimate of costs may be obtained from 
the Local Planning Assistance Office, Department 
of Economic and Community Development, 
312 Eighth Avenue North, 10th Floor, 
Nashville, Tennessee 37243.
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GENERALLy 
Within their UGBs cities may annex territory  
by either of the methods contained in 
T.C.A. Title 6, Chapter 51: ordinance and 
referendum. Until January 6, 2006, cities could 
annex territory outside their UGBs by referendum.  
T.C.A. §§ 6-51-101–114. But Public Acts 2005, 
Chapter 246, amended T.C.A. § 6-58-111 to  
give each municipality the exclusive authority  
to annex territory within its UGB and effective 
January 6, 2006, prohibited municipalities from 
annexing territory outside their UGBs except  
in PGAs and RAs. [See Chapter 6, Annexation  
by Referendum.]
Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101, made some changes 
to annexation law that were applicable only 
before the adoption of each county’s countywide 
growth plan. The following discussion omits those 
temporary provisions because growth plans have 
been adopted by all but one county.
For arguments for and against annexation, common 
mistakes to avoid in annexations, suggested 
annexation schedules, etc., see Chapter 3, The Right 
Annexation Done Right.
NOTICE REquIREMENTS 
pRE-ANNEXATION puBLIC NOTICE 
Notice of the annexation, which describes the 
property to be annexed, must be given in the case 
of annexation by ordinance [and by referendum]. 
T.C.A. § 6-51-101, provides that:
“Notice” means publication in a newspaper 
of general circulation in the municipality at 
least seven (7) days in advance of hearing. The 
notice, whether by ordinance as stipulated in 
§ 6-51-102(a)(1) and (b) or by referendum as 
stipulated in § 6-51-104(b), shall be satisfied 
by inclusion of a map which includes a general 
delineation of the area or areas to be annexed 
by use of official road names and/or numbers, 
names of lakes and waterways, or other 
identifiable landmarks, as appropriate.
NOTICE TO COuNTy MAyOR OF ANNEXATION
Public Acts 2005, Chapter 411, amended  
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a)(1) by providing that during 
the 30-day period following final passage of the 
annexation ordinance during which the ordinance 
is not operative, the municipality must notify 
the county mayor in whose county the territory 
being annexed is located of the annexation. The 
notification must include a copy of the annexation 
ordinance and a map of the area being annexed.
NOTICE TO EMERGENCy  
COMMuNICATIONS DISTRICTS
Public Acts 2005, Chapter 411, amends  
T.C.A. § 6-51-119(a) by requiring that upon the 
final passage of an annexation ordinance the 
legislative body of the annexing municipality must 
provide to any affected emergency communications 
district a copy of the portion of the plan of services 




2For a sample resolution for a public hearing on an annexation by ordinance, see Appendix B. For a sample annexation ordinance, see Appendix C.
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map designating the annexed area. The map must 
identify all public and private streets, including 
street names and direction indicators, in the 
annexed area. The map must also include or have 
appended a list of address ranges for each street 
in the annexed area. For contested annexation 
ordinances, in cases in which the municipality 
plans to begin providing emergency services in the 
annexed territory immediately, the municipality 
must notify the emergency communications district 
when the annexation becomes final.
Both Public Acts 2005, Chapter 411, and Public Acts 
2005, Chapter 24, create a new Section 6-51-119, 
which provides that compliance or noncompliance 
with this provision is not admissible against the 
municipality in any case brought under T.C.A. Title 6 
[presumably Chapter 51, which governs annexation 
and challenges to annexation], Title 29, Chapter 14 
[the Declaratory Judgments Act, under which 
challenges against annexations upon grounds other 
than the reasonableness of the annexation would 
be brought], or against the municipality or any 
affected emergency communications district under 
T.C.A., Title 29, Chapter 20 [the Tennessee Tort 
Liability Act].
NOTICE TO COuNTy MAyOR OF LAWSuITS  
AND FINAL JuDGMENTS 
Public Acts 2005, Chapter 411, also amends 
T.C.A. § 6-51-103 by requiring the municipality  
to notify the county mayor of:
• The municipality’s appeal of a decision in 
 a quo warranto suit; and
• The outcome of litigation in a quo warranto
 suit contesting a proposed annexation.
Note that this statute does not require notice to the 
county mayor of appeals and outcomes of non-quo 
warranto annexation suits.
Similar notice provisions apply to the plan of 
services. [See Chapter 7, Plan of Services.]
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS IN  
ANNEXED TERRITORy
Residents of an annexed area must be accorded 
all the “rights and privileges of citizenship, in 
accordance with the provisions of the annexing 
municipality’s charter, immediately upon annexation 
as though such annexed territory had always been  
a part of the annexing municipality. It is the duty  
of the governing body to put into effect with 
respect to the annexed area any charter provisions 
relating to representation on the governing body.” 
T.C.A. § 6-51-108(a). 
In City of Knoxville v. Graves, 341 S.W.2d 718 (1960), 
an annexation ordinance was attacked because it 
did not contain any provision for implementing 
this requirement. The court could find nothing in 
the statute to warrant a construction “that the 
ordinance must contain, as a condition precedent 
to its validity, a provision setting up such rights,” 
and concluded that “it is enough if the rights of the 
citizens of that area are provided for by ordinance, 
as may be done, when the annexation becomes 
effective. Certainly we cannot declare the ordinance 
void on the assumption that the City Council will 
not do their duty. The presumption is that they 
will do it.” [At 720.] The court reiterated its view 
on this point in Hardison v. City of Columbia, 
360 S.W.2d 39 (1962), and Maury County  
Farmers Co-op Corp. v. City of Columbia,  
362 S.W.2d 219 (1962). In Cope v. Mayor of 
Morristown, 404 S.W.2d 798 (1966), the court 
refused to invalidate an annexation ordinance  
based on the ground that the city’s governing  
body would be powerless to change wards 
established by private act of the General Assembly 
for election of its members.
ANNEXATION By ORDINANCE  
WITHIN THE uGB
GENERALLy 
Cities in Tennessee may, upon their own initiative 
or when petitioned by a majority of the residents 
and property owners in an area, annex territory 
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by ordinance within their UGBs. Passage of an 
annexation ordinance must be preceded by  
a seven-day advance notice of a public hearing.  
The actual schedule for final passage will depend  
on the requirements for preparation and 
consideration of a plan of services for the annexed 
territory that are outlined in Chapter 7, Plan of 
Services. The ordinance does not take effect until  
30 days after its final passage. T.C.A. § 6-51-102. 
ANNEXATION By A CITy IN MORE THAN  
ONE COuNTy T.C.A. § 6-58-108(E) 
A city may annex by ordinance upon its own 
initiative only territory within the county in  
which the city hall is located. There are three  
main exceptions:
• A municipality located in two or more counties 
as of November 25, 1997, may annex in all 
such counties unless the percentage of the city 
population residing in the county or counties 
other than the one in which the city hall is 
located is less than 7 percent of the total 
population of the municipality; or
• A municipality may annex in the second county 
if the legislative body of the county in which 
the territory proposed for annexation is located 
approves the annexation by resolution; or
• The city may annex in any county in which, 
on January 1, 1998, it provided sanitary sewer 
service to 100 or more residential and/or 
commercial customers.
These restrictions do not apply to annexation by 
referendum. Any annexation must also conform to 
the provisions of the growth plans in both counties.
ANNEXATION OF “SuBSTANTIAL”  
INDuSTRIAL pROpERTy 
T.C.A. § 6-51-103(f), provides that:
Should the territory hereafter sought to be 
annexed be the site of substantial industrial 
plant development, a fact to be ascertained by 
the court, the municipality shall have the burden 
of proving that the annexation of the site...is 
not unreasonable in consideration of the factors 
above mentioned, including the necessity for or 
use of municipal services by the industrial plant 
or plants, and the present ability and intent 
of the municipality to benefit the industrial 
plant development by rendering municipal 
services thereto when and as needed. The policy 
and purpose of this provision is to prevent 
the annexation of industrial plants for the 
sole purpose of increasing municipal revenue, 
without the ability and intent to benefit the 
areas annexed by rendering municipal services, 
when and as needed, and when such services are 
not used or required by the industrial plants.
 
City of Kingsport v. State ex rel. Crown Enterprises, 
Inc., 562 S.W.2d 808 (Tenn. 1978), declared that 
T.C.A. § 6-51-103(e) applied only when an industrial 
site was being annexed by a city; it did not apply 
to an 85-acre industrial site that was part of the 
annexation of 806 acres. 
TRIAL AND BuRDEN OF pROOF
CHALLENGES BASED ON “REASONABLENESS” 
OF THE ANNEXATION ORDINANCE
The following rules govern quo warranto challenges 
to the reasonableness of annexations by ordinance 
within the UGB, under T.C.A. § 6-51-103:
• Jury trial generally: Chancellor or circuit court
 judge without a jury tries cases.
• Burden of proof generally: Burden is on the
 plaintiff to prove:
 o That the annexation is “…unreasonable for
  the overall well-being of the communities
  involved,” or 
 o That “the health, safety, and welfare of the
  citizens and property owners of the
  municipality and [the annexed] territory will
  not be materially retarded in the absence of
  such annexation.” T.C.A. § 6-58-111.
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Presumably, T.C.A. § 6-58-111, by implication, re-
peals the provisions of T.C.A. §§ 6-51-103(a)(1)(A), 
6-51-103(c) and 6-51-103(e), which put the burden 
of proving an annexation ordinance reasonable on 
the city.
The question is whether the burdens of proof 
contained in T.C.A. § 6-58-111 are alternative ones 
has been addressed in State ex rel. Tipton v. City 
of Knoxville, No. E2004-10359-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. 
Ct. App. filed January 17, 2006). There the city 
attempted to annex a single piece of commercial 
property that was already surrounded by the city 
(a hole in the donut). The annexation would 
have taken in the hole. The trial court conceded 
that “there was no evidence presented by the 
plaintiffs to establish the annexation ordinance 
is unreasonable for the overall well-being of the 
communities involved,” and that, “In fact, given 
the circumstances the court is of the opinion 
that proving such would be an almost impossible 
burden.” [At 4.] But the trial court accepted 
the plaintiff’s argument that T.C.A. § 6-58-111 
contained separate and alternative burdens of 
proof and that the plaintiffs must satisfy only 
one of those burdens.
With respect to the second burden—that “the 
health, safety, and welfare of the citizens and 
property owners of the municipality and [the 
annexed] territory will not be materially retarded 
in the absence of such annexation”—the trial 
court declared:
The proof showed that this property has been 
surrounded by the City for over a decade. The 
proof showed that most, if not all, of the 
services that the City of Knoxville could provide 
are already being provided either through 
Knoxville Utilities Board, Rural-Metro Fire 
department, Knox County, or private services 
contracted by plaintiff. The City put on proof 
to establish that in some instances the services 
offered by the City might be better than those 
offered by the County or those which could be 
contracted by the plaintiffs. Additionally, the 
City did establish that in the case of dispatching 
fire or police protection to the property at issue 
or surrounding properties, it might be more 
convenient if this particular parcel were a part 
of the city. [At 3.] 
The trial court concluded that the plaintiffs had 
proved that the health, safety and welfare of the 
citizens and property owners of the municipality 
and “territory” would not be materially retarded 
if the property were not annexed.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals overturned the 
trial court and upheld the city’s annexation of 
the territory in question, concluding that the 
plaintiff had not carried the burden of proof that 
the “health, safety, and welfare of the citizens and 
property owners of the municipality and territory 
will not be materially retarded in the absence of 
such annexation.” It reasoned that:
 
1.  The “or” in the alternative burden of proof set 
forth in T.C.A. § 6-58-111 was not ambiguous, 
that it was intended by the General Assembly to 
actually reflect alternative burdens of proof, and 
that a person contesting an annexation could 
win the contest by carrying only one of the 
alternative burdens of proof.
2. Whether annexation is materially beneficial to 
the affected territory depends not only upon 
what services the municipality will provide 
after annexation but also upon the services the 
municipality already provides to the affected 
territory. The fact that an affected territory 
already receives municipal services demonstrates 
that the affected territory benefits from those 
services and that the welfare of the property 
owners in the affected territory is enhanced 
by those services. [Emphasis is mine.] Bowevil 
Express, LLC v. City of Henderson, No. W1999-
02137-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 204211, at 5 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 2001; see also Cox v. City of Jackson, 
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No. 01A01-9701-CH-00001, 1997 WL 777078, 
 at 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). [At 7.] 
3. The territory will receive improved services after 
the annexation.
4.  “After annexation, the city would be able to 
guarantee harmonious land uses throughout 
the area surrounding the Territory. In addition, 
the city will be able to better respond to 
emergencies in that area. Based on these facts, 
the preponderance of the evidence establishes 
that the City would materially benefit from  
the annexation.
In summary, said the court:
...the preponderance of the evidence shows 
that (1) the Territory currently, materially 
benefits from services provided by the City, 
(2) the Territory would materially benefit from 
the additional post-annexation services which 
the City would provide, and (3) the City will 
materially benefit from the annexation. If the 
Territory and the City will materially benefit from 
the annexation, then it follows that the failure 
to annex the Territory would materially retard the 
health, safety, and welfare of the citizens and 
property owners of the City and Territory.  
See State ex rel. Wood v. City of Memphis,  
510 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tenn. 1974); Mulrooney 
v. Town of Collierville, No. W1999-04474-COA-
Re-CV, 2000 WL 34411151, at 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2000…) [At 9-10.]
The facts in State v. Tipton are peculiar, involving 
a large Tennessee city entirely surrounding a small 
piece of property on a busy highway running 
through it. But a positive side of this case is that 
it stands for the general proposition that where 
a municipality already provides a wide range of 
services to territory proposed for annexation, the 
plaintiff will not be able to successfully argue that 
the health, safety and welfare of the territory will 
not be retarded if it is not annexed because it does 
not need municipal services. It also points to the 
proposition that annexations that clearly materially 
benefit both the city and the territory proposed for 
annexation would strengthen a city’s hand in an 
annexation contest.
Public Acts 2005, Chapter 278, gave the Tennessee 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations the duty to conduct a study of, among 
other things: “(1) quo warranto judicial proceedings 
to challenge annexation. The commission shall 
specifically examine issues related to the burden of 
proof and shall also report on the impact of changes 
to the process made by 1998 Public Chapter 1101, 
by February 1, 2006.” 
CHALLENGES TO THE ORDINANCE BASED  
ON CONSTITuTIONAL AND OTHER GROuNDS
Under State ex rel. Earhart v. City of Bristol,  
970 S.W.2d 948 (Tenn. 1998), it appears that suits 
challenging the constitutionality or validity (not 
reasonableness) of annexation ordinances can 
be brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act 
found in T.C.A. §§ 29-14-101 et seq. Chapter 11, 
“Problem” Annexations, points out that it is not 
clear whether Earhart is limited only to cases 
involving annexations that do not take in people, 
private property or commercial activity. But in 
all events, under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 
“When a proceeding under this chapter involves 
the determination of an issue of fact, such issue 
may be tried and determined in the same manner 
as issues of fact are tried and determined in other 
civil actions...” T.C.A. § 29-14-108. That provision 
obviously includes jury trials on issues of fact in 
annexation cases involving challenges on grounds 
other than the reasonableness of an annexation 
under T.C.A. §§ 6-58-111 and 6-51-103. Rule 57  
of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, also 
provides that:
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory 
judgment pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann.  
§ 29-14-101 et seq. shall be in accordance with 
this rule, and the right to a trial by jury may 
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be demanded under the circumstances and in 
the manner provided in Rules 38 and 39 [which 
govern the right and demand for a jury trial by 
either party]. 
However, it is said in Goodwin v. Metropolitan 
Board of Health, 656 S.W.2d 383 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1983), that “Ideally and ordinarily a declaratory 
judgment suit does not invoke disputed issues of 
fact. Although the court has the authority to settle 
disputed issues of fact in Declaratory Judgment 
matters, such settlement is ordinarily left to other 
forums.” Hinchman v. City Water Company, (1943) 
179 Tenn. 545, 167 S.W.2d 986.” At 387. 
Earhart did not involve a question of fact. There 
the court declared that even though the trial 
courts have great discretion in issuing declaratory 
judgments, it erred in not issuing one in this case, 
reasoning that:
This question does not concern disputed facts or 
the delay of another cause of action… In the 
case before the court, a declaratory judgment 
would “terminate” the controversy. Where there 
is presented a significant issue that needs 
resolving, as in this case, refusing to issue  
a declaratory judgment cannot be excused on 
the basis of discretion. This case involves an 
important issue of law which affects the growth 
of cities throughout this state and which needs 
to be resolved… [At 955.] [Emphasis is mine.]
But suppose Earhart had involved a question 
of fact on whether the annexation in question 
actually had taken in people, private property, 
or commercial activity? It might also be possible 
for other questions of fact to arise in annexation 
cases brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act 
on grounds other than the reasonableness of the 
annexation ordinance. In either case, one of the 
parties might demand that the question or questions 
be resolved by a jury.
WHO MAy CHALLENGE ANNEXATIONS 
By ORDINANCE?
“AGGRIEvED OWNERS OF pROpERTy” 
Under T.C.A. § 6-51-103(a)(1)(A) any “aggrieved 
owners of property” that borders on or lies within 
the territory annexed have 30 days to challenge  
an annexation.
Notwithstanding the statutory language that gives 
abutting landowners the right to challenge an 
annexation, State ex. rel. Cordova Areas Residents for 
the Environment v. City of Memphis, 862 S.W.2d 525  
(Tenn. App.1992), held that part of the statute 
unconstitutional. For that reason, only the owners 
of property that lies within the territory proposed 
for annexation have standing to challenge  
the annexation.
An aggrieved owner of property challenging  
an annexation loses his cause of action upon  
his transfer of ownership of the property.  
McNamee v. City of Knoxville, 824 S.W.2d 550  
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
 
A county that owned a mere easement in county 
roads in the territory sought to be annexed was 
not an “aggrieved owner of property” within the 
meaning of T.C.A. § 6-51-103(a)(2)(A), held  
State ex rel. Kessel v. Ashe, 888 S.W.2d 430  
(Tenn. 1994). In that case, the county admitted 
that it did not own the fee to its roads. The court 
distinguished Spoone v. Mayor of Morristown,  
431 S.W.2d 827 (1968), in which the court had 
earlier held that a county that owned the roads 
and a school in the area proposed for annexation 
was an aggrieved owner of property. The county’s 
interest in the roads in that case was not clear, and 
the question was whether a legal person as well 
as a natural person could qualify as an “owner” of 
property under T.C.A. § 6-51-103(a)(2)(A). 
ANNEXATION HANDBOOK • MuNICIpAL TECHNICAL ADvISORy SERvICE 31
TIME FOR CHALLENGING 
ANNEXATIONS By ORDINANCE
Quo WArrAnto CHALLENGES 
An annexation ordinance becomes effective 30 days 
after its final passage. T.C.A. § 67-51-102(a)(1). 
An “aggrieved owner of property” lying within the 
annexed territory can, prior to the operative date  
of the annexation, file a quo warranto suit to  
contest the reasonableness of the annexation in 
accordance with T.C.A. Title 51, Chapter 51, Part 1, 
T.C.A. § 6-51-301 and T.C.A., Title 29, Chapter 35. 
T.C.A. § 6-51-103. 
After 30 days have passed, a quo warranto suit 
against the annexation is not subject to judicial 
review and cannot be filed. Bastnagel v. Memphis, 
457 S.W.2d 532 (1970); City of Oak Ridge  
v. Roane County, 563 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. 1978).  
In the unreported case of Coleman v. City of 
Memphis, 2001 WL 1381277 (Tenn. Ct. App.),  
the court also held that a quo warranto suit filed 
by the plaintiff was not filed within 30 days when 
on August 1, 1995, the city council passed the 
annexation ordinance on third and final reading; 
on August 15, 1995, a motion to reconsider the 
ordinance passed; on August 29, 1995, the plaintiffs 
filed a quo warranto suit to which they attached 
the annexation ordinance adopted by the city on 
August 1, 1995. The ordinance underwent significant 
changes between August 15 and the date of its 
final passage on September 19, 1995. “For this 
reason,” concluded the court, “it is apparent that 
when Plaintiffs filed their suit on August 29, 1995, 
they were not ‘aggrieved property owners’ as the 
ordinance was still being debated and amended 
throughout the city’s legislative process.” [At 5.]
The right to commence a new action within one  
year from the date of a voluntary nonsuit under 
T.C.A. § 28-1-105 does not apply to quo warranto 
suits against annexation ordinances. Brent v. Town 
of Greeneville, 309 S.W.2d 121 (1958).
CHALLENGES ON OTHER GROuNDS
Constitutional and apparently other challenges 
based on grounds other than the reasonableness 
of the annexation ordinance are not subject to the 
30-day limit contained in T.C.A. § 6-51-1102(a)(1). 
State ex rel. Earhart v. City of Bristol, 970 S.W.2d 948 
(Tenn. 1998). For an analysis of Earhart and other 
cases that have interpreted that case, see Chapter 
11, “Problem” Annexations.
LAWSuIT vENuE
A suit contesting an annexation of territory 
in a county other than the one in which the 
municipality’s city hall is located shall be filed 
in the county where the city hall is located. The 
chancellor must then change the venue to a county 
adjacent to either the county where the city hall is 
located or the county where the proposed annexed 
territory is located. T.C.A. § 6 51 103(g).
MAXIMuM ANNEXATION 
WITHIN 24 MONTHS
Cities having a population of more than 10,000 
according to the 1970 or any later federal census 
cannot by means of annexation by ordinance  
upon its own initiative increase its land area  
more than 25 percent during any 24-month 
period. T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a)(3)(A). There are two 
“population bracket” exceptions:
• Cities with a population of less than 12,000
 according to the 1980 or later federal census 
 where the city has a private act rather than  
 a general law charter; and
• Cities in any county having a population 
 (according to the 1980 or later federal 
 census) of: 
 o Not less than 34,100 nor more than 24, 200;
 o Not less than 37,000 nor more than 37,100; 
  or
 o Not less than 49,400 nor more than 49,500. 
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For an analysis of the validity of these and other 
population bracket provisions of the annexation law, 
see Chapter 8, “Population Brackets” Contained in 
the Annexation Law.
 
ABANDONMENT AND REpEAL 
OF ANNEXATION pROCEEDINGS
T.C.A. § 6-51-106 provides that “Any annexation 
proceedings initiated under § 6-51-102 or 
§ 6-51-104 may be abandoned and discontinued 
at any time by resolution of the governing body 
of the municipality.” This statute applies only where 
the annexation has been “initiated” but not finally 
passed. However, an annexation ordinance finally 
passed can be repealed even after it has been 
challenged, provided the repeal has been done by 
ordinance (not by motion or resolution). The repeal 
of an annexation ordinance renders the ordinance 
moot. Lee v. City of Chattanooga, 500 S.W.2d 917 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 
(1974); City of Bluff City v. Morrell, 764 S.W.2d 200 
(Tenn. 1988); Schaltenbrand v. City of Knoxville, 
788 S.W.2d 812 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
LIMITATION ON FuTuRE ANNEXATION 
IF ANNEXATION ORDINANCE 
HELD uNREASONABLE
If the court finds that the annexation ordinance 
is unreasonable or has been done by the exercise 
of powers not conferred by law it “shall” issue an 
order vacating the ordinance, and the city shall be 
prohibited from annexing any part of the territory 
proposed for annexation by the vacated ordinance 
for a period of at least 24 months following the 
date of the order. If the court finds the ordinance 
reasonable, it is operative 31 days after the 
judgment unless an appeal has been taken. A similar 
rule applies to judgments on the appeal of the 
annexation ordinance, except that if the ordinance 
is upheld it is operative “forthwith by court order.” 
T.C.A. § 6-51-103(c). In the unreported case of 
Cathey v. City of Dickson, 2002 WL 970429 (Tenn. 
Ct. App.), it was held that the 24-month ban does 
not apply to annexation ordinances that have been 
repealed; the repeal does not reflect an admission 
by the city that the ordinance was unreasonable.
pLAN OF SERvICES
A city annexing territory by ordinance or, after 
January 1, 2006, by referendum, must adopt 
a plan of services that outlines the services to 
be provided in the territory proposed for annexation 
and the timing of those services. [See Chapter 7, 
Plan of Services.] 
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ANNEXATION By REFERENDuM 
By CITy WITHIN ITS uGB
GENERALLy
Cities also are entitled to annex by referendum 
under T.C.A. §§ 6-51-104 and 105. The referendum 
process begins when a petition of interested persons 
is presented to the city council, or when the council 
on its own initiative decides to proceed without  
a petition. A resolution is prepared and adopted by 
the city governing body that defines the area to be 
annexed and calls for a referendum.
The adopted resolution then must be posted in at 
least three public places in the proposed annexed 
area and in three places in the existing city, and it 
must “at about the same time” be published in the 
local newspaper of general circulation (if there is 
one) in both the territory proposed for annexation 
and in the city.
Between 30 and 60 days after the resolution’s 
posting and publication, a referendum of the voters 
who live in the area proposed for annexation is 
held by the county election commission. At its 
own option, the city may also have the referendum 
include all voters within the existing city.
The city is not required to initiate any annexation 
by referendum. The city may, at any time, proceed 
with an annexation by ordinance of any area 
that the city has been petitioned to annex by 
referendum, assuming all the requirements of 
annexation law and the growth policy law are met.
If the annexation receives a majority vote of the 
residents of the proposed area or, if submitted to 
the city’s voters a majority of those votes as well, 
the annexation is approved and takes effect 30 days 
after the election commission certifies the results.
However, if there are no residents in the territory, 
annexation must be made by ordinance.
NOTICE REquIREMENTS 
puBLIC NOTICE BEFORE ANNEXATION
Notice of the annexation, which describes the 
property to be annexed, must be given in the case 
of annexation by ordinance and by referendum. 
T.C.A. § 6-51-101, provides that:
“Notice” means publication in a newspaper 
of general circulation in the municipality at 
least seven (7) days in advance of hearing. The 
notice, whether by ordinance as stipulated in 
§ 6-51-102(a)(1) and (b) or by referendum as 
stipulated in § 6-51-104(b), shall be satisfied 
by inclusion of a map which includes a general 
delineation of the area or areas to be annexed 
by use of official road names and/or numbers, 
names of lakes and waterways, or other 
identifiable landmarks, as appropriate.
T.C.A. § 6-51-104 also provides that the resolution 
[calling for an annexation referendum] that 
describes the territory proposed to be annexed shall 
be published in:
• Three public places in the territory proposed 




3For a sample resolution for a call for a referendum on annexation, see Appendix D.
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• Three public places in the city proposing the 
 annexation; and 
• A newspaper of general circulation (if there is 
 one) in the territory proposed for annexation 
 and in the city proposing the annexation. 
The same statute provides that the notice must 
include a plan of services, which “shall address 
the same services and timing of services as 
required in T.C.A. § 6-51-101” [which contains 
the requirements for the content of the plan of 
services in annexations by ordinance]. [See 
Chapter 7, Plan of Services.]
NOTICE TO COuNTy MAyOR 
OF ANNEXATION RESOLuTION 
Public Acts 2005, Chapter 411, requires that the 
resolution calling for an annexation referendum 
[which includes the plan of services] be forwarded 
to the county mayor in whose county the territory 
being annexed is located.
NOTICE TO COuNTy MAyOR 
OF ANNEXATION CERTIFICATION 
Public Acts 2005, Chapter 411, amends 
T.C.A. § 6-51-105(d) [annexation by referendum] 
by requiring the municipality, upon receiving the 
certification from the election commission, to 
forward a copy of the certification to the county 
mayor in whose county the territory being annexed 
is located.
NOTICE TO EMERGENCy 
COMMuNICATIONS DISTRICTS
Public Acts 2005, Chapter 411, amends 
T.C.A. § 6-51-119(a) by requiring that the 
legislative body of the annexing municipality, 
upon the final passage of an annexation ordinance, 
provide to any affected emergency communications 
district a copy of the portion of the plan of services 
dealing with emergency services and a detailed map 
designating the annexed area, which must contain 
certain information. In the case of contested 
annexation ordinances where the city plans to 
begin providing emergency services in the annexed 
territory immediately, the municipality must notify 
the emergency communications district when the 
annexation becomes final. [See the Notice Provisions 
contained in Chapter 5, Annexation by Ordinance.] 
Arguably, this notice provision does not apply 
to annexation by referendum. However, it would 
be a legally and practically wise policy for any 
municipality annexing territory by referendum to 
comply with this notice provision.
EFFECT OF FAILuRE TO NOTIFy EMERGENCy 
COMMuNICATIONS DISTRICTS 
Both Public Acts 2005, Chapter 411, and Public Acts 
2005, Chapter 24, create a new Section 6-51-119, 
which provides that compliance or noncompliance 
with this provision is not admissible against the 
municipality in any case brought under T.C.A., 
Title 6 [presumably Chapter 51, which governs 
annexation and challenges to annexation], Title 29, 
Chapter 14 [the Declaratory Judgments Act, under 
which challenges against annexations upon grounds 
other than the reasonableness of the annexation 
would be brought], or against the municipality or 
any affected emergency communications district 
under T.C.A., Title 29, Chapter 20 [the Tennessee 
Tort Liability Act].
pLAN OF SERvICE REquIRED 
Public Acts 2005, Chapter 411, amended 
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b)(1), to require that the 
governing body adopt a plan of services for the 
territory to be annexed by referendum. It is not 
clear whether that act requires the plan of services 
to meet all the conditions that apply to plans of 
services in territory annexed by ordinance. This 
question is analyzed in Chapter 7, Plan of Services.
Public Acts 2005, Chapter 411, requires the 
annexation resolution [which must include the plan 
of services] to be sent to the county mayor before 
the annexation. [See Chapter 7, Plan of Services.] 
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CHALLENGING ANNEXATIONS 
By REFERENDuM
Tennessee’s annexation law makes no provision 
for court review of an annexation accomplished 
by referendum. It is said in Vicars v. Kingsport, 
659 S.W.2d 367 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), that absent 
some claim of constitutional infirmities in the 
annexation, it is not subject to judicial review and 
that no equal protection or due process argument 
can be made when the statute is properly followed. 
The court also said that adjusting the boundaries 
of the territory proposed for annexation to help 
the annexation receive a favorable vote in the 
referendum was not a constitutional infirmity. 
[Also see State ex rel. Smith v. Town of Church Hill, 
828 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).] Those cases 
make annexation by referendum a good alternative 
to annexation by ordinance whenever possible. 
However, the Tennessee Supreme Court in 
Committee To Oppose Annexation v. City of Alcoa, 
881 S.W.2d 269 (Tenn. 1994), limited the extent 
to which a city could adjust the boundaries of 
the territory to help ensure a favorable vote 
in the referendum. Under T.C.A. § 6-51-104(a) 
the “qualified voters who reside in the territory 
proposed for annexation” are entitled to vote in the 
referendum. The court held that “residency” within 
the meaning of that statute was not restricted to 
those whose dwelling houses were located on the 
property proposed for annexation but to those 
whose curtilage extended into that property. The 
difference was an undetermined, but undoubtedly 
significant, number of voters qualified to vote in 
the referendum.
ANNEXATION By REFERENDuM 
OuTSIDE THE CITy’S uGB 
GENERALLy pROHIBITED
Before January 1, 2006, a city could annex territory 
outside its UGB in either of two ways:
1. By obtaining approval of an amendment to its 
 UGB in the same way that the original growth 
 plan was established; or
2. By referendum under T.C.A. §§ 6-51-104 and 
 105. T.C.A. section 6-51-111(d).
Public Acts 2005, Chapter 246, amended 
T.C.A. § 6-58-111, by giving each municipality 
the exclusive authority to annex territory within 
its UGB and prohibited municipalities from annexing 
territory outside their UGBs by referendum except 
in PGAs and RAs. That act became effective 
January 1, 2006. 
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 
IN ANNEXED TERRITORy
Residents of an annexed area must be accorded 
all the “rights and privileges of citizenship, in 
accordance with the provisions of the annexing 
municipality’s charter, immediately upon annexation 
as though such annexed territory had always been 
a part of the annexing municipality. It is the duty 
of the governing body to put into effect with 
respect to the annexed area any charter provisions 
relating to representation on the governing body.” 
T.C.A. § 6-51-108(a).
 
In City of Knoxville v. Graves, 341 S.W.2d 718 (1960), 
an annexation ordinance was attacked because it 
did not contain any provision for implementing 
this requirement. The court could find nothing in 
the statute to warrant a construction “that the 
ordinance must contain, as a condition precedent 
to its validity, a provision setting up such rights” 
and concluded that “it is enough if the rights of the 
citizens of that area are provided for by ordinance, 
as may be done, when the annexation becomes 
effective. Certainly we cannot declare the ordinance 
void on the assumption that the City Council will 
not do their duty. The presumption is that they will 
do it.” [At 720.] The court reiterated its view on 
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this point in Hardison v. City of Columbia, 
360 S.W.2d 39 (1962), and Maury County Farmers 
Co-op Corp. v. City of Columbia, 362 S.W.2d 219 
(1962). In Cope v. Mayor of Morristown, 
404 S.W.2d 798 (1966), the court refused to 
invalidate an annexation ordinance based on 
the ground that the city’s governing body would 
be powerless to change wards established by 
private act of the General Assembly for election 
of its members.
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ANNEXATION By ORDINANCE
pLAN OF SERvICE REquIRED
Under Chapter 1101, a city annexing territory 
by ordinance is required to adopt a plan of 
services that outlines the services to be provided 
to the annexed area and the timing of those 
services. (Public Acts 2005, Chapter 411, amended 
T.C.A. § 6-51-104(b) to require that a plan of 
services be adopted for annexations by referendum.) 
[See Chapter 6, Annexation by Referendum.]
EFFECTIvE DATE OF pLAN 
OF SERvICES REquIREMENT
For an annexation ordinance that was not final on 
November 25, 1997, where the city had not prepared 
a plan of services, it had 60 days to prepare 
one. Chapter 1101, § 20; T.C.A. 6-51102(a)(2). 
Presumably, such a plan of services must have met 
the same reasonableness standard as to the scope 
and implementation schedule as prescribed by 
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b) for annexations accomplished 
by cities after the effective date of Chapter 1101 
(May 19, 1998). [See Plan of Services Must Be 
Reasonable, immediately below.]
pLAN OF SERvICES MuST BE REASONABLE 
Under T.C.A. § 6-51-102 [annexation by ordinance] 
the plan of services must be “reasonable” with 
respect to both the scope of services and to the 
implementation schedule. The implementation 
schedule must provide for delivery of services in the 
new territory that are comparable to those provided 
to all citizens of the city. The plan must address the 
following services, whether or not the city currently 
provides those services:
• Police and fire protection; 
• Water, electrical, and sanitary services;
• Road and street construction and repair;
• Recreational facilities and programs;
• Street lighting; and
• Zoning services.
If the annexing municipality maintains a separate 
school system, the plan of services must also include 
“schools and provisions specifically addressing the 
impact, if any, of annexation on school attendance 
zones.” If the annexing municipality does not 
maintain a separate school system, it must provide 
written notice of the annexation to the affected 
schools systems as soon as practicable, but in  
no event not less than 30 days prior to the  
15-day public notice of the hearing on the plan  
of services required by T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b)(4). 
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b)(2). [See Public Notice and 
Hearing on Plan of Services.]
The plan may exclude services that are provided 
by another public or private agency other than 
those services provided by the county. The city may 
include services in addition to those required to be 
addressed. T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b).
SuBMISSION OF pLAN OF SERvICES 
TO pLANNING COMMISSION
Before its adoption, the plan of services must be 
submitted to the planning commission (if the city 
has one), which must issue a written report on it 
within 90 days. T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b)(4). (The  
90-day deadline can be extended by the city 
governing body by resolution if it chooses to 
CHApTER 7
plan of Services
(T.C.A. § 6-51-102; T.C.A. § 6-51-108)4
____________________
4For a sample resolution for a pubic hearing on adoption of a plan of services, see Appendix E. For a sample resolution adopting a plan of services, 
see Appendix F.
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do so.) In an unpublished opinion, State ex rel. 
New Providence Utility District v. Clarksville, filed 
November 14, 1966, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
considered an objection that “approval of the  
plan of services by the Planning Commission by  
a resolution, and a certified copy of such resolution” 
did not comply with the statutory requirement  
“that a written report of the Commission’s study  
of the plan be furnished the City.” In rejecting  
this contention the court said:
The submission of the plan of services to the 
Planning Commission and its report to the 
legislative body of the municipality is part of 
the legislative process. The form and sufficiency 
of the report is a matter for determination by 
the legislative body and not the courts. The 
Planning Commission had the alternative of 
approving, modifying or rejecting the plan of 
services submitted to it for study. That body 
adopted the resolution approving the plan and 
so reported to the City Council by a certified 
copy of the resolution. There is nothing in the 
statute that requires the Planning Commission 
to report to the City Council its findings in any 
particular form.
puBLIC NOTICE AND HEARING 
ON pLAN OF SERvICES
The city’s governing body is then required to hold 
a public hearing on the plan after giving 15 days 
notice in a newspaper of general circulation in the 
city. The notice must include at least three locations 
where copies of the plan are available for public 
inspection. T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b).
NOTICE OF pLAN OF SERvICES  
TO SCHOOL SySTEM
If the annexing municipality does not maintain  
a separate school system, it must provide written 
notice of the anexation, the plan of services of the 
annexation to the affected school systems as soon 
as practicable, but in no event not less than  
30 days prior to the 15 days public notice of  
the hearing on the plan of services required by 
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b)(4). T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b). If the 
annexing municipality maintains a separate school 
system, see Plan of Services Must Be Reasonable.
NOTICE OF pLAN OF SERvICES
TO COuNTy MAyOR 
Public Acts 2005, Chapter 411, amends 
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b)(1) [annexation by ordinance] 
and T.C.A. § 6-51-104 [annexation by referendum] 
to require that after a plan of services is adopted, 
the municipality shall forward a copy of it to the 
county mayor in whose county the territory being 
annexed is located.
 
NOTICE OF pLAN OF SERvICES 
TO EMERGENCy COMMuNICATIONS DISTRICTS
Public Acts 2005, Chapter 411, amends 
T.C.A. § 6-51-119(a) to require that upon the final 
passage of an annexation ordinance the legislative 
body of the annexing municipality provide to any 
affected emergency communications district a copy 
of the portion of the plan of services dealing with 
emergency services and a detailed map designating 
the annexed area. The map must identify all public 
and private streets, including street names and 
direction indicators, in the annexed area. The map 
must also include or have appended a list of address 
ranges for each street in the annexed area. For 
contested annexation ordinances, in cases in which 
the municipality plans to begin providing emergency 
services in the annexed territory immediately, 
the municipality must notify the emergency 
communications district when the annexation 
becomes final.
Under Public Acts 2005, Chapter 411, the 
notification must be sent by certified return receipt 
mail or any other method that assures receipt by 
the district.
The failure to send notice is not necessarily fatal. 
Both Public Acts 2005, Chapter 411, and Public Acts 
2005, Chapter 24, create a new Section 6-51-119, 
which provides that compliance or noncompliance 
with this provision is not admissible against the 
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municipality in any case brought under T.C.A., 
Title 6 [presumably Chapter 51, which governs 
annexation and challenges to annexation], Title 29, 
Chapter 14 [the Declaratory Judgments Act, under 
which challenges against annexations upon grounds 
other than the reasonableness of the annexation 
would be brought], or against the municipality or 
any affected emergency communications district 
under T.C.A., Title 29, Chapter 20 [the Tennessee 
Tort Liability Act].
For similar notice provisions that apply to 
annexations by ordinance, see Chapter 5, Annexation 
by Ordinance, and for similar notice provisions that 
apply to annexations by referendum, see Chapter 6, 
Annexation by Referendum.
ANNEXATION pROHIBITED 
IF CITy IS IN “DEFAuLT” 
ON pRIOR pLAN/S OF SERvICE
A city cannot annex “any other territory” under 
T.C.A. § 7-51-102 “if the municipality is in default 
on any prior plan of services.” That limitation 
appears to apply only to annexations that were 
not final on November 25, 1997, and forward 
from that date. Chapter 1101, §§ 19 and 20; 
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a); T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b)(5); 
T.C.A. § 6-51-108(b).
It is not clear whether a plaintiff could bring 
a quo warranto challenge to an annexation on the 
ground that the annexation is unreasonable because 
the city is in default on a plan of services from 
a previous annexation. But, presumably, such 
a challenge could be brought under the Declaratory 
Judgments Act found at T.C.A. §§ 29-14-101 et seq. 
on the ground that the annexation violates the 
annexation statute. [See Chapter 5, Annexation by 
Ordinance, Challenges to the Ordinance Based on 
Constitutional and Other Grounds, and Chapter 11, 
“Problem” Annexations.]
Chapter 1101 does not define what constitutes 
a “default.” The answer probably turns on whether 
the city is in compliance with the scope of service 
and/or the implementation schedule provisions 
contained in the plan of services.
CHALLENGING A pLAN OF SERvICES
BEFORE THE ADOpTION 
OF A COuNTyWIDE GROWTH pLAN
Chapter 1101, § 20, gave the county, upon 
a petition filed by property owners subject to 
a plan of services, the right to challenge the 
reasonableness of plans of services that were not 
final on May 19, 1998, and forward from that date, 
until the county adopted a growth plan. It also 
gave the courts certain remedies during that 
interim period with respect to plans of services 
they found unreasonable or that “have been done 
by an exercise of powers not conferred by law.” 
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a)(2)(A)–(D). Almost every  
county has adopted a growth plan.
AFTER THE ADOpTION 
OF A COuNTyWIDE GROWTH pLAN
After a growth plan has been adopted by the 
county, it does not appear that Chapter 1101 or 
existing annexation statutes give either the county 
or property owners subject to a plan of services 
the right to challenge the reasonableness of a plan 
of services separate from their individual rights to 
challenge the annexation ordinance based upon 
their status as property owners in the territory 
proposed for annexation. However, because such 
property owners have the right to challenge the 
reasonableness of the annexation, presumably they 
can argue that the annexation is unreasonable on 
the ground that the plan of services is unreasonable 
or that the territory in question does not need the 
services contained in the plan of services. Chapter 
1101, § 20; T.C.A. § 6-51-102; T.C.A. § 6-51-103. 
[See Chapter 5, Annexation by Ordinance, Trial and 
Burden of Proof.]
ENFORCING THE pLAN OF SERvICES
A property owner subject to the plan of services 
can sue the city to enforce the plan of services 
180 days following the date the annexation 
ordinance becomes effective. That right to sue  
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is extinguished when the plan of services is fulfilled. 
Chapter 1101, § 21; T.C.A. § 6-51-108(d).
If the court finds that the city has “materially and 
substantially” failed to comply with its plan of 
services, the city must be given the opportunity to 
show cause for the failure. If the court determines 
that the failure is due to natural disaster, act of war, 
terrorism, or reasonably unforeseen circumstances 
beyond the control of the city that materially and 
substantially impeded its ability to carry out the 
plan of services, the court can alter the timetable of 
the plan. But if the court finds that the city’s failure 
to comply with the plan of services is none of those 
reasons, it “shall”:
• Issue a writ of mandamus to compel the city  
 to provide the services contained in the plan;
• Establish a timetable for providing those 
 services; and
• Enjoin the city from any further annexations 
 until the services subject to the court’s order 
 have been provided to the court’s satisfaction. 
 T.C.A. § 6-51-109. 
pROGRESS REpORT ON pLAN OF SERvICES
Six months after the plan is adopted and annually 
thereafter until it is fully implemented the city must 
publish a report on its progress toward fulfilling 
the plan and must schedule and hold a public 
hearing on the report. These reporting and hearing 
requirements apply to any plan of services not fully 
implemented, and any resident or property owner in 
the annexed area covered by the plan can file suit to 
force a city to prepare this report if it has not done 
so on schedule. T.C.A. § 6-51-108.
AMENDING A pLAN OF SERvICES 
A plan of services may be amended under 
limited conditions:
• An occurrence such as a natural disaster, an act 
 of war, terrorism, or other unforeseen 
 circumstances beyond the city’s control; or
• The amendment does not substantially or 
 materially decrease the type or level of services 
 or delay the provisions of such services; or
• The amendment has received approval in writing 
 of a majority of the property owners by parcel in 
 the annexed area.
Before any amendment is adopted, the city must 
hold a public hearing preceded by at least 15 days 
notice. T.C.A. § 6-51-108(c).
An aggrieved property owner in the annexed 
territory can challenge the legality of an amendment 
to the plan of services within 30 days after the 
amendment is adopted. If the court finds that the 
city unlawfully amended the plan, it shall “decree 
the amendment null and void and shall reinstate the 
previous plan of services.” T.C.A. § 6-51-108(d).
ANNEXATION By REFERENDuM
Public Acts 2005, Chapter 411, amends 
T.C.A. § 6-51-104(b) [annexation by referendum] 
by providing that “the plan of services shall address 
the same services and timing of services as required 
in § 6-51-102” [annexation by ordinance]. 
That act does not indicate to what extent the 
above statutes that apply to plans of services in 
annexations by ordinance also apply to annexation 
by referendum. The act says only that “the plan of 
services shall address the same services and timing 
of services as required in § 6-51-102.” It is not clear 
whether that language embraces statutes governing 
annexation by ordinance that deal with a broad range 
of plan of services issues, including the effect of 
the failure of cities to fulfill prior plans of services, 
progress reports on plans of services, amending plans 
of services, and challenging and enforcing plans 
of services.
However, a city contemplating annexation by 
referendum should consider drafting a plan of 
services that would survive a legal challenge if it 
had been done in connection with an annexation  
by ordinance.
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GENERALLy
Tennessee statutes are rife with various “population 
brackets” under which cities and counties in 
Tennessee are excepted from, or included under, 
a statute or statutes. Article XI, § 8, of the 
Tennessee Constitution provides that “The 
Legislature shall have no power to suspend any 
general law for the benefit of any particular 
individual....” That provision has repeatedly 
been interpreted to prohibit the passage of 
laws containing population brackets and other 
classifications to benefit specific counties or cities 
as well as individuals, including private acts that 
suspend general laws, unless the classification rests 
upon a reasonable basis. [See, among the literally 
dozens of cases in this area, Vollmer v. City of 
Memphis, 730 S.W.2d 619 (Tenn. 1987); Mink v. 
City of Memphis, 435 S.W.2d 114 (1968); Stalcup 
v. City of Gatlinburg, 577 S.W.2d 439 (Tenn. 1978); 
Knoxville’s Community Development Corp. v. Knox 
County, 665 S.W.2d 704 (Tenn. 1984); Brentwood 
Liquors Corp of Williamson County v. Fox, 496 S.W.2d 
454 (Tenn. 1973); Estrin v. Moss, 430 S.W.2d 345 
(1968); Pirtle v. City of Jackson, 560 S.W.2d 400 
(1977); Clark v. Vaughn, 146 S.W.2d 351 (1941); 
Lineberger v. State ex rel. Beeler, 129 S.W.2d 198 
(1939); State ex rel Smith v. City of Chattanooga, 
144 S.W.2d 1096 (1940); Town of McMinnville v. 
Curtis, 192 S.W.2d 998 (1946); Prescott v. Duncan, 
148 S.W. 229 (1912); Board of Education v. Shelby 
County, 330 S.W.2d 569 (1960); Johnson City v. 
Allison, 362 S.W.2d 813 (1962); State ex rel. v. Mayor 
of Dyersburg, 235 S.W.2d 814 (1954); Wiseman v. 
Smith, 95 S.W.2d 42 (1936); Blackwell v. Miller, 
493 S.W.3d 88 (Tenn. 1973); and numerous cases 
cited therein.]
In addition, Article XI, § 9, of the Tennessee 
Constitution provides that “The General Assembly 
shall by general law provide the exclusive methods 
by which municipalities may be created, merged, 
consolidated and dissolved and by which municipal 
boundaries may be altered.” That provision is 
a product of Constitutional Amendment No. 7 
adopted in November 1953. Prior to that year, 
the prevailing method of annexation in Tennessee 
was by private act of the state legislature. In 
1955, the General Assembly passed the first 
general annexation law of the state (Public Acts 
1955, Chapter 113), the basic form of which is 
still contained in T.C.A. §§ 6-51-102 et seq. Since 
then several cases have addressed the question of 
whether various amendments to that law containing 
population brackets are legal classifications.
In Frost v. City of Chattanooga, 488 S.W.2d 370 
(Tenn. 1972), the Tennessee Supreme Court 
held unconstitutional Chapter 420, Public 
Acts 1971, which amended what is now 
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(c). That act authorized 
municipalities having a population of more than 
100,000 to annex by ordinance territory without 
levying property taxes except for services rendered. 
But the act excluded the application of its 
provisions in counties having a metropolitan form 
of government, counties having a population of 
more than 700,000 according to the 1970 federal 
census or any subsequent federal census, and 
counties having a population of not less than 
260,000 nor more than 280,000 according to the 
1970 federal census or any subsequent federal 
census. The court said:
CHApTER 8
“population Brackets” Contained
in the Annexation Law
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The reasonableness of this classification has to 
be viewed in the light Chapter 420 has been 
drafted to exclude all municipalities above one 
hundred thousand except Chattanooga; and, 
also, in the light the next largest city  
in Tennessee would have to increase two  
and one-half times its 1970 size by the  
U.S. Census figures to come within the popu-
lation classification of one hundred thousand. 
A study of Chapter 420 provides convincing 
evidence it was not drafted to create a class 
of municipalities who have similar annexation-
taxation problems with fringe population areas, 
but seeks to clothe a local act for Chattanooga 
in terms of a general act. [At 372.]
In Frost, the court refused to follow those Tennessee 
cases in which statutes containing a population 
classification applicable to one county were upheld. 
It distinguished those cases on the ground that 
they involved subjects other than annexation, 
while the constitution now in very clear language 
prohibited the legislature from altering municipal 
boundaries except by general law. Going further, 
the court offered the dicta that “we do not hold 
that the legislature could not act to alter municipal 
boundaries by legislation valid as a general law 
under the classification doctrine, but we are not 
able to conceive of any circumstances where such 
would be valid.” [At 373.] The court also ruled 
out the theory that the classification should 
be upheld because Chattanooga’s situation was 
unique: “Even if it be determined Chattanooga 
has a unique situation, it would avail nothing as 
this constitutional provision has invalidated such 
uniqueness justification.” [At 372.]
The annexation statute was amended in several 
respects by Public Acts of 1974, Chapter 753. One 
of these amendments provided that in a suit to 
connect the validity of an annexation ordinance 
the municipality shall have the burden of proving 
that an annexation ordinance is reasonable for the 
overall well-being of the communities involved, 
but it was provided that this amendment not apply 
in counties having a population of not less than 
65,000 nor more than 6,000, in counties having 
a population of 400,000 or more according to the 
federal census, and in counties having a metro-
politan form of government. In Pirtle v. Jackson, 
560 S.W.2d 400 (Tenn. 1977), the Tennessee 
Supreme Court also held the exclusion provision 
unconstitutional. There was no rational basis to 
justify the exclusion of a few chosen municipalities 
from the burden of providing the reasonableness of 
their annexation ordinances when such a burden is 
placed upon all other municipalities.
Citing Frost and Pirtle, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court in Vollmer v. City of Memphis, 730 S.W.2d 619 
(Tenn. 1987), struck down Public Acts 1981, 
Chapter 522, as unconstitutional under 
Article XI, § 9, of the Tennessee Constitution. That 
act permitted the voters to demand a referendum on 
annexation ordinances adopted by cities upon their 
own initiative as authorized by T.C.A. § 6-51-102. 
But the act also contained a bewildering scheme of 
exclusion and inclusion of municipalities to which 
it applied based on population brackets and forms
of government.
The court ordered the offending provisions of 
T.C.A. § 6-51-102 stricken from the code, but the 
population brackets contained in that statute were 
not an issue, and Vollmer left them intact.
pOpuLATION BRACKETS CONTAINED 
IN THE pRESENT ANNEXATION LAW 
The first population bracket still contained 
in the annexation law is found in 
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a)(2)(E). The product of Public 
Acts 1986, Chapter 734, it subjects to a referendum 
the passage of annexation ordinances originating 
from the initiative of the city. It applies to cities 
in counties having a population of not less than 
319,625 nor more than 319,675 according to the 
1980 or later federal census [Knox County]. If the 
referendum is successful, the ordinance appears to 
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become operative 30 days after the official canvass 
of election return but not sooner than 120 days 
after the final passage of the annexation ordinance.
It is difficult to find a reasonable basis for this 
population bracket; for that reason, it probably 
violates Article XI, §§ 8 and 9, of the Tennessee 
Constitution. Why should annexations upon the 
initiative of cities be subject to a referendum in 
cities only in Knox County? Under the dicta in 
Pirtle, above, even if Knox County were unique in 
some circumstance, that uniqueness would not be 
sufficient to support the population bracket.
The second and third population brackets are 
found in T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a)(3)(A) and 
T.C.A. § 6-51-102 (a)(3)(B). Under 
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a)(3)(A), cities having 
a population of more than 10,000 according 
to the 1970 or any later federal census cannot, 
by means of annexation by ordinance upon its 
own initiative, increase its land area more than 
25 percent during any 24-month period. But that 
statute was amended by Chapter 787, Public Acts 
1988, which created the following population 
brackets contained in T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a)(3)(B):
• Cities with a population of less than 12,000 
 according to the 1980 or later federal census, 
 where the city has a private act rather than 
 a general law charter; and
• Cities in any county having a population of 
 (according to the 1980 or later federal census):
 o Not less than 34,100 nor more than 34, 200;
 o Not less than 37,000 nor more than 37,100; 
  or
 o Not less than 49,400 nor more than 49,500
The population bracket contained in 
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a)(3)(A) is arguably a legitimate 
population classification. It applies to all cities 
of more then 10,000 population and reasonable 
arguments can probably be found to support the 
logic of the General Assembly in controlling the 
amount of land larger cities in Tennessee can 
annex by ordinance upon the initiative of the 
city in any given year. But the same is probably 
not true of the population brackets under 
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a)(3)(B). Those appear 
arbitrary on their faces, similar to those at issue 
in Vollmer, above.
The third population bracket is contained in 
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(c). It authorizes annexation by 
ordinance upon the initiative of the city without 
the levy of property taxes except for services 
rendered. It applies to cities in counties having 
a population of more than 66,000 except in counties 
having a population of more than 700,000. As 
indicated above, that provision originated with 
Chapter 420, Public Acts of 1971. It applied to 
cities of more than 100,000 population, excluding 
municipalities in Shelby and Knox counties by 
census figures, and to counties having 
a metropolitan form of government. That act 
was held in Frost v. Chattanooga, 488 S.W.2d 370 
(Tenn. 1972), to violate Article XI, § 9, of the 
Tennessee Constitution. Chapter 944, Public Acts 
of 1972, amended the law to reflect the present 
population classification in the statute. In light of 
Frost, Pirtle, and Vollmer, above, it is difficult to 
argue that the present population bracket in that 
statute does not also violate Article XI, § 9, of the 
Tennessee Constitution.
That statute probably suffers another Tennessee 
constitutional defect. The differential tax rates  
may also be in violation of the provision in  
Article II, § 28, of the constitution that “Each 
respective taxing authority shall apply the same tax 
rate to all property within its jurisdiction.” 
Abundant case law in Tennessee stands for 
the proposition that the unequal taxation of 
property within municipal boundaries is not 
permissible. Two of those cases deal directly with 
differential tax rates in annexed areas but patently 
apply to unequal taxation for any reason. In 
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Jones v. Memphis, 47 S.W. 138 (1898), the 
Tennessee Supreme Court struck down a statute 
exempting newly annexed territory from taxation 
for police, fire, and lighting for 10 years (although 
the annexed area was not to receive those services 
during that period). Citing Article II, § 28, of the 
Tennessee Constitution, the court declared that:
The Court is of the opinion that taxation must 
always be uniform and equal throughout the 
extent of the same jurisdiction; that State 
taxes must be equal and uniform throughout 
the State; that county taxes must be equal and 
uniform throughout the county; and that a city 
tax must be equal and uniform throughout the 
city, so far as revenues for current expenses 
of the future are concerned… [Citing earlier 
Tennessee cases.]
So also, if a portion of a territory is annexed to 
and becomes a part of a city it is entitled to all 
of the benefits extended by the city to any other 
portion and while it may not, in all instances, 
be necessary to furnish at once the same 
advantages and conveniences in each and every 
locality of the city, still an act which prescribes 
that it shall not have such advantages at all, or 
for a given time is not valid and cannot 
be sustained.
The logical result of the contrary holding as 
to taxation would be that in every city taxes 
might be different in different wards and on 
different streets; in every county taxes might 
be different in every civil district; in the State 
taxes might be different in every county and 
in each division–all clearly in violation of the 
Constitution and our whole theory of equal and 
uniform taxation. [At 139.]
The Tennessee Supreme Court reached the same 
result in American Bemberg Corporation v. City of 
Elizabethton, 175 S.W.2d 535 (1943). There the 
court threw out contracts the city had made with 
certain corporations not to annex property without 
their consent and, even if their consent was 
obtained, to remit to the corporations all city 
taxes for 10 years. Jones v. Memphis was still 
the law, reasoned the court.
The fourth population bracket contained in the 
annexation law is found in T.C.A. § 6-51-102(d). 
It provides that in counties having a population of 
not less than 700,000, in counties having not less 
than 260,000 nor more than 280,000 according to 
the 1970 or later federal census, and in counties 
that have a metropolitan government, a smaller 
municipality may, by ordinance, annex contiguous 
territory within the corporate limits of a larger 
city if the territory is fewer than 75 acres; is not 
populated; is separated from the larger city by 
a limited access expressway, its access ramps or 
services roads; and is not the site of industrial 
plant development. No submission of the annexation 
to the planning commission or the adoption of 
a plan of services is required for such annexations.
This provision originated with Chapter 136, 
Public Acts 1969. That act amended what are 
now T.C.A. § 6-51-110 and T.C.A.§ 6-51-102 by 
adding the above substantive provisions to both 
sections but without any population brackets. 
Chapter 420, Public Acts 1971, § 1, amended what is 
now T.C.A. § 6-51-102 by repealing that provision. 
But section 3 of that act made the provisions 
of the act inapplicable in counties having the 
populations or the form of government noted in 
the above paragraph. For that reason, the repeal of 
the provisions in what is now T.C.A. § 6-51-102(d) 
was not affected in counties that fall in those 
population brackets.
It is not clear whether this act reflects 
a reasonable basis; it appears to have been 
designed to accommodate one particular situation. 
From a practical standpoint its purpose may be 
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exhausted. But this statute also appears to 
be inconsistent with Chapter 1101’s limitation 
of annexation by ordinance to territory within 
a city’s UGB.
pOpuLATION AND OTHER BRACKETS 
IN ANNEXATION pRIORITIES STATuTE
Population brackets are also found in 
T.C.A. § 6-51-110, which prescribes the 
priorities among cities attempting to annex 
the same territory. These population brackets 
may also violate Article XI, §§ 8 and 9, of the 
Tennessee Constitution.
T.C.A. § 6-51-109 provides for the annexation by 
a larger municipality of all or part of the territory 
in a smaller municipality upon the petition of 
20 percent of the voters of the smaller municipality 
if the larger municipality annexes by ordinance 
the territory proposed in the petition and the 
annexation is approved in a referendum by 
a majority of voters in the smaller municipality. 
T.C.A. § 6-51-110(g) authorizes annexation by 
a smaller municipality of territory within the 
corporate limits of a larger municipality if the 
territory is fewer than 75 acres and meets 
other qualifications.
T.C.A. § 6-51-110(a) contains several questionable 
population and other brackets that are apparently 
aimed at T.C.A. § 6-51-109 and T.C.A. 6-51-110(g). 
Moreover, T.C.A. § 6-51-109 and T.C.A. § 6-51-110(g) 
should probably be examined to determine whether 
they serve any useful purpose.
T.C.A. § 6-51-110(a) provides that nothing in this 
part [T.C.A.,Title 6, Shapter 51, part 1] nor in 
T.C.A. § 6-51-301 [mutual adjustments provision] 
shall be construed to authorize a smaller 
municipality to annex territory within the corporate 
limits of a larger municipality. It also says the 
same thing with respect to the annexation by 
a larger municipality within the corporate limits 
of a smaller municipality in existence at the time 
of the proposed annexation except as 
to municipalities: 
• In counties with a population of not less than 
 65,000 nor more than 66,000 according to the 
 1970 or subsequent federal census; 
• In counties with a population of 400,000 or 
 more according to the 1970 or subsequent 
 federal census; and
• In counties having a metropolitan government, 
 by a larger municipality with respect to territory 
 within the corporate limits of a smaller 
 municipality in existence for 10 or more years.
 
In addition, the same statute provides that, 
notwithstanding any other provisions in this chapter 
[T.C.A., Title 6, Chapter 51] in counties having 
a population of not less than 276,000 nor more 
than 277,000 according to the 1970 or subsequent 
federal census, nothing in this part [T.C.A., 
Title 6, Chapter 51, Part 1] shall be construed to 
authorize annexation by a larger municipality of 
territory within the corporate limits of any smaller 
municipality in existence at the time of 
the proposed annexation.
T.C.A. § 6-51-110(d) also contains population 
brackets and another bracket with respect to 
when an annexation ordinance is initiated as to 
annexation priorities. The brackets exempt from 
the application of the statute counties having 
a population of not less than 65,000 nor more than 
66,000 and counties having a population of 400,000 
or more according to the 1970 or subsequent 
federal census. It also exempts counties having 
a metropolitan government.
There may be reasons for some of those exemptions 
that satisfy the Tennessee Constitution.
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STATuTORy ANNEXATION ORDINANCE 
AND pLAN OF SERvICES HEARING 
REquIREMENTS 
GENERALLy
The public notice and hearing requirements for 
annexation ordinances and plans of services were 
strengthened by Chapter 1101. However, some 
of the pre-Chapter 1101 cases interpreting and 
applying the annexation ordinance public hearing 
requirements (there are no such cases interpreting 
and applying the plan of services public hearing 
requirements) probably apply to the public notice 
and hearing requirements contained in Chapter 
1101. But some of those cases reflect the failure 
of cities to strictly abide by the public hearing 
and notice requirements. Such a failure might not 
necessarily be fatal to an annexation ordinance or 
to a plan of services, but it invites that result and 
always gives the person challenging the annexation 
another issue to present to the court. Such failures 
are easy to avoid by knowing and strictly obeying 
public notice and hearing requirements contained in 
the annexation laws.
Several recent statutes require cities to give notice 
of annexations and/or plans of services to school 
systems in certain cases, to the county mayor, 
and to emergency communications districts. This 
chapter deals only with statutes and cases dealing 
with public notice requirements. See Chapter 5, 
Annexation by Ordinance; Chapter 6, Annexation by 
Referendum; and Chapter 7, Plan of Services for the 
above notice requirements.
STATuTORy puBLIC NOTICE 
HEARING REquIREMENTS 
ANNEXATION (By ORDINANCE 
AND REFERENDuM)
T.C.A. § 6-51-101 provides that the notice of the 
annexation hearing applies to both annexation by 
ordinance and annexation by referendum. “Notice” 
under that statute means:
Publication in a newspaper of general circulation 
in the municipality at least seven (7) days in 
advance of a hearing. The notice, whether by 
ordinance as stipulated in § 6-51-102(a)(1) 
and (b) or by referendum as stipulated in 
§ 6-51-104(b), shall be satisfied by inclusion 
of a map which includes a general delineation 
of the area or areas to be annexed by use of 
official road names and/or numbers, names 
of lakes and waterway, or other identifiable 
landmarks, as appropriate.
pLAN OF SERvICES
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b)(4) provides that before the 
plan of services is adopted, the city must hold 
a public hearing. Notice of the time, place, and 
purpose of the public hearing “shall be published 
in a newspaper of general circulation in the 
municipality not less than fifteen (15) days before 
the hearing.” The notice must also include the 
locations of a minimum of three copies of the plan 
of service, which the municipality must also make 
available for public inspection during all business 
hours from the date of notice of the public hearing. 
CHApTER 9
Annexation Ordinance and plan of Services
public Notice and Hearing Issues5
____________________
5For a sample resolution for a pubic hearing on annexation by ordinance, see Appendix B. For a sample resolution for a public hearing on 
annexation by referendum, see Appendix D. For a sample resolution for a public hearing on the plan of services, see Appendix E.
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puBLIC NOTICE AND HEARING ISSuES
CITy CHARTER GENERALLy GOvERNS 
ANNEXATION ORDINANCE pROCEDuRE
There are no formal annexation ordinance procedures 
prescribed by Tennessee’s annexation law. Annexa-
tion ordinances should be adopted following the 
ordinance procedures prescribed by the annexing 
city’s charter. It was held in State ex rel. Balsinger 
v. Town of Madisonville, 435 S.W.2d 803 (1968), 
that an annexation ordinance was not required to 
be read at three separate meetings because neither 
the state’s annexation law nor the charter required 
such a procedure.
 
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(a)(1) provides that a city “after 
notice and public hearing, by ordinance, may 
extend its corporate limits by annexation...” In the 
unreported case of Gentry v. Bristol (Tenn., June 5, 
1972), an annexation ordinance was attacked on 
the ground that the ordinance was passed on first 
reading prior to the public hearing. Under the city’s 
charter, it took two readings to pass the ordinance. 
The record showed that the ordinance was passed 
on first reading on December 1, 1970; that notice 
was thereafter published and a public hearing held 
on December 15, 1970; and that the ordinance was 
passed on second and final reading immediately 
after the public hearing. The court was of the 
opinion that there was substantial compliance 
with the statute.
Where the charter of the city provided that no 
ordinance could be adopted at the same meeting 
at which introduced, the requirements of 
T.C.A. § 6-51-102 were met by having the public 
hearing four days after the introduction but before 
the ordinance was adopted. Pirtle v. Jackson, 
570 S.W.2d 400 (Tenn. 1977).
Even irregularities in city ordinance adoption 
procedures may be “forgiven” in some cases. An 
annexation ordinance in Saylors v. City of Jackson, 
575 S.W.2d 246 (Tenn. 1978), was held valid even 
though it had not received a second as required by 
Robert’s Rules of Order (RRO), which the city had 
adopted to govern its meeting procedures, because 
the action on the ordinance was unanimous. Even 
RRO declares that where such action is unanimous, 
a violation of the rules is without consequence. 
CHANGING THE AREA TO BE ANNEXED 
The question of whether a city can describe an area 
being considered for annexation, for purposes of the 
public hearing, and subsequently annex parts of the 
area by several ordinances, perhaps in all less than 
the area on which the hearing was conducted, was 
raised in Senff v. Columbia, 343 S.W.2d 888 (1961). 
The Tennessee Supreme Court appears to have 
approved of such procedure:
As a result of this notice and hearing an 
ordinance was not drawn immediately to take 
in the whole area pursuant to the notice but 
numerous and various ordinances were passed 
taking in smaller areas within the areas as 
prescribed in the notice, the very obvious reason 
being that in many of these other areas the 
people were asking for it and they knew there 
would be no contest about it. [At 889.] 
In Maury County Farmers Co-op Corp. v. Columbia, 
362 S.W2d 219 (1962), it was held that an 
annexation ordinance could annex two separate 
areas that were not contiguous to each other as 
long as each is contiguous to the city. To the 
argument that the annexation of one area might 
be found to be reasonable and the annexation of 
the other unreasonable, the court responded that 
“the part of the ordinance describing that area 
might be eliminated under the familiar doctrine 
of elision.” [At 221.]
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ADEquACy OF puBLIC NOTICE 
AND HEARING
GENERALLy
There are no reported cases involving the adequacy 
of the public hearing on plans of services. Arguably, 
the cases involving the adequacy of the public 
hearing in annexation cases apply to the public 
hearings on the plan of services. However, those 
cases point to the political basis for the public 
hearing on the annexation ordinances. Under 
T.C.A. § 6-51-102(b) (1)–(3), the plan of services 
must (1) establish at least the services to be 
provided and their projected timing, (2) include 
(but not be limited to) police and fire protection, 
water, electrical, sanitary sewer service, solid 
waste collection, road and street construction 
and repair, recreational facilities, street lighting, 
and zoning services, and (3) provide a reasonable 
implementation schedule for the delivery of 
comparable services in the annexed territory with 
respect to the services delivered to all the citizens 
of the municipality. For that reason, the function of 
that hearing may be broader than to simply allow 
the public to speak its voice on the plan. If that is 
so, perhaps the courts would be more inclined to 
strictly enforce the statutory hearing requirements.
INACCuRATE DESCRIpTIONS OF TERRITORy 
TO BE ANNEXED
The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that an 
inaccurate description did not invalidate an 
annexation because an appended map correctly 
showed the territory to be annexed. Johnson City 
v. Maden, 304 S.W.2d 317 (1957). However, great 
care should be taken to ensure that the public 
hearings on annexations reflect maps and boundary 
descriptions of the territory proposed for annexation 
that are consistent and accurate.
INADEquATE NOTICE OF HEARING 
In State ex rel. Robbins v. City of Jackson, 
403 S.W.2d 304 (1966), an official notice published 
only five days in advance, taken together with a 
news article referring to the public hearing to be 
held and setting forth the area proposed for 
annexation, which appeared in the newspaper 
seven days prior to the public hearing, was held 
to be substantial compliance with the statute. But 
it is not clear how much tolerance the courts will 
exercise when there has been a failure of adequate 
notice in terms of time. In Surgoinsville v. Sandidge, 
866 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993), 11 days 
notice of a public hearing on an amendment to 
a zoning ordinance was held not to be substantial 
compliance when T.C.A. § 13-7-203 required “at 
least” 15 days notice.
An annexation ordinance was attacked in Senff 
v. Columbia, 343 S.W.2d 888 (1961), on the ground 
that the notice was insufficient because it had 
been given too long (nine months) before the 
ordinance was adopted. Holding that the notice 
was adequate, the court reasoned that for 
approximately nine months after the notice 
was given the proposed annexation received 
constant publicity in the newspaper.
LOCATION AND ENvIRONMENT 
OF puBLIC MEETING
The location and environment of the meeting in- 
volving the passage of an annexation ordinance 
have also been issues. As to the location of a pub-
lic hearing, the Tennessee Supreme Court in Morton 
v. Johnson City, 333 S.W.2d 924 (Tenn. 1979), 
said this:
The call was for a meeting at the City Hall 
before the City Commission. This notice did 
not designate any particular room and of 
course the very obvious and only place that 
the meeting should and would be held, unless 
designated otherwise in the notice, is in the 
regular chambers of the City Commission. Thus 
it is that the notice was sufficient to notify the 
inhabitants that the meeting would be in the 
Commission room… [At 930.]
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In that case 300 people were gathered outside the 
meeting room, which could hold only 40 people. The 
city commission refused to adjourn to another room 
but announced that it would hear everyone who 
wished to speak, “even if it took all night to do it.” 
Many of those who were present did not stay, but 
the commission heard anyone who wished to speak. 
The public hearing was adequate, declared the court. 
It spoke of the purpose of the public hearing:
…The words here in the Statute of a “public 
hearing” were not used with respect to 
a proceedings in which the constitutional 
rights of any person might be affected. The 
subject before the Commission was the adoption 
of an ordinance annexing the territory in 
question. Such a hearing as is required under 
the political or legislative issue of this kind 
is a kind of hearing that is to be accorded so 
that this body may make up its mind from 
a political standpoint [Emphasis is mine.] in 
their legislative action as to whether or not it 
is feasible and right to annex this territory.
In Commonwealth v. Sisson, 189 Mass 247, 
75 NE 619, 1 LRS, NS, 752, 109 Am. St. 
Rep. 630, the Massachusetts court had before 
it the question of whether or not the Board of 
Health acting in a legislative capacity gave 
a proper kind of hearing under a similar 
act which required a public hearing. The 
court held…a board…acting in a legislative 
capacity…is not required to act on sworn 
evidence…its action is final as is the action of 
the legislature in enacting the statute…[and] 
questions of fact passed on in adopting the 
provisions cannot be tried over in the courts. 
In other words the only suggestions and the 
only requirement under this statute is that it be 
public; that the City Commission have an open 
public hearing so that they can hear those who 
are for or against the proposition and then make 
up their own minds from a legislative standpoint 
of whether or not such an ordinance would be 
feasible in view of their legislative duty to 
the City.
This presents, under the facts in this case, 
a question of law for the Court to determine. 
There was no action being taken at this meeting 
by the Commission; there was no reason why the 
Commission should enter into an agreement pro 
or con with those appearing to speak their piece 
on behalf of this legislation. The only question 
was to allow those that wished to stay and say 
their piece to be allowed to do so and then the 
Commission could make up its own legislative 
mind. [At 929.]
Finally, the court also gave clear instructions 
regarding the time of holding a public hearing:
The day that this public hearing was called 
for and held was on a Tuesday night while the 
regular meetings of the Commission were on 
Thursday night… The argument is that then this 
was not properly called because not held on a 
regular night. Of course this public hearing or 
hearing as was conducted by the Commission did 
not have to be on their meeting night… They 
could have this meeting anytime that they saw 
fit to have these public hearings. [At 930.]
Morton stands for the clear proposition that the 
purpose of the public hearing requirement is that 
the governing body “hear” any person who wishes 
to speak for or against the annexation proposal. It 
was cited in State v. City of Columbia, 360 S.W.2d 39 
(1962), in which the Tennessee Supreme Court also 
held the public hearing on an annexation ordinance 
adequate. There, 100 to 125 people were present 
for the hearing, and all who wished to do so were 
permitted to speak, “with the possible exception of 
one man, who jumped up so frequently he was asked 
to keep quiet.” [At 42.] The meeting lasted about 
90 minutes with a break of approximately 
20 minutes.
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In Stall v. Knoxville, 364 S.W.2d 898 (1962), 
the adequacy of the public hearing was also 
brought under attack. The court referred to 
the criteria set out in Morton v. Johnson City, 
above, and concluded:
The Trial Judge found in the instant cases that 
these requirements were met, and the record 
clearly supports him in this regard. Proper notice 
of the hearing was given. It was held at the time 
and place designated in the notice. The council 
members were present with the mayor presiding, 
the doors were opened to the public. The record 
shows that opinions and discussions were 
invited and that many opinions were given and 
much discussion was had. The council chambers 
might not have seated all who wished to come. 
However, the record shows that the meeting 
lasted for several hours and anyone who wished 
to be heard had the floor. [At 901.]
When an annexation ordinance reaches the stage of 
a public hearing a majority of the city’s governing 
body is probably a proponent of the annexation, but 
before and during the hearing the board should not 
take a hard position that indicates the matter is 
a “done deal.” The purpose of the public hearing is 
to provide an opportunity for objectors to bring to 
their attention any facts and relevant considerations 
that might have escaped their attention. In Maury 
County Farmers Co-op v. Columbia, 362 S.W.2d 219 
(1962), the Tennessee Supreme Court considered 
an objection that “the city commissioners had 
already made up their legislative minds to annex,” 
based upon certain answers given by one of the 
commissioners on cross-examination but rejected it 
on the grounds:
…that a reading of the whole of the testimony 
clearly shows that while the commissioners 
had proposed such annexation, as shown in 
the public notice, they had not foreclosed their 
minds, but afforded a fair and proper hearing 
and passed the ordinance only after careful 
consideration of the need and effect of the 
annexation. [At 221-22.]
Generally, a governing body should simply “hear” 
persons who wish to speak during public hearings 
on annexation ordinances and make no effort to 
justify the annexation proposal; to do so will usually 
lead to long and meaningless arguments. A good 
procedure is for the mayor or other presiding officer 
to recognize each person who wishes to speak and 
thank him courteously at the conclusion of his 
remarks. If the crowd is large, the governing body 
may wish to direct that slips of paper or cards to be 
signed by persons who desire to speak be circulated 
among the audience and direct the presiding officer 
to call on them in some order. It may also direct 
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WHAT IS THE pRESENT RuLE?
Public Acts 1998, Chapter 1101, § 12, shifted the 
burden of proving the annexation was unreasonable 
from the city to the property owner contesting the 
annexation and took from the jury and gave to 
the circuit court or chancellor the responsibility 
for making the determination of whether the 
annexation is unreasonable. [T.C.A. § 6-58-111(a).] 
With respect to the shift in the burden of proof, 
T.C.A. § 6-58-111(a) provides that the burden is on 
the plaintiff to prove that:
• The annexation is “…unreasonable for the 
 overall well-being of the communities 
 involved”; OR
• That “the health, safety, and welfare of  
 the citizens and property owners of the 
 municipality and [the annexed] territory will 
 not be materially retarded in the absence of 
 such annexation.” T.C.A. § 6-58-111. 
That language appears to give the opponent of 
annexation the right to treat those two standards 
as separate alternative ones and to defeat the 
annexation by showing that the annexation does 
not meet one of them. For an analysis of this issue, 
including State ex rel. Tipton v. City of Knoxville, 
No. E2004-01359-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Filed 
January 17, 2006), see Chapter 5, Annexation by 
“Ordinance, Trial and Burden of Proof. 
HISTORy OF THE REASONABLENESS RuLE
In the initial annexation statute [Chapter 113, 
Public Acts of 1955] aggrieved property owners were 
given the right to contest the validity of annexation 
on the ground that “it reasonably may not be 
deemed necessary for the welfare of the residents 
and property owners of the affected territory and 
the municipality as a whole and so constitutes 
an exercise of power not conferred by law.” This 
provision produced a series of cases articulating 
the “fairly debatable” standard. Annexation being 
a legislative power, the function of the court was 
to determine whether the exercise of the legislative 
power was arbitrary or clearly unreasonable, and “if 
it was a fairly debatable question as to whether or 
not an annexation was reasonable or unreasonable, 
then the discretion of the legislative body was 
conclusive.” Morton v. Johnson City, 333 S.W.2d 
924 (1960). There was a presumption in favor of 
the annexation ordinance, and those contesting it 
had the burden of proving it to be unreasonable. 
Senff v. City of Columbia, 343 S.W.2d 888 (1961). 
The preponderance of evidence was not the test in 
annexation cases, but whether a fairly debatable 
question as to reasonableness existed. Hicks 
v. Chattanooga, 513 S.W.2d 790 (Tenn. 1974). 
In 1974 the annexation statute was amended 
to provide that in a suit contesting the validity 
of an annexation ordinance the municipality 
had the burden of proving that the ordinance 
was reasonable for the overall well-being of the 
communities involved. The amendment destroyed all 
presumptions of validity and demolished the “fairly 
debatable” rule [Kingsport v. Crown Enterprises, Inc.]. 
The statute placed “the burden of proving 
the annexation ordinance is reasonable for the 
overall well-being of the communities involved” 
upon the municipality. Wilson v. City of LaFayette, 
572 S.W.2d 922 (Tenn. 1978); State ex rel. 
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Public Acts of 1961, Chapter 220, added 
T.C.A. § 6-51-103(e), which gave owners of 
property the right to file suit to contest the 
validity of an annexation ordinance:
Should the territory hereafter sought to be 
annexed be the site of substantial industrial 
plant development, a fact to be ascertained by 
the court, the municipality shall have the burden 
of proving that the annexation of the site of the 
industrial plant development is not unreasonable 
in consideration of the factors above mentioned, 
including the necessity for, or use of municipal 
services by the industrial plant or plants, and 
the present ability and intent of the municipality 
to benefit the said industrial plant development 
by rendering municipal services when and as 
needed. The policy and purpose of this provision 
is to prevent annexation of industrial plants 
without the ability and intent to benefit the 
area annexed by rendering municipal services, 
when and as needed, and when such services are 
not used or required by the industrial plant.
To trigger the statute, the “territory” to be annexed 
must “be the site of substantial industrial plant 
development.” It is not enough that it “include” or 
“involve” or “embrace” an industrial development; 
it must be the development. This statute has no 
application in any annexation case wherein an 
industrial development is included within a larger 
area or territory annexed in good faith and in 
accordance with acceptable principles governing 
annexation. An 85-acre industrial development 
within an 806-acre annexation was not “the 
territory sought to be annexed” and the industrial 
amendment did not apply. City of Kingsport v. Crown 
Enterprises, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 808 (Tenn. 1978).
As noted above, under State ex rel. Tipton v. City of 
Knoxville, No. E2004-01359-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Filed January 17, 2006), it is safe to assume 
that Chapter 1101, § 12, probably changed the 
reasonableness rule to permit the plaintiff to prove 
that the annexation is either “unreasonable for the 
overall well-being of the communities involved, OR 
that “the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens 
and property owners of the municipality and [the 
annexed] territory will not be materially retarded in 
the absence of such annexation.” T.C.A. § 6-58-111. 
pRE-CHApTER 1101 CRITERIA OR FACTORS 
FOR DETERMINING REASONABLENESS
In cases filed and tried under T.C.A. § 6-51-103, 
the issue has been essentially the reasonableness of 
the ordinance applying the criteria set out in that 
statute. Spoone v. City of Morristown, 431 S.W.2d 827 
(1968). Paragraph (a) of that section speaks of such 
a suit as one to contest the validity of the ordinance 
on the ground that it reasonably may not be deemed 
necessary “for the welfare of the residents and 
property owners of the affected territory and the 
municipality as a whole.” Paragraph (b) provides 
that the municipality shall have the burden of 
proving that an annexation ordinance is reasonable 
“for the overall well-being of the communities 
involved.” Paragraph (c) states the question as 
being whether the proposed annexation be or be not 
unreasonable “in consideration of the health, safety 
and welfare of the citizens and property owners of 
the territory sought to be annexed and the citizens 
and property owners of the municipality.”
Where the territory sought to be annexed is the site 
of substantial plant development, the municipality 
has the burden of proving that the annexation 
of the site of the industrial plant development is 
not unreasonable in consideration of the factors 
mentioned above, including “the necessity for, or 
use of municipal services by the industrial plant or 
plants, and the present ability and intent of the 
municipality to benefit the said industrial plant 
development by rendering municipal services thereto 
when and as needed.” T.C.A. § 6-51-103(e).
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The basic test must be whether the ordinance 
is “reasonable for the overall well-being of the 
communities involved.” While other factors may 
be considered, the primary test of the 
reasonableness of an annexation ordinance must be 
the planned and orderly growth and development 
of the city, taking into consideration the 
characteristics of the existing city and those of the 
area proposed for annexation. Collier v. Pigeon Forge, 
599 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1980).
Factors to be taken into consideration in testing 
the reasonableness of any annexation ordinance 
would include:
1. The necessity for, or use of, municipal services;
2. The present ability and intent of the 
 municipality to render municipal services when 
 and as needed; and
3. Whether the annexation is for the sole purpose 
 of increasing municipal revenue without the 
 ability and intent to benefit the annexed area 
 by rendering municipal services. City of 
 Kingsport v. Crown Enterprises, Inc., 
 562 S.W.2d 808 (Tenn. 1978); 
 Saylors v. Jackson, 575 S.W.2d 264 
 (Tenn. 1978).
The need for city services is not of controlling 
significance. Collier v. Pigeon Forge, 
588 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1980).
The whole theory of annexation is that it is a device 
by which a municipal corporation may plan for its 
orderly growth and development. Heavily involved 
in this is control of fringe area developments and 
zoning measures to the end that areas of unsafe, 
unsanitary, and substandard housing may not “ring” 
the city to the detriment of the city as a whole. 
Annexation gives a city some control over its own 
destiny. Preserving property values, preventing 
development of incipient slum areas, providing 
adequate police protection within a metropolitan 
area, and extending city services to those who are 
already a part of the city as a practical proposition 
are the legitimate concerns of any progressive city. 
Kingsport v. Crown Enterprise, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 808 
(Tenn. 1978).
This reasoning is probably even more pertinent 
when the annexation deals with an area lying in 
the growth pattern of a tourist-oriented city. It is 
a vital concern in guarding against the helter-skelter 
establishment of commercial activities that may 
not be in harmony with those already in operation. 
Indeed, preventing incompatible commercial 
enterprises is a high municipal duty. The failure of 
a city to extend its corporate boundaries to embrace 
contiguous areas of growth and development is an 
abdication of responsibility. The time to annex is in 
the incipient stage of growth, lest the basic purpose 
of annexation be frustrated and the public interest 
suffer by the annexation of substandard areas. 
Collier v. Pigeon Forge, 599 S.W.2d 545 
(Tenn. 1978). Said the court in that case:
We should emphasize that this is not, 
as appellants insist, merely a “strip” or 
“shoestring” or “corridor” annexation, although 
it is long and lean. (Area one mile long situated 
astride Highway 441 with 200 feet on each 
side). Such annexations, so long as they take in 
people, private property, or commercial activities 
and rest on some reasonable and rational basis, 
and are not per se to be condemned. We do not 
deal with an annexation wherein a city attempts 
to run its corporate limits down the right-of-way 
of an established road without taking in a single 
citizen or a single piece of private property. 
Such an annexation is perhaps questionable and 
is not here involved. As in any annexation, and 
more particularly one wherein a geometrically 
irregular parcel of land is annexed, the Court 
must scrutinize the stated and ostensible 
purpose of the annexation. [At 546-47.]
The record showed that the officials of the city of 
Pigeon Forge were motivated by a civic-minded 
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compulsion to control and coordinate the expansion 
and growth of the city and to ensure that its 
development was on an orderly basis, in keeping 
with the character of the existing city. Additionally 
they were concerned about aesthetic considerations.
pROOF OF REASONABLENESS
In Cope v. City of Morristown, 404 S.W.2d 798 
(1966), the Tennessee Supreme Court summarized 
the evidence in the record that was presented on 
the question of reasonableness of the annexation 
ordinance. The testimony of experts in the field 
of municipal government sufficiently familiar with 
the town of Morristown was said to be proper. This 
case appeared to provide guidance in the choice 
of witnesses and the evidence to be presented. In 
Senff v. City of Columbia, 343 S.W.2d 888 (1961), 
it was held that the mayor of the city has a right 
to testify. Other cases touching upon witnesses 
and evidence are Balsinger v. Madisonville, 
435 S.W.2d 808 (1968); Spoone v. Morristown, 
431 S.W.2d 827 (1968), and Vollmer v. City of 
Memphis, 792 S.W.2d 446 (Tenn. 1990). In the 
latter case, the court declared that it was not an 
error for the chancellor to allow the director of 
legislative affairs for the city of Memphis to testify 
as an expert witness in regard to planning matters. 
He was the liaison between the mayor’s office and 
city council. In that capacity he was involved in, 
and familiar with, the Cordova annexation, its 
background, fiscal impact, and the part it played 
in the growth of the city of Memphis.
Where a territory proposed to be annexed includes 
farm land, courts in other states have considered 
the value of the land as a guide in determining the 
reasonableness or propriety of its annexation, the 
land having a high value far in excess of its value 
for farming purposes only because of its prospective 
use for city purposes. In Morton v. Johnson City, 
333 S.W.2d 924 (1960), the Tennessee Supreme 
Court agreed with the reasoning of these courts, 
upholding the annexation of territory that included 
a number of small farm tracts valued at far in 
excess of other like farm land out in the county 
not contiguous or close to the city. The mere fact 
that a large percentage of the tract proposed to be 
annexed consists of agricultural land is not of itself 
a basis for holding the ordinance annexing the area 
to be null and void. [Also see Morton for the view 
that a reason for annexation may be to prevent 
incorporation of a separate corporation right 
on the edge of the town.]
KIND AND quALITy OF pROOF  
The kind and quality of the proof of the reasonable-
ness (and unreasonableness) of annexation 
ordinances is reflected in the following cases:
Hicks v. Chattanooga, 513 S.W.2d 780 (1974) 
In general, as to the four areas to be annexed, 
it was shown by the plaintiffs that the county 
was able to provide health services, a planning 
commission, police protection through its sheriff’s 
department, pollution control, a landfill operation, 
county roads, and county schools; that water 
and electricity were available; that septic tanks 
were reasonably efficient; that private garbage 
collection and fire protection were available; that 
some recreational facilities were available; that the 
health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of these 
areas was not endangered; and that the prosperity 
of the residents of the affected areas in the 
municipality would not be materially retarded if the 
annexation were not permitted. The plaintiff’s proof 
was that the city had failed to provide adequately 
the services mentioned within the present city and 
that it would not be financially able to provide 
the services to the annexed areas and that, 
consequently, it would be unfair to raise their taxes 
for services not received. It was, therefore, their 
position that annexation of these four areas was 
unreasonable under all the circumstances.
On the other hand, it was shown by the city 
that the areas in question had no fire protection 
comparable to what the city could offer (and which 
would ultimately lower insurance rates); that the 
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city would provide better police protection; that 
the schools would have available more funds with 
a smaller teacher-pupil ratio; that the health of 
these areas was endangered due to septic tank 
percolation problems and that the city could provide 
sewers that had never been provided by the county; 
and that the county does not provide refuse and 
garbage collection, recreational facilities, street 
lighting, traffic engineering, or certain inspection 
services, all of which would be provided by the 
city. In addition, the vast majority of the people 
in the proposed areas worked in the city, their 
economic opportunities were provided by the city, 
recreational facilities could be better provided by 
the city, the airport was provided by the city, and 
cultural advantages were provided by the city and 
used by county residents. It was necessary and 
right that the tax burden for all such service shall 
be equitably distributed. It was shown that the city 
was financially able to and would provide the usual 
municipal services in accordance with the schedule 
of services or before the dates scheduled.
The validity of the annexation ordinance sustained 
under the “fairly debatable rule” was in effect at 
that time.
Pirtle v. City of Jackson, 560 S.W.2d 400 
(Tenn. 1977)
The Utility Division of the city of Jackson now 
furnishes the annexed area with gas service, electric 
service, water service, and bus service. The Bemis 
area, which has a sewage collection system built 
by the Bemis Bag Company, has been permitted to 
tie its system into the waste disposal system of the 
city of Jackson. The north Bemis area, where septic 
tanks are used, has a problem with sewage in low-
lying areas after heavy rainfall. This condition and 
its attendant danger to the health of the residents 
of north Bemis and nearby areas will be corrected 
by the installation of sewers as called for by the 
plan of services. Further, the record shows that on 
annexation, the up-to-date city of Jackson Fire 
Department will be substituted for the volunteer 
fire department now serving a large part of the 
annexed area, and the city police department will be 
substituted for the limited manpower of the sheriff’s 
office and the private guards of Bemis Bag Company. 
There will be universal garbage collection rather 
than pick ups by a private concern on a subscriber 
basis with nonsubscribers, such as Mr. Pirtle, taking 
their garbage to remote areas of the county for 
dumping on private property with permission of 
the owners. In addition to the services enumerated 
above, the annexed areas will get building 
department services, housing services, and health 
department services.
It also is suggested by appellants that the city 
failed to carry the burden of showing that its 
annexation of the Bemis area, which is the site 
of the Bemis Bag Company, was not “for the sole 
purpose of increasing municipal revenue, without 
the ability and intent to benefit the area annexed by 
rendering municipal services, when and as needed, 
and when such services are not used or required 
by the industrial plants.” We find no basis for this 
position. Many municipal services are already being 
furnished to the residents of Bemis and the Bemis 
Bag Company. Further the uncontradicted evidence 
is that for several years the additional revenue 
received by the city of Jackson as the result of the 
annexation will be less than the cost of carrying out 
the plan of service to the annexed areas.” 
The city carried its burden of proving reasonableness 
of the annexation ordinance.
Saylors v. City of Jackson, 575 S.W.2d 264 
(Tenn. 1978) 
A civil engineer and the chief environmentalist of 
the Jackson-Madison County Health Department 
testified that most homes in the annexed areas are 
served by septic tanks and that a health hazard 
existed because of surface drainage problems. The 
annexation plans include installation of sewer 
services and curbs and gutters to protect the area 
from flooding. Testimony was developed at trial that 
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the Northside area lacked a full-time fire service; 
that police service was inadequate for a developing 
community; and that existing building, electric, fire, 
gas, and plumbing codes were not being enforced. 
Mayor Conger testified that the annexed area 
would be provided regular police protection, a new 
fire station, and street lights. His testimony was 
corroborated by that of a city planner, a fire chief, 
a city commissioner and an insurance agent, who 
testified that lower home insurance premiums in the 
Northside area would result from the annexation. 
There was additional testimony concerning the 
added benefits to the Northfield area of improved 
recreational facilities, sanitation services, and 
highway improvements.
In light of the above, the court found that the 
appellee has established that the annexation 
would further the health, safety, and welfare of the 
property owners of both the municipality and the 
annexed area. The improved municipal services that 
will accrue to the citizens of the Northside area 
and the need for the citizens of Jackson to control 
a fringe area development point to the obvious 
reasonableness of the annexation ordinance.
The reasonableness of ordinance clearly shown 
by a preponderance of the evidence.
Wilson v. Lafayette, 572 S.W.2d 922 (Tenn. 1978)
Most of the testimony was directed to showing 
a need for services in the annexed area and the 
ability of the city to furnish those services. For 
example, there was testimony showing that the 
annexed area already draws heavily on the city of 
LaFayette for such needed services as water, fire 
protection, and garbage disposal. In addition to 
those services there was evidence that the city will 
make fire protection more available, will upgrade 
police protection, will inspect and monitor future 
construction in the area, and will perform needed 
maintenance on roads. There also was testimony 
that without the services provided by the city, 
property in the annexed area will deteriorate, and 
its deterioration will adversely affect property 
within the city.
Further, there was testimony that the annexed area 
is in need of sewers and that the need will increase 
as population in the area increases. Even now, 
residents of the annexed area and of the city are 
exposed to a potential health hazard from wells in 
the annexed area contaminated by septic tank flow. 
Also, a potential health hazard was shown to exist 
in a part of the city where the septic tank is the 
only way to disperse sewage. The city of LaFayette 
has taken affirmative steps to alleviate the health 
hazard within its city limits by constructing sewers. 
Engineering studies have been made, plans have 
been drawn, and an application has been filed with 
the Environmental Protection Agency for necessary 
funding. The city’s need for sewers has resulted 
in its being given a “top priority for funding” in 
the state of Tennessee. The plan of services for 
the annexed area also calls for the construction of 
sewers as part of the ongoing efforts of the city to 
protect the health of its citizens and those in the 
annexed area. 
The evidence clearly demonstrated that the 
annexation was logical and reasonable and to the 
best interest of both the citizens and property 
owners of the city and of those in the annexed area.
City of Kingsport v. Crown Enterprises, Inc., 
562 S.W.2d 808 (Tenn. 1978) 
The court agreed with the trial judge that:
1. There are no residential dwellings on the 
 annexed property;
2. Preston Farm Associates intends to develop its 
 309 acres as a residential subdivision;
3. Sullivan County owns a 63-acre tract where 
 a new high school is to be constructed;
4. Crown Enterprises and Mason and Dixon are 
 substantial corporate entities, employing a large 
 number of people in the Kingsport area and 
 paying substantial taxes;
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 5. Mason and Dixon has an adequate sewage 
 treatment plan, and its connection with the city 
 sewer line is unnecessary;
 6. The annexation study report shows that the 
 806-acre territory is in need of zoning and other 
 municipal service in order to coordinate an 
 orderly development of the entire area;
 7. The city of Kingsport has adequate service 
 in the areas of police protection, fire protection, 
 education, planning, traffic engineering, and 
 refuse collection, all of which could be extended 
 to the annexed area;
 8. The city plans to expend approximately 
 $320,000 to extend city sewer and water lines 
 into the annexed area;
 9. The total tax revenue accruing to the city from 
 the annexed property would be $85,281, of 
 which appellees would pay approximately  
 56 percent; and.
10. That “the site in question constitutes a site 
 of substantial industrial development.”  
 Mason and Dixon is a site of substantial 
 industrial development.
When consideration is given to the entire record, we 
are fully persuaded that the annexation ordinance 
under consideration represents a fair, reasonable 
and responsible effort of the city of Kingsport to 
cause its municipal boundaries to keep apace of the 
growth and development of the city.
The decision of trial judge that the city failed to 
carry burden of proof was reversed. The ordinance 
was declared valid.
Cope v. City of Morristown, 
404 S.W.2d 798 (1966)
Mr. Carl Cope testified that there was a sinkhole 
in the area in question, which had been there for 
some 10 years and that county officials had advised 
residents that they were unable to satisfactorily 
rectify the situation; that there was no routine 
police patrol through the area, either by the 
county sheriff’s office or the highway patrol; and 
that he has never seen a patrol car in the area. He 
further stated that in case of fire, the cities of the 
area would try to put it out, but that he knows 
of at least one instance when the Morristown Fire 
Department had sent a fire truck to their assistance; 
that the county rendered a weekly garbage pick-up 
service but that the garbage was disposed of at 
a city-operated and maintained garbage dump, 
which no resident of the area paid to maintain; and 
that all of the residents of the area are on septic 
tanks, some of which have given trouble, his being 
one of them.
Bud Wolfe, the road superintendent of Hamblen 
County, testified that he had visited the area in 
question to look at the so-called sinkhole, but that 
the county had never done anything about water 
that collects there.
The Honorable George W. Jaynes, general sessions 
judge, testified that there were only three salaried 
deputies for all of Hamblen County, while the town 
of Morristown 28 policemen. He further stated that 
teachers in the town of Morristown were paid more 
than Hamblen County teachers, and that teachers’ 
pay was one element going toward the creation of 
a better school system.
The city recorder, Charles Smith, testified that in 
both 1964 and 1965, the city had operated with 
a surplus over its budgeted expenditures.
Mr. Elwood P. Hastic, chief sanitarian with the 
Hamblen County Health Department, testified that 
generally over the county area, garbage was picked 
up only once a month and that the city maintains 
a full-time health department employee for city 
service whose primary duty is insect control. He 
further testified that water in the Ridgeview area 
is furnished by the town of Morristown; that 
percolation tests had never been carried out in the 
Ridgeview area to ascertain whether that area was 
adaptable to septic tank usage; and that there had 
been septic tank failures in the Ridgeview area and 
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some parts of the Ridgeview area were unsuitable for 
septic tank usage, the trouble being aggravated by 
a concentration of septic tanks with a likelihood of 
increased problems with continued usage. It was his 
opinion that unsanitary conditions would develop 
in the area in the future. He also testified at some 
length concerning the likelihood that problems 
would develop in the future because of a lack of any 
program for the control of flies, mosquitos, insects, 
and vermin.
Mr. W. P. Bell testified that the water lines in 
the Ridgeview area belong to the Morristown 
Water System.
Mr. Amos Turley, an employee of the Appalachian 
Electric Co-operative, which furnished power to 
Ridgeview, testified that service to the area 
would be easier if provided by the Morristown 
Power System.
Mr. Earl Missing, city engineer for the town of 
Morristown, testified that sewer availability in 
the city was between 95 percent and 97 percent 
and that he did not believe other towns of 
comparable size were sewered to that extent. He 
further testified that the sinkhole problem could 
be eliminated; that garbage collection and street 
maintenance could be extended to the Ridgeview 
area with existing personnel; and that a street 
washing service could be extended to the area.
Mr. Ed Tucker, office manager and accountant with 
the Morristown power and water system testified 
that the contemplated extension of service to the 
area was within the financial resources of the system 
and that present water rates in the area would be 
reduced by 50 percent.
The following testimony introduced by defendants 
in error abundantly supports the action of the 
trial judge. Dr. Lee S. Greene, head of the Political 
Science Department of the University of Tennessee, 
testified that he had visited the area and was 
generally familiar with the growth and industrial 
development of Morristown. It was his opinion that 
cities should annex areas before development of the 
area and that the area in question being partially 
developed, it was logical that the area be annexed. 
He expressed his opinion that service and facilities 
necessary to the prosperity, welfare, health, and 
safety of both the residents of Morristown and 
the Ridgeview area would best be provided by 
annexation. He further testified that the bonded 
indebtedness of Morristown was not excessive, 
and the interest rate on the indebtedness was 
quite good.
Mr. Victor Hobday, a consultant on municipal 
government, then director of the Municipal 
Technical Advisory Service, a part of the Extension 
Division of the University of Tennessee, testified 
that he was generally familiar with Morristown and 
its environs and that it would be beneficial to all 
the people of the community to keep the community 
under a single municipal government.
Mr. William V. Ricker, city administrator of the town 
of Morristown, testified that 45 heads of households 
in the area to be annexed are employed inside the 
city; that sewer service would be contemplated to 
be rendered to the annexed area within two years; 
that a new patrol car had been added to the police 
force for the purpose of patrolling newly annexed 
areas and that police protection could and would 
be rendered to the area with existing patrol cars 
and officers; that immediate fire protection would 
be rendered to the area, a new fire hall near the 
area being planned for 1967; that a savings on 
fire insurance would follow annexation; that trash 
and garbage service would be rendered to the area; 
and that streets in the area would be curbed and 
guttered, a regular street maintenance program 
would be carried out, the sinkhole area would be 
corrected, a storm drain system would be installed, 
and there would be no need for students to attend 
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county schools against their will. He further 
testified that various city inspection services would 
be rendered in the area; that plumbing codes, health 
codes, and fire codes would be instituted; that 
planning and zoning regulations would be effective 
upon annexation; that the Morristown Power System 
would take over electrical service; that street lights 
would be installed; and that the expenses involved 
for these improvements and operations are within 
the feasible structure of the city’s finances.
The annexation was held reasonable under the 
“fairly debatable” rule then in effect.
Vollmer v. City of Memphis, 
792 S.W.2d 466 (Tenn. 1990)
The evidence at trial was ample to show that the 
growth of the City of Memphis will be inhibited 
if Cordova is not annexed and is allowed to 
incorporate as planned. Annexation of the area to 
be incorporated into the city limits would place the 
citizens of that area on the tax rolls of the City of 
Memphis. Residents of the area would participate 
in payments for city services and amenities which 
the majority of them now enjoy without cost, 
including parks, libraries and other public facilities 
financed and provided by the city. The great 
majority of the residents in the area are employed 
in Memphis and commute by automobiles which do 
not presently meet the emissions standards required 
of automobiles owned by Memphis residents. 
Compliance with these standards will insure cleaner 
air for citizens of the entire region. Ambulance 
and fire services would be greatly enhanced by 
annexation and immediate construction of new 
facilities in the Cordova area. Sanitary services, 
street construction and upkeep will improve as 
well as police protection. Annexation will bring the 
Cordova area within the Memphis City School System 
which is better equipped and financed than that 
currently provided otherwise. It is plain that a great 
deal of material evidence supports the jury verdict 
that annexation of the proposed territory by the City 
of Memphis is reasonable, taking into consideration 
the health safety and welfare of the citizens and 
property owners of the area to be annexed, as well 
as the City of Memphis. [At 449.]
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CORRIDOR ANNEXATIONS
GENERALLy 
Chapter 1101 set restrictions on how and when 
corridor annexations could occur during the period 
before the countywide growth plan was adopted. 
Those restrictions expired after the adoption of the 
countywide growth plans. T.C.A. § 6-58-108(c).  
But, corridor annexations must still be approached 
with caution.
In State ex rel. Collier v. City of Pigeon Forge, 
599 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1980), the Tennessee 
Supreme Court distinguished between “corridor,” 
“strip,” and “shoestring” annexations on one hand, 
and “long and lean” annexations on the other. In 
that case, the city annexed an area contiguous 
to the city about one mile long the width of the 
main highway through the city. The territory 
had a population of 47 people. In upholding the 
annexation as reasonable, the court said:
We should emphasize that this is not, as 
appellants insist, merely a “strip” or “shoestring” 
or “corridor” annexation, although it is long and 
lean. Such annexations, so long as they take in 
people, private property, or commercial activity, 
and rest on some reasonable and rational basis, 
is not per se to be condemned. We do not deal 
with an annexation wherein a city attempts to 
run its corporate limits down the right-of-way of 
an established road without taking in a single 
citizen or a single piece of private property. Such 
an annexation is perhaps questionable and is not 
here involved. As in any annexation, and more 
particularly one where a geometrically irregular 
parcel of land is annexed, the Court must 
scrutinize the stated and ostensible purpose of 
the annexation. [At 547.] [Emphasis is mine.]
There are two substantive points in Collier:
• First, by whatever name they are called, 
 annexations that run down rights of way or 
 other artificial or natural features of land 
 and that take in no other territory or people  
 are “perhaps questionable”; and 
• Second, in any annexation, particularly those 
 involving geometrically irregular parcels of  
 land, the court must scrutinize the stated and 
 ostensible purpose of the annexation.
In a broad sense, most annexations are 
geometrically irregular, but Collier applied that 
description to annexations that are not reasonably 
consistent with the planned and orderly growth of 
the city. Also see Hart v. City of Johnson City, 
801 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. 1990).
CHALLENGES TO STRIp, SHOESTRING 
AND CORRIDOR ANNEXATIONS
Generally, T.C.A. § 6-51-103 authorizes challenges 
to annexation ordinances by quo warranto suits by 
property owners inside the annexed territory within 
30 days following the annexation. But in State ex 
rel. Earhart v. City of Bristol, 970 S.W.2d 948 
(Tenn. 1998), the Tennessee Supreme Court held 
that T.C.A. § 6-51-103 applies only to challenges 
based on the reasonableness of the annexation. It 
permitted property owners annexed in 1995 by the 
city of Bristol to challenge on constitutional grounds 
by a declaratory judgment suit a corridor annexation 
adopted in 1989; the territory annexed in 1995 was 
attached to the corridor annexed in 1989. Citing 
State ex rel. Collier v. City of Pigeon Forge,  
599 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1980), the court frowned 
CHApTER 11
“problem” Annexations
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upon corridor annexations, declaring that “the 
30 day limitation does not apply to declaratory 
judgment suits contesting the validity of an 
ordinance which purports to annex an area that does 
not include people, private property, or commercial 
activity and is, therefore, void.” [At 954.]  
[Citing Collier.]
In that connection it also declared that:
The majority of courts have interpreted the 
requirement that annexed land be “contiguous” 
to not allow the annexation of thin strips 
of land to connect a larger parcel of land to 
a municipality. [Citation omitted.]… These 
decisions articulate the principle implicit in the 
Tennessee statute. [At 953-54.]
  
It is not clear whether Earhart applies only to 
corridor, strip, or shoestring annexations, or 
perhaps to other annexations that do not take in 
people, private property, or commercial property. 
But the Tennessee Court of Appeals gave it such a 
limitation in the unreported case of Snell v. City of 
Murfreesboro, 1004 WL 1924032 (2004). There, the 
territory annexed by the city included several acres 
and 1,600 feet of road right of way that connected 
those acres to the city. The plaintiffs, who owned 
property abutting the road (but not in the annexed 
territory), challenged the annexation under the 
Declaratory Judgments Act, arguing that the road 
right of way contained no people, private property, 
or commercial activity and that the annexed 
property was not contiguous to the city. They urged 
the court to find that the annexation was illegal 
under both T.C.A. § 6-51-101 et seq. and Earhart.
The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing 
to challenge the annexation by ordinance under 
T.C.A. § 6-51-103(a)(1) because they did not live 
in the territory annexed as required by that statute 
as it had been interpreted by Hart v. City of Johnson 
City, 801 S.W.21d 512 (Tenn. 1990). The court also 
rejected the plaintiff’s Earhart claim, declaring 
that the annexation did include people and private 
property (in the territory at the end of the road 
right of way), and reasoning that:
…Earhart clearly applies only in those situations 
where a municipality passes an ordinance 
that “purports to annex an area that does not 
include people, private property, or commercial 
activity and is, therefore, void.”… Because 
the annexed territory in this case does include 
people and private property, the quo warranto 
remedy is available tos challenge the annexation 
ordinance in question; it is just not available to 
Appellants. The alternative remedy of declaratory 
judgment is therefore not available to Appellants 
under the rationale set out in Earhart. Under 
both T.C.A. § 6-51-103 and Earhart, Appellants 
lack legal standing to challenge the annexation 
ordinance… [At 5.]
But in the unreported case of Town of Oakland 
v. Town of Somerville, 2003 WL 22309498 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 2003), the court allowed the town of Oakland 
to sue the town of Somerville in a declaratory 
judgment action on grounds other than whether 
the territory annexed by the town of Somerville 
contained people, private property, or commercial 
activity. In that case, Oakland alleged that the 
Somerville ordinance was void because it was 
enacted after Oakland’s annexation ordinance on 
the same property had been passed on final reading 
[but before the effective date of the ordinance] and 
that Somerville breached its agreement with Oakland 
regarding the annexation of property in Oakland’s 
“annexation reserve” area. The court concluded that 
“Oakland clearly sought to contest the validity of 
the annexation, not its reasonableness, an action 
which Earhart clearly holds is permissible under 
the Declaratory Judgment Act and not subject to 
the time limitations available to quo warranto 
proceedings.” [At 8.]
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“DONuT HOLE” ANNEXATIONS
GENERALLy 
Donut hole annexations rest on legally shaky 
ground in Tennessee. In City of Kingsport v. State 
ex rel. Crown Enterprises, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 808 
(Tenn. 1978), Crown Enterprises challenged 
Kingsport’s annexation of 806 acres, which 
included an 85-acre industrial park owned by 
Crown Enterprises and used by its subsidiary, 
Mason and Dixon Lines (M&D). The trial court 
found the annexation unreasonable for several 
reasons: The 85-acre site used by M&D was 
industrial, M&D provided virtually all its own 
services, and annexation of the M&D property 
was solely for the purpose of obtaining tax 
revenue in violation of T.C.A. § 6-51-103.
In overturning the trial court, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court declared that, “The basic fallacy in 
the trial judge’s conclusion is that he treated the 
controversy as if the Crown-M&D Property were the 
only territory being annexed as opposed to being 
but a small portion of a substantially larger territory 
being annexed in good faith.” The court was not 
impressed with Crown Enterprise’s argument that 
M&D didn’t need city services because:
The whole process of annexation would be 
frustrated if the city could only annex those 
properties then in need of city services. The 
result of this would tend to create islands of 
unincorporated areas within a city and the 
archipelagic monstrosity thus created would 
thwart the rendition of essential city services and 
would not be in the public interest.
Appellees do not contest the annexation of the 
remaining property. Should we uphold their 
contention the result would be the creation 
of an 85 acre island or enclave, completely 
surrounded by the City of Kingsport. This area 
thus omitted would be within, but not a part of 
a city. Absent the most compelling considerations, 
such a situation would be intolerable and an 
annexation that produced such a result would 
not meet the test of reasonableness. [At 814.] 
[Emphasis is mine.]
KINDS OF DONuT HOLE ANNEXATIONS
The courts in other states have gone both ways on 
the question of whether donut hole annexations 
meet the test of contiguity where, as in the case of 
Tennessee, the annexation statute does not define 
the term “contiguity.” Two kinds of donuts have 
been issues in those cases: one where one or more 
parts of the donut hole actually touches the city 
(technically, the donut is broken at one or more 
points) and one where the donut hole is completely 
surrounded by the city. The weight of authority is 
that donut hole annexations of the latter kind do 
not meet the test of contiguity. [See 49 ALR3d 589.] 
City of Kingsport v. State ex rel. Crown Enterprises, 
Inc., 582 S.W.2d 808i (Tenn. 1978), points to the 
prospect that the Tennessee courts could also follow 
the majority rule and hold that such annexations are 
not contiguous as well as unreasonable.
 
Indeed, it would take only a short step for the 
Tennessee courts to connect Crown Enterprise and 
Earhart on that point.
CORRIDOR AND DONuT HOLE ANNEXATIONS 
By REFERENDuM 
Although Tennessee’s annexation statute makes no 
provision for judicial review for annexations done by 
referendum, it is said in State ex rel. Vicars v. City 
of Kingsport, 659 S.W.2d 367 (Tenn. Ct. App.1983), 
that such annexations are subject to judicial 
review on constitutional grounds. Also see State 
ex rel. Earhart v. City of Bristol, 970 S.W.2d 948 
(Tenn. 1998).
DONuT HOLES CREATED By DEANNEXATION
The Tennessee courts do not appear to have 
addressed the question of whether donut holes 
created under the deannexation statute are legal.
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ANNEXATION By ACquIESCENCE
Two unreported Tennessee cases deal with 
the question of how the courts might treat 
an annexation that is procedurally defective 
in some way but that has been treated by both 
the municipality and the population in the 
annexed territory as part of the municipality 
for a long period.
In King v. City of Watertown, 1986 WL 10696 (Tenn. 
Ct. App.), the city’s charter required ordinances to 
be passed on two readings and to be signed by the 
mayor. The annexation ordinance at issue in this 
case was passed only once on January 26, 1976, 
and never signed by the mayor. The court held 
that the 30-day limit on the filing of quo warranto 
annexation suits contained in T.C.A. § 6-51-103 did 
not apply because no annexation ordinance had ever 
been passed, but it also held that the “annexed” 
territory was part of the city by acquiescence.
The court reasoned that:
1. The property appeared on the tax rolls of the 
city in 1978, and the plaintiff’s predecessors 
in title paid city property taxes for the years 
1978 through 1982. The plaintiffs purchased the 
property on November 5, 1982, and paid city 
property taxes for the year 1983 and business 
taxes in 1982 and 1983 for the grocery and fruit 
market they operated there.
2. The city charges outside residents for water at 
the rate of one-and-one-half times the rate it 
charges inside residents. The plaintiffs have at 
all times paid the inside water rate.
3. The city provides free garbage pickup to city 
residents and to businesses for $6 per month. 
The plaintiffs turned down city garbage service 
for their store.
4. The plaintiffs were provided city 
 police protection.
5. All the county and city maps since 1978 showed 
the property as being located within the city 
limits of Watertown.
6. The plaintiffs raised no question regarding being 
a part of the city until 1983 when they applied 
to the Wilson County Beer Board for a license to 
sell beer at their grocery store. The sale of beer 
was prohibited inside the city of Watertown. 
They were refused a license because the city of 
Watertown contended the property was within 
the corporate limits of the city.
Citing Roane County v. Anderson County, 
14 S.W. 1079 (1890), Putnam County v. White 
County, 203 S.W. 334 (1918), and Putnam County 
v. Smith County, 164 S.W. 1147 (1914), for the 
proposition that a county could lose property to 
another county by laches and long acquiescence, 
the court also pointed to several cases in other 
jurisdictions in which it had been held that a local 
government can lose property to another local 
government by acquiescence: City of Whiting v. City 
of East Chicago, 359 N.E.2d 536 (1977); Starry 
v. Lake, 28 P.2d.80 (1933) (Calif.); LaPorta 
v. Village of Philmont, 346 N.E.2d 503 (1976) 
(New York). It also pointed to Township of Scotch 
Plains v. Town of Westfield for the proposition 
that “It has also been held that maps published 
by authority of law may be referred to as evidence.” 
[At 4.]
In this case, concluded the court:
We are of the opinion that acquiescence over 
the long period of time in the location of the 
municipal boundary by both the municipality 
and the inhabitants of the municipality where 
municipal action and improvements have been 
done under the assumption that the property 
is located within the boundary will support the 
conclusion that the boundaries acquiesced in are 
the true boundaries…Here, plaintiffs and their 
predecessors in title have acquiesced in the 
property being considered inside the city limits 
of Watertown, Tennessee. The property was 
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originally zoned and subdivided to the plaintiffs’ 
and their predecessors’ benefit by and according 
to the zoning codes of the City of Watertown. 
City services have been provided to and enjoyed 
by the plaintiffs. City and county maps show the 
property to be inside the corporate limits of the 
City of Watertown…Plaintiffs acquiesced in their 
property being a part of the City of Watertown 
until such time as it no longer suited their 
purposes. Then, and only then, did they raise 
any objection. [At 4.]
It is clear that a similar result would have been 
reached in White v. City of Townsend, 1995 WL 
306877 (Tenn. Ct. App.), had not the city held two 
annexation referenda [the first ended in a tie, the 
second in a defeat for the annexation] pending the 
appeal of the trial court’s decision in 1994 that the 
annexation ordinance passed in November 1959, was 
procedurally defective. The court at length discussed 
King v. City of Watertown and declared that:
We are of the opinion that under the authority 
of King and under the circumstances here the 
plaintiffs’ property was, prior to this action, 
located within the corporate limits of the City 
of Townsend. We are compelled to point out, 
however that a Rule 11, T.R.A.P., application was 
made to the Supreme Court for review of King 
v. City of Watertown. Permission to appeal was 
denied, with the Supreme Court concurring in 
results only, January 5, 1987. Since we are not 
privy to the reasons of the Supreme Court for 
their action, we nevertheless accept King as an 
implicit approval of the principle of “annexation 
by acquiescence,” since in our view, the result 
reached in King could have been reached in 
no other way except through annexation by 
acquiescence or some form of estoppel brought 
about the acquiescence and acceptance of city 
services. [At 7.]
But the court reasoned that “the action of the city 
in calling two referenda while asserting the property 
in question is within the municipal boundaries of 
the city is contradictory and an effective disclaimer 
of ‘annexation by acquiescence.’” [At 10.]
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ANNEXING MuNICIpALITy’S RIGHT 
TO pROvIDE MuNICIpAL SERvICES
Two statutes generally address the right of 
an annexing municipality to provide municipal 
services inside the annexed territory, including 
utility services: T.C.A. § 6-51-111 with respect 
to all municipal services except service provided 
by electrical cooperative and T.C.A. § 6-51-112 
with respect to services provided by 
electrical cooperative. 
T.C.A. § 6-51-111 provides that following 
an annexation accomplished by either ordinance 
or referendum:
…an annexing municipality and any affected 
instrumentality of the State of Tennessee, 
such as, but not limited to, a utility district, 
sanitary district, school district, or other 
public service district, shall attempt to reach 
agreement in writing for allocation and 
conveyance to the annexing municipality of 
any or all public functions, rights, duties, 
property, assets, and liabilities of such state 
instrumentality that justice and reason may 
require in the circumstances. Any and all 
agreements entered into before March 8, 1955, 
relating to annexation shall be preserved. The 
annexing municipality, if and to the extent 
it may choose, shall have the exclusive right 
to perform or provide municipal and utility 
functions and services in any territory which it 
annexes, subject, notwithstanding § 7-82-301 
or any other statute, subject, however, to the 
provisions of this section with respect to electric 
cooperatives. [Subsection (a).]
The same statute provides that: 
Subject to the annexing city’s exclusive rights 
under the statute, any matters upon which the 
parties have not come to a written agreement 
in 60 days after the operative date of the 
annexation shall be settled by arbitration and 
review under the rules set out in the statute. 
[Subsection (b).]
Where the annexed territory is being provided 
with utility service by a state instrumentality, 
the agreement or arbitration award must protect 
the bondholders and contract rights under the 
conditions of the statute. [Subsection (c).]
 
If a private individual or business entity provides 
utility services within the boundaries of 
a municipality pursuant to a privilege, franchise, 
etc., from the municipality, and the municipality 
annexes territory which includes the service area of 
a utility district, the private individual or business 
and the utility district shall attempt to reach an 
agreement for the latter to convey to the former 
any or all public functions, rights, duties, property, 
assets and liabilities of such utility district that 
reason and justice may require. If an agreement is 
not reached, then notwithstanding the change of 
municipal boundaries, the service area of the utility 
district shall remain unchanged and the private 
individual or business entity shall not provide 
utility service in the utility district’s service area. 
[Subsection (d).]
CHApTER 12
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If at the time of the annexation the annexed 
territory is being provided with utility service 
by a municipal utility service or other state 
instrumentality, including a utility district, the 
annexing municipality can purchase all or part 
of the utility system by delivering to the utility 
system written notice of its election to exercise 
its right under the statute to be the exclusive 
service provider. The purchase price and terms 
of payment shall be those agreed upon by 
the parties. If the parties cannot agree on 
a purchase price, a final determination of 
the fair market value of the properties being 
acquired and all other outstanding issues 
related to the provision of utility services in the 
annexed area shall be made using the arbitration 
procedures contained in Subsection (b), above. 
Additional provisions governing arbitration are 
contained in the statute. [Subsection (e).]
Subsection (e) was added to T.C.A. § 6-51-111 
by Public Acts 1998, Chapter 922, undoubtedly in 
response to the case of Knoxville Utilities Board 
v. Lenoir City Utilities Board, 943 S.W.2d 979 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). The question in that case 
was whether T.C.A. § 7-51-111 or T.C.A. § 6-51-112 
controlled the taking by the city of Knoxville of 
utility property owned by the Lenoir City Utilities 
Board in territory annexed by the city of Knoxville. 
At the time of the annexation T.C.A. § 6-51-111 
contained no provisions for compensation to be 
paid by an annexing municipality to governmental 
entities covered by that statute for such property, 
while T.C.A. § 6-51-112 provided for compensation 
to be paid by an annexing municipality to electrical 
cooperatives for the taking of such property. The 
Lenoir City Utilities Board did not qualify as an 
electrical cooperative under T.C.A. § 6-51-112; 
rather, it fell under T.C.A. § 6-51-111 and was 
not entitled to compensation for the taking of its 
property by the city of Knoxville. But subsection (e) 
is limited only to municipal electrical services and 
state instrumentalities, including utility districts; it 
does not apply to utilities providing other kinds of 
utility services or to electrical cooperatives.
The Tennessee Supreme Court in Hamilton County 
v. City of Chattanooga, 310 S.W.2d 153 (1958) held 
that a county is an affected instrumentality within 
the statute, and in City of Lenoir City v. State ex rel. 
City of Loudon, 571 S.W.2d 298 (Tenn. 1978), that 
a municipality is an affected instrumentality within 
the statute.
T.C.A. § 6-51-112 provides that if the annexing 
municipality owns and operates its own electric 
system, it shall either offer to purchase any electric 
distribution properties and service rights within 
the annexed area that are owned by an electric 
cooperative, or grant such cooperative a franchise 
to serve the annexed area. Procedural details are 
spelled out in that section.
 
uTILITy DISTRICTS
protection of utility Districts 
under State Law
In Hendersonville v. Hendersonville Utility District, 
506 S.W.2d 149 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973), it was held 
that although a city by its offer would acquire all of 
a utility district’s assets and would assume all of its 
liabilities, arbitration was a necessary prerequisite 
to filing of suit by the city to be allowed 
immediately to assume control and operation 
of the system.
The court outlined some of the items that should be 
considered as subject to arbitration:
 
It is the argument of the City that since the 
City by its offer will acquire all of the Utility 
District’s assets and will assume all of the 
liabilities of the Utility District there is simply 
nothing to arbitrate as the Utility District is 
a public agency holding property by virtue 
of a trust in favor of the public and the City 
occupies the same status. Therefore, it is only 
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the matter of a successor trustee assuming 
all the assets, whatever they might be, and 
liabilities, whatever they might be, of the 
first trustee. This being true, there can be no 
disputed issues which would be the subject of 
a proper arbitration. It is readily admitted, that 
if only a small portion of the Utility District was 
taken over by the City and the Utility District 
were to continue its operation in the non-
annexed area, such things as the value of the 
facilities received, the division of liability for 
bonded indebtedness, etc., would be the proper 
subject of arbitration.
We cannot agree with this argument. The 
statute does not limit its application to cases 
of a partial take-over. It should be noted that 
it is required by the statute that the parties 
“shall attempt to reach agreement in writing 
for allocation and conveyance to the annexing 
municipality of any or all public functions, 
rights, duties, property, assets and liabilities 
of such state instrumentality that justice and 
reason may require in the circumstances.” 
The statute also contemplates possible 
disagreements between the parties on the 
matters to be attempted to be agreed upon for 
it further provides “any such matters upon which 
the respective parties are not in agreement in 
writing within sixty (60) days after the operative 
date of such annexation shall be settled by 
arbitration with the laws of arbitration of the 
state of Tennessee effective at the time of 
submission to the arbitrators, and subsection 
(2) of section 23-501 shall not apply to any 
arbitration arising under sections 6-309–6-320.”
We do not here attempt to list or limit in any 
way items which could be in dispute and the 
subject of arbitration for such attempt would 
be beyond the scope of this appeal, but even 
when the annexing authority is to take over an 
entire utility district, the date of takeover might 
very well be the subject of disagreement and 
arbitration. In the instant case, that problem 
is present as well as others. For instance, the 
second paragraph of the statute provides for 
protection of the bond holders to be an item of 
the agreement of arbitration. Also, it must be 
born in mind in this case that the City is going 
to, or so they say they will provide services 
for members of the Utility District outside the 
annexed area. It would seem to us that “justice 
and reason may require” some sort of written 
agreement on this subject by the City and 
release of the Utility District trustees.
We hold the arbitration as set out in the statute 
is a necessary prerequisite to the filing of such 
a suit as this. We think it would be somewhat 
difficult for the Chancellor below to order 
a take-over of assets when a list of those assets 
is not before the Court and the Chancellor has 
no knowledge of what they actually are. This 
case involves more than underground pipes 
and fireplugs, it involved service equipment, 
bonded indebtedness, etc. As we view it, to hold 
any other way would defeat the purpose of the 
statute, which no doubt was to relieve the Court 
of having to supervise the dispute between the 
parties until some sort of agreement or award 
had been made through arbitration which the 
Court could either at that time approve or 
disapprove. [At 151-52.]
After the city of Memphis annexed an area that 
included a part of the area served by a utility 
district, the city entered into an agreement to take 
over and to assume all obligations of the district. 
Before the annexation the district had contracted 
with a subdivision developer, agreeing to build 
water supplying facilities and to supply water 
to the subdivision. The developer had deposited 
$88,456.90 with the district as the estimated 
cost of construction, and the district agreed to 
refund the deposit by annual payments equal to 
50 percent of water revenues from its customers 
in the subdivision for a period of 10 years or until 
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the total amount of the deposit was repaid. The 
contract contained a provision that in the event 
the ownership or contract of the district was sold or 
transferred the balance of refunds would be paid in 
full at that time. The developer sued to enforce the 
terms of the contract, and the Court of Appeals of 
Tennessee, Western Section, held that the city was 
bound by the acceleration of refund provision of the 
contract. Pitts & Company, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 
558 S.W.2d 448 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).
Radnor District v. Nashville (unreported) grew out 
of a contract between the First Suburban (Radnor) 
Water District and Nashville, a condition of which 
was that the former would withdraw its suit against 
an annexation ordinance. The contract provided in 
part as follows:
Upon receipt of just compensation, as herein 
defined, the District will allocate and convey to 
the City the properties and assets of the District, 
herein described ...
Just compensation is defined as the fair market 
value in case of the properties and assets to 
be allocated and conveyed by the District to 
the City as a going business, together with 
incidental damage to the remaining property and 
assets of the District by the severance therefrom 
of such properties and assets to be allocated and 
conveyed to the City, as though the properties 
and assets so to be allocated and conveyed had 
been taken or condemned in the exercise of 
the power of eminent domain under the laws of 
the State of Tennessee; provided, however, that 
the element of “good will” shall be given no 
consideration in arriving at just compensation.
The annexed area included about 6,600 of the utility 
district’s customers, and about 2,500 were left 
outside. The city conceded that this reduction in 
the number of customers would increase the cost of 
the remaining part of the utility district. The lawsuit 
resulted from the city’s contention that the utility 
district should not be compensated for meters 
(allegedly paid for by customers) nor for water lines 
installed by subdividers and deeded to the district 
at no charge, and that deductions should be made 
for the cost of upgrading the district’s facilities to 
city standards.
The arbitrator (a former chancellor) appointed by 
the chancellor to hear the case recognized the 
validity of the arguments on both sides. He ruled, 
however, that his role was limited strictly to 
making an award pursuant to the contract, 
and that therefore he must include “all of the 
properties and assets of the District used and 
useful in performing of its utility functions and 
services to be allocated and conveyed to the city” 
since this was the requirement of the contract. 
He noted that this award ($1,585,437) was not 
determinative of the issues raised by the city, 
which would be appropriate for consideration 
by a court of law or equity.
Subsequently, suit was filed to determine the 
distribution of the arbitrator’s award, the city 
contending that the district was acting as a trustee 
for the users and that a portion of the award should 
be allocated to the users or to improving the quality 
of the system. The chancellor ruled that the award 
would be allocated as follows: $392,900.79 to 
a trust fund set up by the city doe water system 
improvements within the district; $797,500 for 
assumption of a proportionate share of the system’s 
debt; $268,563.45 for real estate and severance 
allowance; $42,879.76 for customer deposits 
assumed by the city; and $83,593 credited to the 
city for construction.
 
The city of Knoxville persistently declined to resort 
to arbitration in a wrangle with the Fountain City 
Utility District that lasted for more than four years. 
Practically all of the district had been annexed, 
and it was conceded by all that acquisition by the 
city was the only reasonable solution. The utility 
district refused to go out of business, however, 
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unless the city would agree to use its surplus funds 
to reimburse its customers for their “equity” in the 
system. As the successor public agency, the city of 
Knoxville was, of course, entitled to assets in the 
form of surplus funds as well as pipes in the ground 
and other properties. For that reason, its agreement 
to this disposition of such funds was the equivalent 
of it making payment. Finally, to end the long 
dispute without recourse to the courts, the city in 
1966 agreed to a distribution of $387,500 in surplus 
funds, which the district paid to the customers it 
was serving on December 31, 1965. 
Appendix G contains a resolution of the city of 
Jackson setting forth the terms and conditions 
for taking over a utility district and a subsequent 
ordinance fixing water rates in the acquired area. 
Appendix H is a contract whereby the city of 
Memphis took over the utility district in the Frayser 
area. Appendix I contains resolutions adopted by 
a utility district and Johnson City for this purpose.
pROTECTION OF uTILITy DISTRICTS 
uNDER FEDERAL LAW 
It is provided by 7 United States Code, § 1926(b) 
that:
The service provided or made available through 
any such association shall not be curtailed or 
limited by inclusion of the areas to be served by 
such association within the boundaries of any 
municipal corporation or other public body, or by 
the granting of any private franchise for similar 
service within such area during the term of such 
loan; nor shall the happening of such event be 
the basis of requiring such association to secure 
any franchise, license, or permit as a condition 
to continuing to serve the area served by the 
association at the time of the occurrence of such 
event. [Emphasis is mine.]
This law applies even where the municipality 
has annexed the area in which it wishes to 
provide utility service. The reason is that many, 
if not most, utility districts have outstanding FmHA 
or RECD loans.
However, some recent cases have held or implied 
that where a utility district does not meet the 
“service provided or made available” requirement 
of § 1926(b), it is not accorded the protection of 
that statute.
The earliest of these cases, Glenpool Utility Services 
Authority v. Creek County Rural Water District 
No. 2, 861 F.2d 1211 (10th Cir. 1988) (cert. 
denied by U.S. Supreme Court, 490 U.S. 1067), 
was resolved in favor of Creek County Rural Water 
District No. 2. The district had a water line that 
ran within 50 feet of the property in question, 
and apparently the district was obligated under 
Oklahoma state law to provide a line extension 
or a road bore. The court reasoned that:
The face of the statute [7 U.S.C. § 1926(b)] 
makes clear that Congress protected the 
indebted rural association from curtailment or 
limitation by impinging municipal corporations. 
The district court correctly held that District 
No. 2 came within the purview of Section 
1926(b) and had met the statute’s threshold 
requirements, having a continuing indebtedness 
under Section 1926 and having “made [service] 
available” to the area by virtue of a line adjacent 
to the property and its responsibilities to 
applicants within its territory… [At 1214.] 
[Emphasis is mine.]
The U.S. Sixth Circuit (in which Tennessee is 
located) denied a water district’s claim to the 
exclusive right to provide service in territory 
annexed by a city and in territory that lay outside 
its boundaries. In Lexington-South Elkhorn Water 
District v. City of Wilmore, Ky., 93 F.3d 230 (1996), 
the court observed that the water district provided 
no water service in, and had received no requests 
for service from, any of the disputed areas; in the 
annexed area, the water district had no facilities in 
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or adjacent to the disputed properties; in the 
10 areas outside the limits of the annexed territory, 
only one contained the water district’s main, and 
that main had been constructed after the city had 
begun providing water service in the area; and in 
the other nine areas outside the annexed territory 
that contained no mains, one of the areas had 
a main within 50 yards; the others ranged in 
distance from 0.1 to 0.4 miles.
Then, in reviewing earlier cases on the application 
of § 1926(b), including Glenpool Utility Services 
Authority, above, the court said that:
These cases teach that whether an association 
had made service available is determined 
based on the existence of facilities on, or in 
the proximity of, the location to be served. If 
an association does not already have service in 
existence, water lines must either be within or 
adjacent to the property claimed to be protected 
by Section 1926(b) prior to the time an allegedly 
encroaching association begins providing service 
in order to be eligible for Section 1926(b). Based 
on the location of Lexington-South Elkhorn’s 
distribution lines, it had not made service 
available prior to the time that Wilmore began 
providing service to the disputed properties… 
[At 237.] [Emphasis is mine.]
But language in that case suggests that had the 
district obtained the certificate of necessity that 
water districts were required under Kentucky law 
to obtain with respect to territory in which they 
claimed the right of service, the question of whether 
service was “available” may have been closer. 
The court pointed out that Kentucky law required 
a water district that had obtained such a certificate 
to make reasonable extensions of water service to 
all customers at least the first 50 feet and a longer 
one where the 50-foot extension was unreasonable 
under the circumstances. But immediately after 
making that observation, the court declared, “Thus, 
a key factor in determining whether a water district 
has made water service available is the proximity 
of the water district’s distribution lines to areas 
in dispute.” [At 235.] 
  
Sequoyah County Rural Water District No. 7 
v. Muldrow, 191 F.3d 1192 (10 Cir. 1999), declares 
that, “Courts are in disagreements about what is 
required to satisfy the ‘made services available’ 
requirement of § 1926(b).” [At 1201.] It divides 
the cases into three categories based on the kind 
of test the particular court applied to determine if 
the service was made available: (1) legal obligation 
(under state law) to provide utility service test, (2) 
“pipes in the ground test,” and (3) a combination of 
both tests.
The court in that case decided there was no state 
(Oklahoma) law duty to provide service but declared 
that even if there were:
 “....we do not think that such a duty, standing 
alone, is sufficient to meet the “made service 
available” requirement. For one thing, to hold 
that a legal duty is sufficient to meet the 
requirement would be contrary to the language 
of the statute, which provides protection only 
against curtailments of “service provided or 
made available.” 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b). In addition, 
allowing a water district to meet the requirement 
simply by showing a legal duty to serve may 
undermine the principle goals of the statute, 
which is to “encourage water development by 
expanding the number of potential users of such 
systems.” [Citations omitted.] “Inherent in the 
concept of providing service or making service 
available is the capability of providing service, 
or, at a minimum, of providing service within 
a reasonable time.” [Citing Bell Arthur, below.] If 
a water association has a legal duty to provide 
service but has no proximate or adequate 
facilities or cannot provide them within 
a reasonable time, it is the customer who 
suffers. For these reasons, we think that 
the second prong of § 1926(b) should focus 
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primarily on whether the association has in 
fact [emphasis is the court’s] “made service 
available,” i.e., on whether the association has 
proximate and adequate “pipes in the ground” 
with which it has served or can serve the 
disputed customers within a reasonable time.” 
[At 1203.]
The court sent this case back to the district court 
to make a finding of fact on the question of whether 
the water association had “made service available” 
under the “pipes in the ground” test.
Whatever confusion the cases create with respect 
to the question of whether the state law that 
requires a utility district to provide service to 
customers in its service area should be weighed in 
determining whether service is “available” under 
§ 1926(b), Tennessee is among those states whose 
laws regulating utility districts do not require such 
districts to provide service as a matter of right. For 
that reason, the “pipes in the ground” test probably 
applies to Tennessee under Lexington-South Elkhorn 
Water District and subsequent cases in other federal 
judicial jurisdictions.
  
The question of what is “available” utility service 
was hit almost head on in Bell Arthur Water 
Corporation v. Greenville Utilities Commission, 
173 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 1999). There, in 1994, the 
Greenville, North Carolina, Utilities Commission 
agreed to provide sewer service to the Ironwood 
development. In 1995, the city of Greenville 
annexed the Ironwood development, following 
which the Greenville Utilities Commission and Bell 
Arthur engaged in a dispute over which of them 
should provide water service to Ironwood. Bell 
Arthur already had a six-inch water line in the area, 
which it had paid for with FmHA loans, but those 
loans had been retired. However, in 1993, Bell 
Arthur had borrowed money from FmHA to finance 
the extension of water services in its service area to 
territory that did not involve Ironwood.
Bell Arthur’s own engineers determined that 
providing water service to Ironwood would require 
a 14-inch water line at a cost of $650,000. In May 
1995, Bell Arthur agreed in writing to provide both 
temporary and permanent water service to Ironwood 
and began temporary service to a construction 
trailer there. However, Bell Arthur took no further 
steps to provide water service to Ironwood until 
1996 when it obtained necessary permits from the 
state. In August 1996, Bell Arthur’s board resolved 
to borrow the necessary funds to construct the 
larger water line, and in December 1996 borrowed 
$1 million from a private bank for that purpose. 
Apparently, the dispute between Greenville Utilities 
Commission and Bell Arthur was already in court 
when Bell Arthur borrowed the $1 million because 
the loan was “conditioned on the outcome of this 
litigation.” [At 521.]
However, the Greenville Utilities Commission had 
not been idle. In July 1995, it notified the Ironwood 
developer that it would provide water service and 
had already ordered the pipe to provide the service, 
and by October 1995, had constructed a 12-inch 
water line to Ironwood. Bell Arthur continued water 
service to the developer’s construction trailer until 
February 1996.  
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
North Carolina [972 F. Supp. 1951 (1997)] held that 
Bell Arthur was not entitled to the protection of 
7 U.S.C. § 1926(b), for three reasons:
1. It had paid the FmHA loans with which it had 
constructed the six-inch water lines  
into Ironwood;
2. The new FmHA loans it had obtained for water 
line extensions to an area that did not include 
Ironwood were not directly related to the service 
to that area; and
3. Bell Arthur was “not capable of providing the 
requisite service within a reasonable time after 
application was made for the service.” 
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With respect to the first two reasons, the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that Bell Arthur could 
not rely upon retired FmHA loans to invoke the 
protection of 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b), but held that the 
1993 FmHA loans that Bell Arthur had obtained to 
make water line extensions to areas in its service 
area, but that did not include Ironwood, triggered 
the protection of Bell Arthur under 7 U.S.C. 1926(b) 
for its entire service area, including Ironwood.
With respect the third reason, the court held that:
…Bell Arthur is entitled to the protection of  
§ 1926(b) only for that area. On this issue, we 
agree with the district court that Bell Arthur was 
not entitled to protection for the Ironwood area 
because it did not have the capacity to serve 
that area, nor did it have the capacity to provide 
such service within a reasonable time after the 
request for service was made. [At 525.]
The court reasoned that with respect to § 1926(b): 
Inherent in the concept of providing service 
or making service available is the capacity of 
providing service or, at a minimum, of providing 
service within a reasonable time. See North 
Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. City of San Juan, 
90 F.2d 910, 916 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
a water association may establish the 
availability of service under § 1926(b) by 
demonstrating, inter alia, that it “has lines 
and adequate facilities to provide service to 
the disputed areas.” (Emphasis added)); see 
also Lexington–South Elkhorn Water Dist. v. City 
of Wilmore, 93 F.3d 230, 238 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(noting that “an association’s ability to serve 
[under 1926(b)] is predicated on the existence 
of facilities within or adjacent to a disputed 
property”). Having a six-inch pipeline in the 
ground when a 14-inch line is necessary provides 
no support to a claim that a water association 
has adequate facility to provide service. We 
conclude that in order to enjoy the protection 
of § 1926(b) for an area, an association must 
demonstrate as a threshold matter that it has 
adequate facilities within or adjacent to the 
area to provide service to the area within 
a reasonable time after a request for service is 
made…We hold that Bell Arthur’s inadequate 
six-inch pipe in the ground coupled with only 
a general, unfulfilled intent to provide the 
necessary 14-inch pipe sometime in the future 
does not amount to “service provided or made 
available.” [At 526.] 
In some cases where the utility district has not 
made the utility at issue “available,” a battle over 
the question of whether 27 U. S. C. § 1926(b) 
protects the utility district from incursion into its 
service area may not even be necessary. Recently 
the county mayor in one Tennessee county gave 
a city the certificate of convenience to provide 
sewer service inside the city, which was in the 
utility district’s service area, where the utility 
district had not provided such service inside the 
city. It is difficult to see how that action would be 
envisioned by the holders of the bonds of the utility 
district when the utility district was not deriving 
any revenue from service inside the city limits, and 
there was no likely prospect that it would do so for 
the foreseeable future. Although annexation was 
not an issue in that case, there may be instances 
in which a similar situation exists in a territory 
proposed for annexation. 
SCHOOLS
A city desiring to take over a county school in 
an annexed area will need to negotiate with the 
county. The opening sentence in the opinion of 
Hamilton County v. Chattanooga, 310 S.W.2d 153 
(Tenn. 1958), is “The sole question in this case 
is whether under section 9 of chapter 113 of the 
Public Acts of 1955, T.C.A. section 6-318, counties 
are included within the phrase ‘any affected 
instrumentality of the state of Tennessee.’” 
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The question was answered in the affirmative, and 
the case was remanded for further proceedings. The 
Tennessee Supreme Court did not prescribe the terms 
of settlement between the county and the city. It 
may be significant that the court noted 
that Hamilton County in its bill “prayed for… 
a judgment against the City of Chattanooga for the 
total amount, supra, expended on said schools,” 
but refused to grant such relief. Subsequently the 
county and the city reached an agreement that 
was summarized by the Chattanooga City Attorney 
as follows:
In the first annexation, under Chapter 113, 
Public Acts of 1955, the City acquired a new 
school building from Hamilton County. The 
County had issued bonds under the provisions 
of section 49-715 of the Code, the interest and 
principal being payable only from taxes levied 
on property outside the corporate limits of the 
City. The City entered into an agreement with 
the County to pay to it the amount of bonds 
and interest as they mature, the bonds being 
serial bonds.
In the next territory annexed there were two 
school buildings belonging to the County which 
had been constructed several years before and 
bonds issued therefor payable on taxes levied on 
all property in the County, including property in 
the City. The bonds issued were divided between 
the County and City as provided by section 
49-711 of the Code. There had been some 
additions to these buildings made from bonds 
funds payable only on taxes levied on property 
outside the City, and also the County has spent 
some of its capital outlay funds received from 
sales tax, in making improvements to these 
schools. The City entered into a contract with 
the County to reimburse them the amount of the 
capital outlay funds and to pay to the County 
annually the balance due on the issue of bonds 
allocated to the school buildings.
The County in each instance agreed to 
discontinue levying taxes on property in annexed 
territories for the payment of the principal of 
and interest on the urban school bonds.
The City has not paid or agreed to pay any part 
of the bonds outstanding which were issued for 
school purposes payable from taxes levied on all 
the property in the County, including that within 
the City. The taxpayers of the City will continue 
to pay on the County bonds, including the bonds 
used on constructing buildings in the County 
outside the City. 
Where it was alleged that the annexation of territory 
would reduce the county area liable to taxation for 
the payment of principal and interest on rural school 
bonds and thus impair the obligation of contract, it 
was held that this is not a justifiable issue in 
a suit in the nature of quo warranto attacking 
the reasonableness of an annexation ordinance. 
[See Cope v. Morristown, 404 S.W.2d 298; Spoone 
v. Morristown, 431 S.W.2d 827 (1968).]
Fairly serious problems developed in Davidson 
County and Knox County resulting from large 
annexations by Nashville and Knoxville. The 
county judges of these two counties were quoted 
in newspaper stories as saying that annexation 
without unification of the county and city schools 
into a single school system would be intolerable, 
and this position gained substantial support in 
both communities. The Davidson County problem 
was submitted to arbitration, but the issue became 
moot when voters approved a single metropolitan 
government, including a unified school system, on 
June 28, 1962.
Several problems arise from the division of a county 
school district by a new city boundary that cuts 
off county students from the schools they formerly 
attended. The area annexed by Nashville included 
approximately 12,500 students, 2,600 of whom had 
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been attending schools outside the annexed area; 
an additional 1,650 students lived outside 
but had been attending county schools in the 
annexed areas. Knox County reported that 14,840 
students were attending 29 schools in the area 
annexed by Knoxville, 2,275 of whom lived 
beyond the new city boundaries.
A Knoxville city school official suggested as 
a solution to such a situation at one high school 
that the county pay tuition to the city for the 
nonresident students and that the city pay the 
county for transporting students within the annexed 
areas. If the tuition rate is reasonable, this would 
seem a sensible solution; such tuition payments 
may be little more than it would cost the county 
to educate the children directly, and the county 
receives state funds for transportation that are not 
distributed to city systems. In consideration of 
county transportation for city schools, a city might 
even agree to accept county students at tuition 
rates equal to the net cost per student to operate 
the county system.
The county judge of Knox County proposed that two 
high schools be retained by the county on a basis 
of “law and common horse sense.” A precedent for 
such an arrangement exists in Chattanooga, where 
a large county high school has been located in 
the city for many years. Davidson County school 
officials proposed that the county retain four of the 
22 schools in the annexed areas because 40 percent 
of the enrollment in these schools was from beyond 
the new city boundaries, but the city expressed an 
intention of taking over all schools.
When an annexation case is in litigation, there 
usually is a considerable time lag before the 
annexation is finally effective. During this time 
a problem arises as to building or enlarging school 
facilities to take care of an increasing number of 
students attending schools in the area subject 
to annexation. A solution for this problem in the 
Nashville area, formulated by the staff of the city-
county planning commission, was accepted by the 
two school systems. [See Appendix J.] The law now 
provides that during the time that any annexation 
ordinance is being contested, the annexing 
municipality and the county governing body 
may enter into an agreement to provide for new, 
expanded and/or upgraded services and facilities. 
T.C.A. § 6-51-103(f).
Preliminary negotiations between Nashville and 
Davidson County school officials on existing 
school properties reflect typical conflicts in 
points of view. The county places a replacement 
value of $11,262,732.37 on the buildings, sites, 
improvements and equipment of 22 schools in 
the annexed area, which had an original cost 
of $7,558,752.88, but an “asking price” was 
not specified. The city had previously offered 
$6.4 million on the grounds that 40 percent of 
the total county property assessment was in the 
annexed area, and this amount represented 
40 percent of the total rural school bonds 
outstanding against these schools. The city 
proposed no division of outstanding countywide 
bonds issued for these schools on the grounds that 
city taxpayers had paid and would continue to pay 
taxes for their retirement, but this was rejected by 
the county on the basis that the city had received 
its ADA share of these bonds when issued.
Knox County officials stated that the loss of the 
property tax base in areas annexed would make it 
impossible to issue rural school bonds (amortized by 
a tax levy outside the city), and to issue countywide 
bonds to obtain the amount of funds needed by the 
county would require an unreasonably large issue 
because of the required ADA sharing with the city. 
A suggested partial solution to this problem, which 
received some city and county support, was that 
the city waive its share of such a bond issue if the 
county would agree to apply the city share against 
the amount eventually determined to be chargeable 
against the city for county school facilities taken 
over by the city.
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Eventually an agreement was worked out 
between Knoxville and Knox County that covered 
several of the problems discussed above. [See 
Appendix K.] The agreement was negotiated by 
a “school negotiating committee” and ratified 
by both local governing bodies. The negotiating 
committee was composed of two members of county 
court, the county school superintendent, the county 
solicitor, one city council member, one city school 
board member, the city school superintendent, and 
the city law director.
Twenty-eight schools, valued at $12 million, 
were transferred to the city. One school offering 
a countywide special education program was 
continued under county operation. The city agreed 
to pay the debt service on about $4 million of 
the outstanding rural school bonds of the county 
that had been invested in the schools taken over. 
The city also waived its ADA short of a $2 million 
countywide school bond issue, the proceeds of 
which had been spent primarily on the annexed 
schools. Further, there was provided a cooperative 
system of financing all future capital improvements. 
The later provision includes ongoing planning and 
capital budgeting of all school facilities in both the 
city and county.
Section V of the agreement covers the question 
of which pupils can attend which school with or 
without tuition. Paragraph (D) requires tuition 
payments for pupils who resided inside the city 
at the time annexation proceedings were begun 
and later moved outside the city, including the 
annexed area. This provision has been cumbersome 
and virtually impossible to enforce. All of section 
V has been rendered null and void by a subsequent 
agreement reached in connection with the adoption 
of a county sales tax earmarked for schools. The 
essence of the latter agreement is that tuition 
payments are entirely eliminated, and the county 
provides transportation for city pupils on 
a reimbursable basis.
A byproduct of annexation and the resulting transfer 
of county school facilities to the city was the 
desire on the part of the county to raise its teacher 
salaries to the level of city teachers. The cost of 
the salary increases would have required a large 
increase in the tax rate (the county needed about 
$300,000 but would have had to raise in excess of 
$1 million to allow for the city’s ADA share of the 
levy). The city school system did not need these 
additional funds at the time. Section VII of the 
“Agreement for Transfer of Schools” was amended 
to provide for an additional payment to the county, 
permitting an increase in county teacher salaries to 
the level of city teachers without raising the county 
tax rate. In exchange, the county agreed to provide 
transportation for pupils in the annexed areas for 
one year.
An extensive annexation by Memphis, in four 
phases (effective on December 31 in each of the  
years 1968, 1969, 1971, and 1972), resulted in an 
arbitration proceeding with Shelby County involving 
27 county schools located in the annexed areas. 
The county asked for approximately $17 million, the 
board of arbitration awarded $1,917,904, and on 
appeal a chancery court, in a consent order, awarded 
$8,213,768 to be taken from future ADA funds due 
the city school system. The city’s brief before the 
arbitration board, the board’s memorandum, and 
the chancellor’s consent order are reproduced in 
Appendix L. 
AGREEMENT FOR NEW OR IMpROvED 
SERvICES AND FACILITIES
During the time that any annexation ordinance is 
being contested as provided herein, the annexing 
municipality and the county governing body (and/
or affected school, sanitary, or utility district) 
may enter into an agreement to provide for new, 
expanded, or upgraded services and facilities 
(including, but not limited to, equipment, land, and 
buildings) and capital expenditures (including sale 
of bonds) to finance such services and facilities, 
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which agreement shall include an equitable 
division of the cost and liabilities of such capital 
expenditures between the annexing municipality 
and the county governing body (and/or affected 
school, sanitary, or utility district) upon final 
determination of such contested annexation 
ordinance. T.C.A. § 6-51-103(f).
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CONTRACTION OF BOuNDARIES 
(DEANNEXATION)
There are two ways for a city to “deannex” territory, 
both of which are covered in T.C.A. § 6-51-201.
By REFERENDuM AFTER THE ADOpTION 
OF AN ORDINANCE 
By THE CITy’S GOvERNING BODy
T.C.A. § 6-51-201(a), presently provides that:
Any incorporated city or town, whether it was 
incorporated by general or special act, may 
contract its limits within any given territory; 
provided that three-fourths (3/4) of the 
qualified voters voting in an election thereon 
assent to. 
That statute is highly confusing due to several 
amendments. It is not clear on its face whether the 
vote must be three-fourths of the city voters voting 
or three-fourths of the voters voting in the territory 
to be deannexed. However, in light of the history 
of T.C.A. §§ 6-51-201(a) and 6-51-202, the three-
fourths vote probably means a three-fourth vote of 
the voters voting in a city election.
 
The complicated reasoning supporting this 
conclusion follows. That statute derives from Public 
Acts 1875, Chapter 92, and appears in Tennessee 
Code of 1932, § 3322, which itself was a part of 
Article III of that code. Under Article III, a city 
could add territory or contract its limits. With 
respect to the contraction of limits the city had to 
adopt an ordinance authorizing a referendum on the 
contraction. The contraction had to be approved by 
a three-fourths vote “of the voters qualified to vote 
in the election of mayor and aldermen or governing 
body....” For that reason, the three-fourths vote in 
Article III was, arguably, three-fourths of the voters 
voting in a city election.
Tennessee Code of 1932, § 3322, was specifically 
amended by Public Acts 1955, Chapter 61, 
as follows:
Any incorporated city or town, whether the same 
shall have been incorporated by general or special 
Act, may contract its limits within any given 
territory, provided three-fourths of the qualified 
voters voting in an election thereon assent thereto. 
Public Acts 1955, Chapter 113, which is the famous 
first general annexation law of the state, in Section 
10, without mentioning Tennessee Code of 1932, 
§ 3322, whether the referendum had to be preceded 
by an ordinance, and whether the vote was a three-
fourths vote of the voters voting in the territory or 
three-fourths of the voters voting in the city, simply 
said that:
Any city incorporated under any Public or Private 
Act of the State of Tennessee may contract its 
city limits within any given territory provided 
three-fourths of the qualified voters voting in an 
election thereon assent thereto.
Both of those public acts were codified in 
T.C.A. § 6-51-201(a) as they appear as indicated 
above. Although the language relative to the 
“voters qualified to vote in the election of mayor 
and aldermen or governing body” was dropped, it 
still did not limit the voters to those residing in the 
territory to be deannexed.
 
CHApTER 13
“Deannexation” and Other Boundary Adjustments
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T.C.A. § 6-51-202 does require that the referendum 
be held pursuant to an ordinance describing the 
territory to be deannexed and requires that the 
deannexation be approved by a vote of three-fourths 
of the voters. That statute is consistent with the 
way it appeared in Public Acts 1875 and in Tennessee 
Code of 1932, § 3323, which, again, applied to both 
additions of territory to cities and to the contract of 
city limits.
By INITIATIvE OF THE CITy’S GOvERNING BODy
T.C.A. § 6-51-201(b) provides a completely separate 
method of deannexation. It was added by Public 
Acts 1984, Chapter 731. That statute authorizes 
deannexation by ordinance upon the initiative of 
the city’s governing body, by a majority vote of the 
“total membership of the city legislative body.” 
However, a petition of 10 percent of the voters 
residing in the area to be deannexed that is 
submitted to the city recorder within 75 days of the 
final reading of the deannexation ordinance triggers 
a referendum on the deannexation. The referendum 
is held at the “next general election.” Only voters 
residing in the territory proposed for deannexation 
vote. It requires a majority vote of those voters to 
approve the deannexation. 
It is not clear whether the “general election” 
at which the referendum must be held refers to 
the next general municipal election or to the 
next general state election; presumably, it could 
refer to either. T.C.A. § 2-1-104(a)(7) defines 
the term “election” as “a general election for 
which membership in a political party in order to 
participate therein is not required.” General city 
elections and the “regular November [state] election 
held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in 
November in even-numbered years” appear to meet 
that definition. See T.C.A. § 2-1-104(25).
Once an area is deannexed, the city may 
continue to levy and collect taxes in the area 
to pay the excluded territory’s share of any 
debt contracted prior to the deannexation. 




Two contiguous cities may adjust a common 
boundary by contract to eliminate confusion 
and uncertainty about its location or to conform 
the boundary to certain man-made or natural 
geographical features. T.C.A. § 6-51-302.
MuNICIpAL MERGERS 
T.C.A. §§ 6-51-401 et seq. authorizes municipalities 
that share contiguous boundaries and that are 
located in the same county to merge using one of 
two methods.
RESOLuTION AND REFERENDuM
This method requires the governing bodies of 
municipalities proposing to merge to pass 
a resolution (or joint ordinance in the case of 
a proposed merger involving a home rule 
municipality) requesting a referendum upon the 
proposed merger. The resolution (or joint ordinance) 
must be passed by a majority vote of the members 
to which each of the governing bodies of the 
municipalities are entitled. The resolution states the 
name of the municipality that will result from the 
merger and the charter under which it will operate, 
which may be the general law mayor-aldermanic 
charter, the general law manager-commission 
charter, or one of the charters of the merging 
municipalities. The resolution may also establish 
the wards or districts of the new municipality if its 
new charter provides for such wards or districts. The 
wording of the merger question that must appear on 
the ballot is contained in the statute and takes into 
account the possibility that the merger will involve 
a home rule municipality and that the charter of the 
new municipality will be a home rule charter. The 
referendum must pass by a majority of those voting 
in each municipality for the merger to become 
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effective. If the referenda are successful, the merger 
is effective 120 days after the certification of the 
election results.
pETITION AND REFERENDuM
Under this method, 10 percent of the registered 
voters in each municipality may petition for 
a merger. The petition must contain essentially 
the same information that must appear on 
the resolutions (or joint ordinance in the case 
of a proposed merger involving a home rule 
municipality). The rules that govern the merger 
referenda under the resolution and referendum 
method apply to this method.
T.C.A. §§ 6-51-406—409 govern questions 
pertinent to the continuation of ordinances of 
the municipalities that have merged under both 
methods and the financial integration of the “old” 
municipalities into the “new” municipality.
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EXECuTIvE SuMMARy
The three-year moratorium during which cities and 
counties (except for Shelby County and its cities) 
were prohibited from amending their comprehensive 
growth plans absent extraordinary circumstances 
has now passed for most cities and counties. Some 
communities have amended their growth plans and 
others are considering amendments. The steps to 
follow in amending the comprehensive growth plan 
are summarized below. These issues are discussed in 
more detail following the executive summary.
 1. The city or county wanting to amend the plan 
must do research and examine factors that are 
appropriate to the area to be designated, and 
identify territory suitable for inclusion in the 
area. The city or county must hold two public 
hearings for which public notice has been 
published at least 15 days before the meeting.
 2. The city or county proposing the amend-
ment must file notice with the mayors of each 
municipality in the county and the county mayor 
or executive.
 3. The coordinating committee must be 
reconvened, most likely upon notice from the 
county mayor or executive.
 4. The coordinating committee must hold  
two public hearings for which at least  
15 days notice is published. The burden is on 
the party proposing the amendment to show  
it is reasonable.
 5. The coordinating committee must vote on 
whether to recommend the amendment.
 6. The coordinating committee shall submit its 
recommendations regarding any amendments to 
the governing body of the county and each city 
in the county for ratification. Each has  
120 days to ratify or reject the amendment. 
Failure to act signifies ratification.
 7. If a city or county rejects the amendment, it 
must submit its objections to the coordinating 
committee. The coordinating committee then 
reconsiders its action.
 8. After reconsideration, the coordinating 
committee may recommend a revised amend- 
ment and submit it to the local governments  
for consideration.
 9. If this amendment is rejected, the city  
or county may declare an impasse and  
request mediation through the secretary  
of state’s office.
10. Approved amendments must be submitted to the 
local government planning advisory committee 
for approval. Locally ratified amendments receive 
automatic LGPAC approval. In all other cases, 
LGPAC must examine the plan to ensure that it 
complies with law. After approval the plan is 




When the General Assembly passed Tennessee’s 
Comprehensive Growth Policy Law in 1998, it 
required cities and counties across Tennessee to 
work together to develop a comprehensive growth 
plan. For cities and counties that had a completed 
plan in place by July 1, 2000, there were incentives 
and benefits. For cities and counties that did not 
have an approved plan in place by July 1, 2001, 
there were penalties. Nearly every community in 
Tennessee that was required by the law to have  
a plan met the July 1, 2001, deadline. 
AppENDIX A
Amending Comprehensive Growth plans
David Connor and Dennis Huffer, Legal Consultants, May 2005
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For all counties under the act except Shelby 
County, the law provided that once a growth plan 
was agreed upon by local governments and was 
approved by the local government planning advisory 
committee, it was to remain in effect for not less 
than three years, absent a showing of extraordinary 
circumstances (T.C.A. § 6-58-104(d)(1)). [For 
Shelby County, there was no waiting period and 
amendments could be proposed immediately. See  
T.C.A. § 6-58-104(d)(2).] For most cities and 
counties in Tennessee, this three-year window  
has now passed. A few communities have amended 
or begun considering amendments to their 
comprehensive growth plan. The purpose of this 
brief memorandum is to outline the steps and 
procedures that local governments should follow 
when considering amendments to a comprehensive 
growth plan.
THE LAW
There was very little content in the comprehensive 
growth policy law that related to the process of 
amending plans in the future. What direction there 
is may be found in T.C.A. § 6-58-104(d)(1).
   (d)(1) After the local government planning 
advisory committee has approved a growth 
plan, the plan shall stay in effect for not 
less than three (3) years absent a showing 
of extraordinary circumstances. After the 
expiration of the three-year period,  
a municipality or county may propose an 
amendment to the growth plan by filing 
notice with the county executive and 
with the mayor of each municipality in 
the county. Upon receipt of such notice, 
such officials shall take appropriate action 
to promptly reconvene or re-establish 
the coordinating committee. The burden 
of proving the reasonableness of the 
proposed amendment shall be upon the 
party proposing the change. The procedures 
for amending the growth plan shall be the 
same as the procedures in this section for 
establishing the original plan. 
 (emphasis added)
The key provision is the last sentence which  
states that the same procedures apply to amend- 
ing the growth plan as were used to establish the 
original plan.
DEvELOpING AND  
pROpOSING AMENDMENTS
When the original growth plan was developed each 
city went through a statutory process to develop 
an urban growth boundary and propose it to the 
coordinating committee. Likewise, each county 
developed planned growth and/or rural areas and 
submitted them to the coordinating committee. 
Since T.C.A. § 6-58-104(d)(1) states that 
amendments to the growth plan must be adopted 
in the same manner as the plan was originally 
established, it is assumed that any city or county 
proposing an amendment to the plan must follow 
the same procedures used to originally develop and 
propose an urban growth boundary, planned growth 
area, or rural area in developing the proposed  
amendment. These requirements are found in 
T.C.A. § 6-58-106(a), (b), and (c). Essentially, they 
require a city or county to research and examine 
certain factors that are appropriate to the type of 
area to be designated, identify the territory suitable 
to be placed in that area, and conduct two public 
meetings prior to making recommendations to the 
coordinating committee. These public meetings must 
be advertised in a newspaper of general circulation 
in the municipality or county not less than 15 days 
before the meeting, with the notice indicating the 
time, place, and purpose of the public meeting. 
Cities and counties should follow these same 
procedures prior to proposing any amendments to 
the growth plan. According to the attorney general, 
if one local government is proposing an amendment 
but another city or the county does not intend to 
respond formally to the proposed change or propose 
an alterative amendment to the growth plan of its 
own, there would be no need for that city or county 
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to go through the research and public  
hearing process (Op. Tenn. Att’y Gen. 03-154 
(December 2, 2003)). In the same opinion the 
attorney general also opined that a municipality or 
county may begin the research and public hearing 
process for developing amendments prior to the 
termination of the three-year waiting period, but 
the new coordinating committee may not be formed  
or begin considering any proposed amendments 
until after the three-year period has expired. Even  
if a city or county does not make a formal proposal 
to the coordinating committee, nothing would 
prevent the representative of that local government 
on the coordinating committee from participating 
fully in the process and making suggestions 
or proposals during the deliberations of the 
coordinating committee. 
REquESTING CONSIDERATION  
OF AN AMENDMENT
After the three-year waiting period has passed, 
either the county or any municipality within  
a county may then propose an amendment to  
the growth plan. To initiate the process, the local 
government desiring an amendment must file 
notice with the mayor of all municipalities in the 
county and with the county mayor. Upon receipt 
of that notice, the mayors of the cities and county 
are directed by law to take action to reconvene 
or re-constitute the coordinating committee that 
originally drafted the growth plan for the county. 
RECONvENING THE 
COORDINATING COMMITTEE
If all the original participants in the coordinating 
committee still hold the same positions or  
are still amenable to representing the same 
interests, the committee may be reconvened.  
If some of the original participants no longer hold 
the same positions (for example, a mayor who 
represented a city the first time around is  
no longer in office), then those positions need  
to be reappointed by the authorities designated 
in T.C.A. § 6-58-104(a)(1). While the law requires 
a party proposing an amendment to provide 
notice to city and county mayors of the need to 
reconvene the committee, some of the members 
of the committee represent interests other than 
cities and counties. For instance, the board of the 
local education agency with the largest student 
enrollment has a representative on the committee. 
When notice is provided to mayors, someone (most 
likely the county mayor) needs to contact those 
other entities represented on the coordinating 
committee to notify them that the committee is 
being reconvened and give them the opportunity to 
designate their representative.
CONSIDERATION By THE 
COORDINATING COMMITTEE
Once it is reconstituted or reconvened, the 
committee may begin consideration of any proposed 
amendments to the growth plan. The law states 
that the burden of proving the reasonableness of 
the proposed amendment shall be upon the party 
proposing the change (T.C.A. § 6-58-104(d)(1)). 
Before reaching a final decision on proposed 
amendments, the coordinating committee 
must also conduct two public hearings 
(T.C.A. § 6-58-104(a)(3)). The county is required 
to give at least 15 days notice of the time, place, 
and purpose of each public hearing by notice 
published in a newspaper of general circulation 
throughout the county. After those hearings are held 
and the coordinating committee has had adequate 
time for deliberation, it should vote on whether 
proposed amendments to the growth plan should be 
adopted. Once the coordinating committee makes 
its determination, it should submit its decision 
and any recommended amendments to the growth 
plan to the county and all cities in the county for 
consideration and ratification.
LOCAL CONSIDERATION  
OF THE AMENDMENTS
Once the recommendations of the coordinating 
committee are received by the governing bodies 
of the county and municipalities, each governing 
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body has 120 days to ratify or reject any proposed 
amendments (T.C.A. § 6-58-104(a)(4)). There is no 
requirement for further public hearings during this 
phase of the process. Failure to act by a governing 
body within the 120-day period is deemed to 
constitute ratification of the recommendation of the 
coordinating committee.  
If a city or county rejects the recommendation  
of the coordinating committee, the law directs  
it to submit its objections and the reasons  
therefore to the coordinating committee  
(T.C.A. § 6-58-104(a)(5)). The coordinating 
committee then reconsiders its action. After 
reconsideration, it may recommend a revised 
amendment and re-submit it to the local 
governments for consideration. 
MEDIATION AND 
DISpuTE RESOLuTION
If the revised or recommended amendment is 
rejected, then, as with the original plan, the 
county or any municipality may declare an impasse 
and request the secretary of state to provide an 
alternative method for resolution of disputes. 
This involves the appointment of a panel of three 
administrative law judges to mediate the dispute 
unless the county and all municipalities agree to use 
a single administrative law judge. The secretary of 
state certifies the reasonable and necessary costs of 
the dispute resolution panel. The county and cities 
are required to reimburse the secretary of state 
for the costs of dispute resolution on a pro rata 
basis; provided that, if the panel determines that 
the process was necessitated or unduly prolonged 
by bad faith or frivolous actions on the part of the 
county and/or one or more municipalities, then the 
secretary of state, upon recommendation of the 
panel, may reallocate liability of the cost of dispute 
resolution in a manner that is punitive to the party 
responsible for the bad faith or frivolous actions.
SuBMISSION OF AMENDMENTS TO 
THE LOCAL GOvERNMENT pLANNING 
ADvISORy COMMITTEE
Once any amendments to the growth plan are 
approved locally, they should be submitted to the 
local government planning advisory committee 
(LGPAC) for approval. If the amendment was ratified 
by all appropriate local governments, then approval 
by LGPAC is automatic. In all other cases, LGPAC 
is directed by law to examine the plan to ensure 
that the boundaries and areas designated in the 
plan conform to the requirements of the law. After 
approval of the plan, a copy is sent to the county 
mayor, who in turn files the plan in the county 
register’s office.
WAITING pERIOD
In 2003, the attorney general was asked whether 
amended growth plans also have to be left 
undisturbed through a three-year waiting period 
before they may be amended again. The attorney 
general concluded that, although amendments were 
to go through the same process used to adopt the 
original plan, the three-year waiting period was not 
a part of this process, but a condition put in place 
subsequent to the creation of a plan. Therefore, 
there would be no waiting period after a plan was 
amended before additional amendments could be 
proposed and considered (Op. Tenn. Att’y Gen. 
03-154 (December 2, 2003)). 
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A RESOLUTION SCHEDULING A PUBLIC HEARING TO DETERMINE WHETHER CERTAIN TERRITORY SHOULD BE 
ANNEXED TO THE CITY/TOWN OF _______________, TENNESSEE.
WHEREAS, it appears that the prosperity of this City/Town and of the territory herein described may be 
materially retarded and the safety and welfare of the inhabitants and property thereof endangered if such 
territory is not annexed; and,
WHEREAS, the annexation of such territory may be deemed necessary for the welfare of the residents and 
property owners of the said affected territory and this City/Town as a whole; and,
WHEREAS, the annexation of such territory appears to benefit the overall well-being of the communities 
involved;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the City Council of the City/Town of _________________, Tennessee:
The city recorder (or other official) is required to have published in the City/Town on the _____ day  
of _____________, 20 ___, a notice that a public hearing before this body will be held on the (at least  
7 days after publication of the notice) _____ day of ____________________, 20 ___, at (time and place) 
______________________ , to determine whether the following described territory adjoining the present 
corporation boundaries should be annexed:
Embracing that part of civil district(s) no(s). _______ of ___________ County, Tennessee, and reflected on 
the attached map, and more fully described as:
(NOTE: Use the same description of the area as contained in the plan of services. Include a map of the 
territory to be annexed that meets the requirements of T.C.A. § 6-51-101.)
(NOTE: The notice requirements for public hearings on the annexation itself and the plan of services are 
different. The annexation public hearing requires a seven-day prior notice while the plan of services public 
hearing requires a 15-day prior notice. If your city combines the two hearings, the longer 15-day notice must 
be used.)
(NOTE: The public hearing on the annexation and on the plan of services can be held at the same time. In that 
case, the notice would need to be modified to provide for both hearings. See APPENDIX E.)
AppENDIX B
Sample Resolution, public Hearing,
proposed Annexation
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AppENDIX C
Sample Annexation Ordinance
AN ORDINANCE TO ANNEX CERTAIN TERRITORY AND TO INCORPORATE THE SAME WITHIN THE 
CORPORATE BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY/TOWN OF ___________, TENNESSEE.
WHEREAS, a public hearing before this body was held on the _____ day of __________, 20__, 
pursuant to a resolution adopted on _______________, 20__, and notice thereof published in 
the (name of newspaper) on _______________, 20__; and,
WHEREAS, it appears that the prosperity of this City/Town and of the territory herein described 
may be materially retarded and the safety and welfare of the inhabitants and property thereof 
endangered if such territory is not annexed; and,
WHEREAS, the annexation of such territory may be deemed necessary for the welfare of the 
residents and property owners of the said affected territory and this City/Town as a whole; and,
WHEREAS, a plan of services for this area was adopted by resolution of ____________, 20__ as 
required by Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-51-102; 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council of the City/Town of ________________, 
Tennessee:
Section 1. In accordance with T.C.A. Sections 6-51-101 to 6-51-118, there is hereby annexed 
to the City/Town of ___________________, Tennessee, and incorporated within the corporate 
boundaries thereof, the following described territory adjoining the present corporate 
boundaries:
Embracing that part of civil district(s) no(s). _______ of ___________ County, Tennessee, and 
more fully described, and reflected on the attached map which is incorporated by reference as 
if fully set out herein, to wit:
Section 2. This ordinance shall be effective from and after its passage, the public welfare 
requiring it. (This section should conform to the city charter’s requirements governing effective 
date of ordinances.)
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AppENDIX D
Sample Resolution, Annexation Referendum Call
A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A REFERENDUM OF ANNEXATION OF CERTAIN TERRITORY TO THE 
CITY/TOWN OF ______________ , TENNESSEE.
BE IT RESOLVED by the City Council of the City/Town of ______________ , Tennessee:
Section 1. As provided in Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 6-51-104 and 6-51-105, it is proposed 
to annex the following described territory adjoining the present corporate boundaries:
Embracing that part of civil district(s) no(s). _______ of ___________ County, Tennessee, and 
reflected on the attached map, and more fully described as:
(Attach a map of the area that meets the requirements of T.C.A. § 6-51-101)
Section 2. The city recorder (or other official) is directed to have copies of this resolution 
posted in three public places in this City/Town and in three public places in the above-
described territory, and to have the resolution published in the (name of newspaper of general 
circulation in the City/Town) on the ______ day of ____________ , 20__. All copies of this 
resolution shall be so posted on or before the date of publication in said newspaper. The 
city recorder (or other official) shall immediately file with this body and with the _________ 
County Election Commission a certificate showing the date(s) on which such posting and 
publication took place.
Section 3. The _________ County Election Commission is requested to hold an election in said 
territory proposed for annexation and in this City/Town (add this language if the city chooses 
to exercise its option of calling for an election in the existing city), at least 30 days and not 
more than 60 days after the foregoing date of newspaper publication.
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A RESOLUTION SCHEDULING A PUBLIC HEARING
ON THE PLAN OF SERVICES FOR A PROPOSED ANNEXATION
WHEREAS, a plan of services for the proposed annexation hereinafter described has been prepared and referred 
to the city planning commission for review; and,
WHEREAS, three copies of said plan of services are available for public inspection during regular business 
hours in the office of the city recorder (or another official), at ___________ , and at ____________;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the City Council of the City/Town of ________________, Tennessee:
That the city recorder (or other official) be hereby required to have published in the City/Town on  
the _____ day of _____________, 20 ___, a notice that a public hearing before this body will be held  
on the (at least 15 days after publication of the notice) _____ day of _____________, 20 ___, at  
(time and place) ______________________ , to consider the plan of services for the following described area 
proposed for annexation:
Embracing that part of civil district(s) no(s). _______ of ___________ County, Tennessee, and more fully 
described as:
(NOTE: Use the same description of the area as contained in the plan of services. Include a map of territory to 
be annexed that meets the requirements of T.C.A. § 6-51-101.)
(NOTE: The hearings on the proposed annexation and the plan of services can be held at the same time. Where 
that is proposed to be done, modify the resolution accordingly.)
AppENDIX E
Sample Resolution, public Hearing, plan of Services 
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A RESOLUTION ADOPTING A PLAN OF SERVICES FOR THE ANNEXATION OF (general description of the area) BY 
THE (CITY/TOWN) OF _______________, TENNESSEE.
WHEREAS, Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-51-102 requires that a plan of services be adopted by the municipal 
governing body prior to passage of an annexation ordinance [or prior to the passage of a resolution calling for 
a referendum of an annexation]; and 
WHEREAS, the area proposed for annexation to the (City/Town) is within the (City/Town’s) Urban Growth 
Boundary, as required by law, and is described as follows:
 (Insert description of the area to be annexed)
NOW, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED BY THE (Governing Body) OF THE (City/Town) OF__________________ , 
TENNESSEE:
Section 1. Pursuant to the provisions of T.C.A. § 6-51-102, there is hereby adopted, for the area bounded as 
described above, the following plan of services:
A. Police
 1. Patrol, response to calls, and other routine police services, using present personnel and equipment, 
  will be provided on the effective date of annexation.
 2. Within _____ months, _____ additional personnel and _____ patrol car(s) will be added to continue 
  the present level of police services throughout the city, including the newly annexed area.
 3. Traffic signals, traffic signs, street markings, and other traffic control devices will be installed as the 
  need is established by appropriate study and traffic engineering standards.
B.  Fire Services
 1. Fire protection by the present personnel and equipment of the fire department, within the 
  limitations of available water and distances from fire stations, will be provided on the effective date  
  of annexation.
 2. Within _____ months, _____ additional personnel and _____ fire engines and auxiliary equipment will 
  be added to the fire department to maintain present standards within the entire city, including the 
  annexed area.
  3. Within _____ months (years), _____ additional station(s) will be constructed to serve the 
  annexed area.
 
AppENDIX F
Sample plan of Services
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C.  Water
 1. Water for domestic, commercial, and industrial use will be provided at current city rates, from existing 
  city lines, on the effective date of annexation, and thereafter from new lines as deemed necessary 
  under current city policies and procedures concerning density, development patterns, and future 
  development plans.
 2. Water for fire protection will be available within _____ months (years), the time estimated to be 
  required to install adequate water lines and hydrants in the annexed area.
 3. In those parts of the annexed area currently served by the ____________ Utility District, the above 
  time periods will begin on the date of acquisition by the city of said District or parts thereof, which 
  may be delayed by negotiations and/or litigation.
D. Wastewater
 1. The necessary interceptor and trunk sewer lines to serve the substantially developed annexed areas will 
  be completed in _____ years.
 2. Construction of collector lines in the substantially developed annexed areas will be completed within 
  _____ years. Residences, commercial, and industrial properties will then be connected to the 
  wastewater system in accordance with current policies of the city.
E.  Refuse Collection
 The same regular refuse collection service now provided within the city will be extended to the annexed 
 area (within one week after the effective date of the annexation) OR (as soon as additional personnel and 
 equipment can be obtained, estimated to require _____ months.
F.  Streets
 1. Emergency maintenance of streets will begin on the effective date of annexation.
 2. Routine maintenance, on the same basis as in the existing city, will begin in the annexed area when 
  state shared street aid funds begin to be received based on the annexed population. (July 1 following 
  the annexation effective date.)
 3. Reconstruction and resurfacing of streets, installation of storm drainage, and construction of curbs, 
  gutters, and sidewalks will be accomplished under existing city policies.
 4. Regular cleaning of streets with curbs and gutters will begin within _____ week(s) after the effective 
  date of annexation on the same basis as in the existing city.
G.  Schools
 County schools in the annexed area will become part of the city school system as soon as necessary 
 negotiations and arrangements with the county can be completed. Normally, this change will take place at 
 the beginning of the school year following the effective date of annexation. Thereafter the curriculum 
 offered in the annexed area will be the same as in other schools in the city school system.
H.  Inspections and Code Enforcement
 Any inspection services now conducted by the city (building, plumbing, electrical, gas, housing, 
 sanitation, etc.) will begin in the annexed area on the effective date of annexation.
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I.  Planning and Zoning
 The planning and zoning jurisdiction of the city will extend to the annexed area on the effective date of 
 annexation. City planning jurisdiction and regulation will thereafter encompass the entirety of the 
 annexed area. (Study will be required before specific zoning can be adopted, which should be completed 
 within _____ months.) The annexation ordinance will temporarily zone all property in the annexed area as 
 ________, _________________ District.
J.  Street Lighting
 Street lights will be installed in substantially developed commercial and residential areas within _____ 
 months after the effective date of annexation, using the prevailing standards in the existing city.
K.  Recreation
 Residents of the annexed area may use all city recreational facilities, parks, ball fields, etc., on the 
 effective date of annexation. The prevailing standards and policies now used in the existing city will be 
 applied in expanding the recreational and program facilities in the enlarged city. Approximately _____ 
 acres will be developed as parks, playgrounds, etc., in the annexed area.
L.  Miscellaneous
 (Include any other service not covered by the foregoing categories.)
Section 2. This resolution shall become effective from and after its adoption.
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 WHEREAS, Jackson Suburban Utility District of Madison County, Tennessee, has been and is now furnishing 
water to the residents in certain territory of which a part was recently annexed by the City of Jackson, 
Tennessee, under the authority of Tennessee Code Annotated, sections 6-308 to 6-319, inclusive; and, 
 WHEREAS, The City of Jackson has as the result of negotiations with Jackson Suburban Utility District of 
Madison County, Tennessee, as authorized and required by Tennessee Code Annotated, section 6-318, reached 
a mutually satisfactory and acceptable agreement whereby the City of Jackson shall purchase* all the assets 
and properties of said District, and assume and operate only a part of said water system now owned by the 
District; and,
 WHEREAS, the Commissioners of said Jackson Suburban Utility District of Madison County, Tennessee, have 
agreed to transfer all the assets of said District, real and personal, and otherwise, to the City of Jackson, 
Tennessee, on condition that the City agree to operate the entire utility system of said district, and to 
assume the payment of outstanding bonds of said District in accordance with their terms, and to pay all other 
obligations of said District outstanding as of the effective date of transfer of the assets, and subject to the 
further understanding and agreement that of the cash on hand of the District and its investments in U.S. 
Government Bonds which are to be transferred to the City, there shall be earmarked or set aside in a reserve 
account a sum equal to such cash on hand and investments in bonds, after deducting therefrom a sum equal 
to the requirements for the payments of interest due August 1, 1961, on the outstanding bonds of the District 
and both principal and interest due February 1, 1962, and a further deduction in an amount equal to any 
outstanding liability for customers deposits and current accounts payable or other liabilities (except bond 
indebtedness) of the district, including any unpaid water accounts payable to the City of Jackson, as of the 
effective date of the transfer of the assets; and that such reserve funds (as adjusted), or at least the cash 
equivalent thereof, shall be used for an elevated water storage tank designed for use in the area presently 
served by the District, or for such other equipment or facilities, and at such time or times, as may be deemed 
feasible within the best judgment and discretion of the City, or its representatives, to provide adequate water 
service to areas; and 
 WHEREAS, it appears advisable and in the best interests of The City of Jackson, Tennessee, to enter into 
said agreement and thereby acquire the assets of said District, assume the obligations thereof and take over 
the operation of its entire water system.
________________________
*Although the word “purchase” is used here, a careful reading of the resolution will disclose that this was not 
a purchase transaction. It was a transfer of functions, assets, and liabilities from one governmental unit to 
another governmental unit. A formal agreement between two such units could closely parallel the language of 
this resolution.
AppENDIX G
City of Jackson Resolution to Acquire
Jackson Suburban utility District
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 NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF JACKSON,  
AS FOLLOWS:
1. That, in consideration of the transfer to the City of Jackson Suburban Utility District of Madison County, 
Tennessee, of all of its assets, real and personal, the same being described and set forth in Schedule No. 1, 
annexed hereto, and made a part hereof, The City of Jackson shall assume and take over the management 
and operation of the entire utility or water system of Jackson Suburban and Utility District of Madison 
County, Tennessee, and accept title thereto.
2. That The City of Jackson hereby assumes and agrees to pay from the revenues of its water and sewerage 
departments all outstanding bonds and other obligations of the Jackson Suburban Utility District of 
Madison County, Tennessee, as such bonds and obligations may mature, and in accordance with their 
terms, and to otherwise perform all covenants contained in the bonds required of the District, said bonds 
being described and set forth in Schedule No. 2, annexed hereto, and made a part hereof; said bonded 
indebtedness consisting of an issue of water works revenue bonds of said District in the original total 
amount of $75,000.00, dated February 1, 1951, in the denomination of $100.00 each, bearing interest at 
three and one-half percent (3-1/2%), payable semi-annually on August 1st, and February 1st, of each year 
commencing August 1, 1951, maturing serially in numerical order, without option of prior redemption, on 
February 1st of each year from February 1, 1953, to February 1, 1970, inclusive; and provided further, that 
the City agrees, as a consideration for the transfer of all assets of said District, to earmark or set aside  
in a reserve account all of the cash on hand and the cash equivalent of the present redemption value of  
U.S. Government Bonds in the face sum of $10,000.00 which are being transferred by the District to the 
City, after having deducted therefrom a sum equal to the requirements for the payment of interest on  
the outstanding bonds issued by the District due August 1, 1961, and both interest and principal due 
February 1, 1962, and a further deduction in an amount equal to outstanding customers’ deposits and 
current accounts payable or otherwise liabilities (except bond indebtedness) of the district as of the 
effective date of the transfer of assets, and to use said reserve fund, or at least the cash equivalent 
thereof, for the purposes hereinabove set forth at such time or times as may be deemed feasible within 
the best judgment and discretion of the City or its representatives.
3. That this Resolution be effective June 1, 1961, upon delivery to the City of Jackson of deeds, bills of  
sale, and other instruments of writing necessary to transfer all assets of the Jackson Suburban Utility 
District of Madison County, Tennessee, to The City of Jackson, Tennessee, and to vest title to same in  
The City of Jackson.
NOTICE
 The foregoing resolution was introduced, read and approved by the Board of Commissioners of the City  
of Jackson, Tennessee, the 27th day of June, 1961, and will be considered for adoption at the regular meeting 
of said board to be held June 30, 1961, in the Board Room of the City Hall, Jackson, Madison County, 
Tennessee at 10 A.M. at which time any and all suggestions pertaining to the adoption of said resolution  
will be considered.
 Published by the order of the Board of Commissioners of the City of Jackson, Tennessee, this  
27 day of June, 1961.
           ATTEST: B. F. Graves
             City Recorder
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Schedule No. 1 To Resolution For Transfer Of Jackson Suburban utility District
Of Madison County, Tennessee
Assets of Described to be transferred to the City of Jackson, Tennessee.
FIXED ASSETS
Real Estate, consisting of a parcel of land and building together with all other improvements thereon 
described in deed from Jackson Suburban Utility District to The City of Jackson, Tennessee, dated 
June 1, 1961.
All Machinery and Equipment, Meters, Underground Lines, together with all other personal property, including 
the entire water distribution system, mains, services and meter connections, valves, hydrants, supplies, 
accessories and inventory on hand as of effective date of this transfer as per resolutions.
CuRRENT ASSETS
All cash on hand and in banks; including cash in the National Bank of Commerce of Jackson, Tennessee, as of 
effective date of this transfer as per resolutions, consisting of the following accounts:
Operating Account  .................................$25,417.25
Customer Account ...................................          - 0 -
Construction Account ..............................       209.82
Total.....................................................$25,627.07
All accounts receivable, including current and unbilled customer water accounts.
Accrued interest receivable.
Investments—U.S. Government Bonds (or redemption value or cash realized therefrom as, if and when 
redeemed, same now being in face amount of $10,000.00).
Any unexpired insurance premiums.
All permits and licenses from The State of Tennessee, Madison County, Tennessee, and any others now held or 
enjoyed by said District.
Together with, and including, any and all other assets of said District, real or personal, tangible or intangible, 
which are on hand and to the extent of the District’s interest therein as of the effective date of this transfer 
as per resolutions and agreements in reference thereto.
Provided, however, of the cash on hand and investments in U.S. Government Bonds (or cash equivalent at 
redemption), there shall be established by The City of Jackson a reserve account for use to improve the water 
system in the area presently served by said District as provided in resolutions in reference to this transfer.
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Schedule No. 2 To Resolution For Transfer Of Jackson Suburban utility District
Of Madison County, Tennessee
 Liabilities and Obligations of Jackson Suburban Utility District of Madison County, Tennessee, Assumed by 
The City of Jackson, Tennessee.
 Bonds Payable, dated February 1, 1951, of issue in original principal amount of $75,000.00, bearing 
interest at three and one-half percent (3-1/2%) per annum, payable semi-annually on August 1st and 
February 1st of each year, of which the principal amount of $26,000.00 has been paid together with interest 
due February 1, 1961, thereby leaving an outstanding principal amount of $49,000.00 due and payable on 
February 1st of each year as follows:
year  Amount  Bond Numbers
1962  $4,000   27 to 30, inc.
1963  5,000   31 to 35, inc.
1964  5,000   36 to 40, inc.
1965  5,000   41 to 45, inc.
1966  5,000   46 to 50, inc.
1967  6,000   51 to 56, inc.
1968  6,000   57 to 62, inc.
1969  6,000   63 to 68, inc.
1970  7,000   69 to 75, inc.
 Together with all unpaid accrued interest and the interest hereafter due and payable on said bonds; and 
to duly and punctually perform all covenants of said bond issue remaining unpaid and to protect all contract 
rights vested in the holders of said outstanding bonds.
 Customers’ deposits to secure payment of customers’ obligations for water bills.
 All outstanding unpaid accounts, bills and other obligations at the District, including final water bill due 
The City of Jackson, Central Service for billing customers and Arnold & Badgett for final audit.
 An existing contract dated March 9, 1951, between the District and The City of Jackson for furnishing 
water to the District; said contractual obligations to be assumed or else rendered void and of no further force 
and effect.
 AN ORDINANCE ESTABLISHING WATER RATES FOR WATER SERVICE SUPPLY FROM DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM OF 
JACKSON SUBURBAN UTILITY DISTRICT OF MADISON COUNTY, TENNESSEE OUTSIDE AND INSIDE THE CORPORATE 
LIMITS OF THE CITY OF JACKSON, TENNESSEE.
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 BE IT ORDAINED BY THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF JACKSON, TENNESSEE:
 Section 1. That water rates of the Jackson Utility Division for water service from the Jackson Suburban 
Utility District of Madison County, Tennessee, inside the corporate limits of the City of Jackson, Tennessee, be 
the same rates charged all other consumers inside the corporate limits of the City of Jackson, Tennessee.
 Section 2. That water rates of the Jackson Utility Division for water service from the Jackson Utility 
District of Madison County, Tennessee, outside the corporate limits of the City of Jackson, Tennessee, be and 
remain the same rates as are now being charged by the Jackson Suburban Utility District of Madison County, 
Tennessee.
 Section 3. That this ordinance take effect June 1, 1961, upon its adoption, the Public Welfare requiring it.
NOTICE
 The foregoing ordinance was introduced, read and approved by the Board of Commissioners of the City 
of Jackson, Tennessee, the 27th day of June, 1961, and will be considered for adoption at the regular meeting 
of said board to be held June 30, 1961, in the Board Room of the City Hall, Jackson, Madison County, 
Tennessee, at 10 A.M. at which time any and all suggestions pertaining to the adoption of said ordinances 
will be considered.
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 THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this 30th day of April, 1957 by and between THE MEMPHIS 
SUBURBAN UTILITY DISTRICT OF SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE, a public corporation of the State of Tennessee 
(hereinafter called “District”) and the MEMPHIS LIGHT, GAS AND WATER DIVISION OF THE CITY OF MEMPHIS, 
a Division of Government of the City of Memphis, (hereinafter called “Division”)
 WITNESSETH:
 WHEREAS, the District now owns, operates and maintains a water supply and distribution system, fire 
protection facilities and sanitary sewer system within the territorial limits of said District as shown on the 
plat annexed hereto as Exhibit “A”; and
 WHEREAS, in order to finance said water supply and distribution system and said fire protection 
facilities and to refund certain obligations of the District issued for the foregoing purpose, the District 
has issued and sold and now has outstanding $1,572,000.00 Utility Revenue Refunding Bonds, dated 
April 1, 1957, represented by Interim Receipts therefor, as described in a resolution adopted by the District 
on April 29, 1957, annexed hereto as Exhibit “B”; and 
 WHEREAS, in anticipation of the annexation to the City of Memphis of the territorial area of the District 
and the practical necessity for combining the water system of the Division, the District and the Division, duly 
authorized by the Board of Commissioners of the City, have conducted negotiations for the acquisition by 
the Division of the water supply and distribution system of the Division, and the parties hereto, for valuable 
considerations, the receipt and sufficiency whereof being acknowledged, have agreed and do hereby agree and 
bind themselves as follows:
1. The District hereby agrees to transfer and deliver to the Division and the Division hereby agrees to accept 
and take over from the district, on the terms and conditions and on or before the time herein set forth, all 
of the water supply and distribution system and priorities relating thereto now or hereafter owned by the 
District, together with all of the real estate belonging to the District, and the District agrees to convey to 
the City of Memphis for the use and benefit of the Division by good and valid conveyances, with the usual 
covenants of warranty and quiet possession, the real estate described in Exhibit “C” annexed hereto, and 
all of the personal property of every kind and character owned and used by the District in the operation 
of said water supply and distribution system at the date of closing under this contract, including all 
easements, wells, pumping plants, water treatment works, water storage facilities, water ines and mains, 
________________________
*Actually, no “sale” occurred. The contract simply provided for a transfer of functions, assets and liabilities to 
the Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division.
AppENDIX H
Contract of Sale* for Acquisition
of Memphis Suburban utility District
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 meters, contracts, accounts receivable and bank deposits and cash on hand except the sum of $10,000.00 
which is hereby determined by the parties hereto to be the sum that will be required by the District for 
the operation of its fire protection system until the annexation of the territorial area of the District by the 
City of Memphis and said sum shall be retained by the district for such purpose.
 The District and the division agree that consummation of the transactions provided for above in this 
paragraph 1 will take place on or before January 1, 1958. The actual date of consummation of such 
transactions is herein referred to as the “Closing Date.”
 Upon annexation of the territorial area of the district by the City of Memphis, the District, for the 
consideration herein set forth, agrees to transfer and convey to the City of Memphis all of its property, 
both real and personal constituting, and used in connection with, its fire protection system, including all 
money on deposit to banks and on hand, which shall be paid over to the Division.
2. The Division agrees to assume and pay, from and after the Closing Date, all obligations of the District, 
secured and unsecured, relating to or incurred in connection with the ownership and operation by the 
District of its water supply and distribution system, including the Utility Revenue Refunding Bonds 
described in Exhibit “B”; provided, however, that the obligation of the Division aforesaid shall be 
conditioned upon the financial condition of the District as of the Closing Date being as favorable as the 
financial condition of the District evidenced by the Accountant’s Report of Balch, Pratt, Priddy & Co., 
dated as of May 31, 1956. The District agrees to furnish the Division, not later than June 25, 1957, with 
an Accountant’s Report of its financial condition as of May 31, 1957, and covering its preceding fiscal year 
prepared by a firm of certified public accountants acceptable to the Division and to furnish on the Closing 
Date a supplemental report of such accountants showing the true financial condition of the district as of 
the Closing Date. The Division reserves the right to waive any or all of the foregoing requirements.
3. The Division binds itself to operate said water supply and distribution system in an efficient manner, 
to make all necessary additions and extensions as may be needed from time to time, and to charge 
water rates in accordance with its applicable rate schedules for customers in like circumstances as such 
schedules may be amended from time to time; all in accordance with the Rules and Regulations of the 
Division as they presently exist, or may be hereafter amended.
4. The Division agrees and binds itself to assume the obligations of all executory contracts entered 
 into by the District with subdivision developers and other property owners covering the installation  
and maintenance of water services, and to pay such refunds as may be required under the terms  
of said contracts.
5. The Division further agrees and binds itself to carry out the terms of the contract of the District with 
International Harvester Company, as set forth in Exhibit “D” hereto, until such time as the Division and 
said International Harvester Company may enter into superseding contracts covering water services to be 
furnished said Company.
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 6. The Division agrees to employ such of the personnel now employed by the District as may desire 
employment by the Division and as may be equipped to perform the duties required of them by the 
Division; and the Division agrees to accept into the Retirement & Pension System for Employees of 
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division, City of Memphis, all such employees who desire to participate 
therein and make the payments hereinafter referred to, with full rights in said employees to retirement 
benefits beginning with the dates of their respective employments by the district, provided, the District 
pays the cost as an operating expense account on or before the Closing Date to said retirement and 
pension fund of the Division the sum set out in Exhibit “E” hereto for those employees who elect to enter 
said retirement system and who personally pay to said retirement and pension fund of the Division, as the 
employees contribution, 4% of the total compensation of such employee from the District from the time 
of his employment to January 1, 1956, and 5% of his total compensation from the District or the Division 
after January 1, 1956, such payments by the employee and application for participation in said retirement 
and pension fund of the Division to be made within six months from their employment by the Division.
 7. The Division further agrees to bill the charges made by the District for sewer services furnished to the 
present District customers, as certified by the District to the Division, provided the customers so certified 
are being billed for electric, gas or water service by the Division. The Division shall remit to the district 
monthly the sewer rentals paid to the Division as above provided until the area so served sewer service is 
annexed to the City of Memphis, or until the City of Memphis shall take over the operation of the sewer 
systems now operated by the District.
 8. Each party shall cooperate and take such action as may be reasonably requested by the other in order to 
carry out the provisions and purposes of this agreement; and the district shall continue in existence for 
the operation of the fire protection system and sewer systems now under its jurisdiction until annexation 
of the territorial area of the District by the City of Memphis.
 9. The Division hereby consents and agrees that this contract may be assigned or pledged by the District in 
such form or manner as the District may provide.
10. This contract is contingent upon approval thereof by the board of commissioners of the City of Memphis, 
as required by law.
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto duly authorized and by their lawfully authorized officers and 
agents, have executed this agreement on the day and in the month and year first hereinabove written.
      The Memphis Suburban Utility District of Shelby County, Tennessee
      By __________________________________________________
      Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division of the City of Memphis, Tennessee
      By ____________________________________________________
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RESOLUTION
 IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED by the Mayor and Board of Commissioners of the City of Memphis that the action 
taken by the Board of Light, Gas & Water Commissioners on April 25, 1957, as evidenced by the attached 
excerpts from that meeting authorizing the execution of contract of sale with Memphis Suburban Utility 
District, be and is hereby ratified and approved.
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 On motion of Commissioner Floyd Bolton, seconded by Commissioner P. J. Humphries, the following 
resolution was presented for adoption. The motion was carried by a vote of 3 to 0.
 WHEREAS, the City of Johnson City, Tennessee, heretofore has annexed certain territory on the westerly 
side of said City, commonly known as “West Hills,” which territory at the time of its annexation was being 
served by the North Johnson City Utility District of Washington County, Tennessee; and
 WHEREAS, the City of Johnson City, Tennessee, has elected to exercise its right under section 6-318 of the 
Tennessee Code Annotated, to assume the operation of the entire Utility system and to pay all outstanding 
bonds and other obligations of said North Johnson City Utility District of Washington County, Tennessee, in 
accordance with their terms;
 NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved by the Commissioners of the North Johnson City Utility District of 
Washington County, Tennessee as follows:
 That all of the assets of the North Johnson City Utility District of Washington County, Tennessee, be, and 
they hereby are, transferred to the City of Johnson City, Tennessee, and title thereto vested in said City in 
consideration of said City’s agreement to pay all outstanding obligations of the North Johnson City Utility 
District of Washington County, Tennessee, in accordance with the terms and to protect the contract rights 
vested in the holders of all outstanding bonds and other obligations of the District.
RESOLUTION
 On Motion of Commissioner McDowell, seconded by Commissioner Spears, the following resolution was 
presented for adoption. The motion was carried by a vote of 4 to 1.
 WHEREAS, the North Johnson City Utility District of Washington County, Tennessee, is and has been 
furnishing water to certain inhabitants of the territory commonly known as “West Hills,” which was recently 
annexed by the City of Johnson City, Tennessee; and
 WHEREAS, the City of Johnson City, Tennessee, has entered into negotiations with the said North Johnson 
City Utility District of Washington County, Tennessee, as required by section 6-318 of the Tennessee Code 
Annotated and as a result of said negotiations it appears that it will be to the advantage of the City of 
Johnson City to assume the operation of the entire Utility system of said North Johnson City Utility District of 
Washington County, Tennessee, rather than to purchase a part thereof;
AppENDIX I
Resolution for Acquisition
of North Johnson City utility District
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 NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved by the Board of Commissioners of the City of Johnson City, Tennessee, as 
follows:
 
 Section 1. That the City of Johnson City, Tennessee, hereby assumes the operation of the entire Utility 
system of the North Johnson City Utility District of Washington County, Tennessee, and accepts title thereto.
 Section 2. That the City of Johnson City, Tennessee, hereby assumes and will pay all outstanding bonds 
and other obligations of said North Johnson City Utility District of Washington County, Tennessee, in 
accordance with their terms. Said indebtedness consisting of 1952 series bonds of $985,000.00; 1956 series 
bonds in the amount of $265,000.00; 1958 Certifications of Indebtedness in the amount of $550,000.00; 
East Tennessee Water Corporation bonds in the amount of $160,000.00, totaling $1,960,000, all payable from 
revenues of said system.
ANNEXATION HANDBOOK • MuNICIpAL TECHNICAL ADvISORy SERvICE 107
 WHEREAS, the Nashville City and Davidson County school systems exist to provide the best educational 
opportunity for the children and youth of the total community within the limits of the people’s ability to pay 
for the services, and 
 WHEREAS, continuous progress in education is the primary goal and objective of a school policy for the 
City of Nashville and Davidson County, and 
 WHEREAS, the coordination of community participation in the furtherance of education must be based on 
a plan of action directing efforts toward the common goal, and 
 WHEREAS, a plan of action to provide, maintain and improve the quality level of educational opportunity 
for the children and youth of the community requires the establishment of a statement of policies, and 
 WHEREAS, the promotion of maximum efficiency of education facilities requires that the creative and 
productive capacities of all concerned must be encouraged, utilized, and coordinated within a framework of 
mutual respect and understanding;
 NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Nashville City Board of Education and the Davidson County Board 
of Education:
1. That they shall coordinate their efforts to secure the decisions necessary to achieve the public purpose of 
 education within the total Nashville-Davidson County community.
2. That the Nashville City Board of Education hereby enters into an agreement with the Davidson County 
 Board of Education whereby:
 A. The Davidson County Board of Education will operate the school facilities during the 1961-62 fiscal 
  year in all areas served by them during the 1960-61 fiscal year;
 B. The Davidson County Board of Education shall proceed with its capital improvements program in the 
  annexed areas and in the areas affected by the annexation, said program for the 1961-62 being 
  described in Appendix A of the Davidson County Capital Improvements Program, 1961-67;
 
 C. The Nashville City Board of Education shall proceed with its capital improvements program in the areas 
  affected by the annexations, said program for the 1961-62 being described in Appendix A of the 
  Davidson County Capital Improvements Program, 1961-67;
 D. It is proposed that the County shall authorize and sell a $4,000,000 countywide General Obligation 
  Bond issue to finance school construction.
AppENDIX J
Nashville City/Davidson County
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 E. The formula for the distribution of a proposed $4,000,000 countywide General Obligation Bond 
  issue shall be on the basis of the proposed formula shown on page ____ of the Davidson County 
  Capital Improvements Program, 1961-67; and shall be specifically allocated, as follows:
  TENTATIVE FORMULA FOR DISTRIBUTION OF A $4,000,000 COUNTYWIDE GENERAL OBLIGATION BOND 
  ISSUE FOR 1961-62*
  I. Assuming an issue of $4,000,000 Countywide General  Obligation Bond
  II. A. County Program for 1961-62  $3,150,000
     Less: Undivided Program 
    John Early Elementary $ 90,000  
    Glengarry Elementary  285,000
    John Overton High  250,000     625,000
    Total remaining for divided program    2,525,000
       B. City Program for 1961-62
     Less: Undivided Program
     Highland Heights Junior High  287,000 287,000
    Total remaining for divided program   1,979,000
 
  III. A. County A.D.A.
     Less: Undivided Program A.D.A.
    John Early Elementary 439
     Glengarry Elementary (est)  400
     John Overton High 817    1,656
    Net County A.D.A.  42,844
       B. City A.D.A.
     Less: Undivided Program A.D.A.
    Highland Heights Junior High   492  492
    Net A.D.A.  27,008
       C. Percentage Relationship of Net A.D.A.
     Net County A.D.A. 42,844* 61.3354%
     Net City A.D.A. 27,008* 38.6646%
    Total 69,582* 100%
________________________
*The final 1960-61 Average Daily Attendance of the City and County School systems will be used in computing 
the final and exact distribution.
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  IV. Undivided Program
     John Early Elementary   90,000
     Glengarry Elementary   285,000
     John Overton High   250,000
     Highland Heights Junior High  287,000 912,000
  V. Divided Program
    $4,000,000 issue less undivided program  3,088,000
    Issued to County by percentage in No. III C     1,984,037 
    Issued to city by percentage in No. III C     1,393,963
  VI. Summary of Divided and Undivided Programs
     County:
     Divided 1,894,037
     Undivided 625,000  2,529,037
     City:
     Divided 1,193,963
     Undivided 287,000  1,480,963
     Total:
     Divided 3,088,000
     Undivided 912,000  4,000,000
 F. It is recognized that the project costs shown in the Capital Improvements Budget and Program are 
  estimated costs and that the actual costs can only be determined through the letting of bids. In 
  the event that the bids for the construction of the proposed facilities or the cost acquiring proposed 
  sites for projects within the undivided bond program differ from the estimated figures whom in the City 
  Capital Improvements Budget and Program, 1961-67 and the County Capital Improvements Program, 
  1961-67, the City and County School Boards shall resolve the difference within the spirit of 
  this agreement.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT:
3. The Nashville City and Davidson County Boards of Education shall cooperate in a comprehensive 
 examination of public education needs within the Nashville-Davidson County Community. This study 
 shall include an examination of administration, school zoning policies, pupil transportation, school debt 
 administration, finance and capital outlay programming and such other subjects as may be deemed 
 appropriate to the furtherance of education opportunity.
_______________________
*The final 1960-61 Average Daily Attendance of the City and County School systems will be used in computing 
the final and exact distribution.
110 ANNEXATION HANDBOOK • MuNICIpAL TECHNICAL ADvISORy SERvICE
 4. The Nashville City Board of Education and the Davidson County Board of Education shall prior to 
 May 1, 1962, develop a mutually acceptable plan for the acquisition and/or transfer of school priorities 
 located within the areas annexed by the City of Nashville. During the period prior to the transfer of such 
 priorities they shall continue to be maintained at County standards.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT as part of this agreement between the Nashville City Board of Education and 
the Davidson County Board of Education:
 5. That consistent with the principle that pupils should be disturbed as little as possible with respect to the 
 school they attend:
 A. The Boards jointly study the problems of rezoning along the boundary areas of the two school systems 
  on an annual basis; and
 B. That pupils be permitted to attend schools as presently assigned or as determined by agreement 
  between the City and County Boards of Education without regard to corporate lines.
 6. That no tuition be charged except for county students attending Hume-Fogg Technical High School and 
 Pearl High Vocational School.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT:
 7. The Superintendent of the County Board of Education shall advise the Superintendent of the City Board of 
 Education as to the status of all school personnel for schools within the areas annexed to the City of 
 Nashville as of the effective date of such annexation.
 8. The Superintendent of the County Board of Education and/or his representative shall advise with the 
 Superintendent of the City Board of Education and/or his representative prior to personnel transfers or 
 the assignment of new personnel concerning schools within the areas annexed to the city of Nashville but 
 subsequent to the effective date of such annexation.
 9. That all rights of all school personnel shall be protected in accordance with existing law.
10. That the County Board of Education, under policies which the County Board transports pupils throughout 
 the County, will continue to transport pupils living within the annexed area during the 1961-62 and the 
 1962-63 school years.
        APPROVED BY DAVIDSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
        May 25, 1961
        APPROVED BY NASHVILLE CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION
        June 9, 1961
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 THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this 19 day of June 1963, by and between the CITY OF 
KNOXVILLE, a municipal corporation with situs in Knox County, Tennessee, of the first part, hereinafter called 
“CITY,” and the COUNTY OF KNOX, a governmental division of the State of Tennessee, of the second part, 
hereinafter called “COUNTY,”
WITNESSETH
 WHEREAS, by Ordinances Nos. 2947, 3049, 3050, 3052, 3053, 3054, the City annexed certain territory 
pursuant to the authority of Title 6, Chapter 30 TCA so that the said territory is now within the corporate 
limits of the City, and
 WHEREAS, certain public schools of a value of approximately $12,000,000 now owned and operated by the 
County are located within the area so annexed, and 
 WHEREAS, the parties are empowered by law to effect a transfer of annexed school properties by contract 
between them,
 NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the premises and the covenants hereinbelow contained, it is 
agreed between the parties as follows:
I
 On or before July 1, 1963, the County will give and convey absolutely to the City the following 
County Schools:
 1.  Alice Bell School  2.  Anderson School
 3.  Bearden Elementary School  4.  Bearden High School
 5.  Cedar Grove School  6.  Central High School
 7.  Chilhowee School  8.  Fountain City Grammar School
 9.  Galbraith School 10.  Happy Home School
11.  Holston High School 12.  Inskip Elementary School
13.  Lyons View School 14.  Mooreland Heights School
15.  Norwood School 16.  Oakland School
17.  Pleasant Ridge School 18.  Pond Gap School
19.  Ridgedale School 20.  Robert Huff School
21.  Rocky Hill School 22.  Shannondale School
23.  Smithwood School 24.  Spring Hill School
25.  Sterchi School 26.  West Haven School
27.  West Hills Elementary School 28.  Young High School
AppENDIX K
Knoxville and Knox County Agreement
for Transfer of Schools
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 Such conveyance shall include all land and buildings comprising the school properties of the above 
schools, together with all equipment, furniture, fixtures, books and other items of personal property now in 
use or present and available for use at any of the above schools, excepting however items of equipment used 
by or available for the use of all County Schools without designation to a particular school, such as but not 
limited to special projectors, film strips, special scientific equipment and special musical instruments and 
equipment. County agrees that it will, on or before the said date, execute and deliver all deeds, assignments 
and other instruments of transfer necessary or appropriate to effectuate such conveyance or conveyances.
II
 Effective July 1, 1963, all employees of the Knox County Board of Education assigned to the above schools 
shall be and become employees of the Board of Education of the City if they choose to do so, providing that 
as concerns teachers, such employment rights shall exist only for those who are at that time certified or 
otherwise approved by the State of Tennessee Department of Education. An appropriate proportionate number 
of maintenance employees, clerical employees, and supervisory personnel of the County Board of Education, 
not assigned to any particular school, whose employment by the County will no longer be necessary by reason 
of the reduction of the number of County Schools shall similarly become employees of the Board of Education 
of the City if they choose to do so. All such persons thus becoming employees of the City shall be entitled to 
the following rights, which the City hereby agrees to preserve and protect:
A. They shall acquire tenure rights under the City Charter as if they had been employees of the City for the 
 period of time they have been employees of the County Board of Education.
B. They shall be placed on the salary scale of the City Board of Education as if they had been employees of 
 the City Board of Education for the time they have been employees of the County Board of Education. 
 If the County shall have granted credit for pay purposes for experience in employment by other Boards 
 of Education, the City Board of Education shall likewise grant credit for such experience not to exceed 
 three years, provided however that compensation of no Knox County employee shall be decreased by 
 reason of the three year limitation for non-Knox County experience.
C. Such employees may elect to continue membership in any pension plan of which they are members. In 




 County represents that Exhibit “A” attached hereto is a complete listing of the proportion of the 
outstanding Rural Bonds of the County applicable to the schools above listed, and that the same accurately 
reflects the principal and interest requirements to maturity of such proportion of such bonds. City agrees that 
it will provide funds sufficient to meet all payments to principal and interest due and accruing on the above 
listed bonds from and after July 1, 1963, as follows:
A. Not less than thirty days before any date on which a payment on principal or interest is due to be 
 delivered by the County, the County’s general accounting office shall give written notice to the Mayor and 
 Finance Director of the City, advising them of the due date and the amount of such payment and such 
 other information respecting the same as they may reasonably request.
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B. Not less than fifteen days preceding such due date, the City shall transmit and deliver to the Trustee of 
 the County funds sufficient to meet such payment to principal and interest.
C. The City’s liability under this Article III shall be only to the County and shall be limited to the amounts 
 stated in Exhibit “A,” plus interest on any amount not paid when otherwise due.
D. County agrees that the funds to be transferred will be applied to the payment of such bonds according to 
 the terms of the notice given the City as above.
IV
 Pursuant to the authority of TCA 49-711 the parties agree as follows respecting the issuance of school 
bonds and the division between them of funds from school bonds:
A. City hereby waives its right to all or any part of funds due it from County bonds sold during 1962.
B. In lieu of its rights to demand a proportional payment from each county-wide school bond issue, the City 
 agrees that from and after the execution of this agreement all County bonds for school purposes shall be 
 issued and sold according to the following terms:
 1. Funds raised at the request of the County Board of Education for school construction outside the City 
  shall be expended by the County without a proportional payment from such funds.
 
 
 2. County shall issue county-wide bonds to meet the capital needs of the City School System as follows:
  a. City shall make request or requests for funds from time to time by delivery to the County Court 
   Clerk and the County Judge of a certified copy of a Resolution by the City Council authorizing 
   expenditure of such funds by the City School Board. Such request for requests shall be made on 
   or before January 1 of each year in which funds will be needed so that necessary bond resolution 
   may be prepared for presentation to the County Court at its regular January meeting and the bonds 
   marketed by April 1.
  b. The County shall upon receipt of such request or requests issue without delay sufficient County 
   bonds to produce the amount of funds requested.
  c. Upon receipt of the proceeds of such bonds, the County Trustee shall forthwith transfer said funds 
   to the Treasurer of the City free of any control of the County as to the use of such funds, provided 
   that the same shall be expended by the City in accordance with the terms of TCA 49-713.
  d. The City School Board and the County School Board will develop by mutual agreement a county-
   wide budget of capital expansion and improvement funds, projecting the needs for school facilities 
   over a ten year period, and specifying the recommended order of such expansion and improvements 
   year by year. In developing such budget the respective Boards may make such use of population 
   studies and school studies as may be available from the Metropolitan Planning Commission. The 
   Capital Budget and projection of needs so developed shall annually be extended by the Boards for 
   one year, and may be adjusted from time to time as circumstances shall require.
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   When a majority of each of the respective Boards agrees upon such a budget, it is agreed that such 
   budget shall form the basis for each Board’s request to its respective legislative body for 
   capital funds. 
   Nothing herein is intended to limit or in any wise restrict the right of County Court to issue or 
   refuse to issue bonds for school construction outside the City in such amounts and at such times as 
   it may see fit, whether consistent or inconsistent with the request of the County Board of 
   Education. Neither is anything herein intended, except as provided in paragraph 3 hereinbelow, to 
   limit or in any wise restrict the right of City Council to request or refuse to request the issuance of 
   county-wide bonds for school construction inside the City in such amounts as it may see fit, and 
   County court shall be bound to issue such bonds upon proper request by City Council in accordance 
   with Article IV, C, a, b, c, above, irrespective of any agreements or lack of agreement between the 
   Boards of Education.
 3. The City may not in the first three years hereafter be entitled to more than 60 percent of the total 
  bonds issued by the County under this agreement. In the next three years thereafter the City may not 
  be entitled to more than 65 percent of the total bonds issued by the County under this agreement. 
  After these two periods of three years have expired the limitation of division of bonds sold by the 
  County shall be upon the basis of average daily attendance for each year thereafter.
 4. Nothing herein shall be construed to give to the County or its School Board any right to direct or 
  control the management or operation of the City School System or any part thereof.
 5. The provision of this Article IV shall continue in full force and effect until the City shall have paid 
  to the County the total requirements of principal and interest on Rural bonds as set out in Exhibit “A” 
  hereto, provided, that the parties may by mutual agreement sooner terminate the same. After the 
  said total requirements of principals and interest have been paid by the City to the County the parties 
  shall review the fiscal problems of each with reference to schools existing at that time to determine 
  whether the provisions of Article IV shall be terminated or not.
 
  If after review it appears to either party upon reasonable grounds that it would be inequitable to 
  continue in force the provisions of this Article IV, then such party may terminate the provisions of 
  this Article IV upon six months notice to the Chief Executive Office of the other, assigning reasons for 
  such termination.
V
 The Parties agree as follows respecting the attendance at the above schools by a student living outside the 
corporate limits of the City.
A. Pupils now attending such schools may continue to do so tuition-free.
B. New first graders, new high school students, and other pupils hereafter moving into a county school 
 district may attend the nearest of the above listed schools located within two miles of his residence, 
 tuition-free.
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C. Pupils not now attending one of the above listed schools who move hereafter into a different county 
 school district, and whose residence is more than two miles from all of the above listed schools, may 
 attend one of the above listed schools nearer to his residence than the nearest county school if he would 
 have attended said school had it remained a part of the County School System.
D. No pupil may attend a City School without payment of tuition if he or his parents or guardian have moved 
 their residence from within the present corporate limits of the City to a place outside the present 
 corporate limits of the City at any time after November 22, 1960.
E. The City reserves the right to transfer pupils attending under paragraphs A, B, and C above if transfer shall 
 seem advisable to alleviate crowded conditions.
F. Attendance tuition-free under paragraphs A, B, and C above shall cease after June 1969, following which 
 time all County Students attending City Schools must pay tuition or attend under an exchange agreement 
 then in effect.
VI
 In event of consolidation of the two school systems the above agreement respecting the city’s payment 
of principal and interest on rural bonds and the above agreements respecting waiver of the division of bond 
proceeds shall be void and of no effect. If such consolidation shall become effective at a time less than one 
year following any remittance by the City to the County of funds for payment of bonds as provided in Article 
III above, the County shall return to the city the same proportion of such remittance as the time elapsed 
between such remittance and the effective date of consolidation bears to one year, less the amount of funds 
the County would have received during such period from beer tax, capital outlay, etc., and which the County 
had previously pledged for retirement of said rural school bonds had annexation not been voted.
VII
 As additional consideration for the transfer and conveyance of the school properties aforesaid, City agrees 
to pay to the County the sum of Three Hundred Twenty-Eight Thousand Dollars ($328,000) cash, the same 
to be paid as follows: Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) on the l5th day of October, November and December, 
1963, Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) on the 15th day of January and February 1964, and Seventy-Eight 
Thousand Dollars ($78,000) on the 15th day of March, 1964.
 County agrees, as additional consideration, that during the school year ending June 1964, it will provide 
transportation to and from school for all pupils who would have been entitled to such transportation by the 
County for the transfer and conveyance provided in this Agreement.
VIII
 The provisions of this agreement may be enforced by suit for specific performance to the Chancery Court 
for Knox County, Tennessee, or in the alternative by suit for damages in any Court of this State having 
jurisdiction. It is specifically agreed that in event of breach of Article IV, B, 2, any funds borrowed by the City 
and applied to school construction pending outcome of the suit for specific performance may be repaid by the 
City with proceeds of the bonds thereafter issued by the County whether the same be issued in conformity 
with a decree of specific performance or otherwise.
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 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, parties have caused this agreement to be executed on the day and year first above 
written by their duly authorized authors and officials.
Approved as to form and correctness:   CITY OF KNOXVILLE
_____________________________________  By _________________________
Director of Law      Mayor
          COUNTY OF KNOX
          By ________________________
          County Judge
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SHELBY COUNTY AND
 THE SHELBY COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
 Petitioners
 and
 BOARD OF EDUCATION




 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
 ____________________________________________
 Comes the respondent, Board of Education of the Memphis City Schools, and respectfully submits this 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities to the Board of Arbitration:
I.
 THE LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT AN ANNEXING MUNICIPALITY COMPENSATE ANOTHER AGENCY OF 
GOVERNMENT FOR PUBLIC PROPERTIES WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN AS A RESuLT OF ANNEXATION
 At the threshold of this controversy, there is a fundamental difference of view between the parties as 
to the basic function of the Board of Arbitration. In the one hand, petitioners view the law as requiring 
that compensation be paid for annexed schools, and they would limit this arbitration to the sole issue of 
the value of the school properties taken into the City. Respondent on the other hand very earnestly contends 
that the Board is confronted by a much broader range of issues than the mere appraisal of real estate. It is 
responsible for arriving at a just and reasonable decision which takes into account the overall realignment 
of governmental functions, rights and responsibilities resulting from the annexation. Obviously, since the 
results of the Board’s decision will ultimately be borne by the residents and taxpayers of the community, 
the final criterion must be one of fairness to the various groups of taxpayers involved.
AppENDIX L
Arbitration Brief for Memphis Board of Education
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 It is appropriate to consider, at the outset of this discussion, the language of the statute which authorizes 
this arbitration:
 
 Municipal property And Services—Upon adoption of an annexation ordinance or upon referendum 
approval of an annexation resolution as hereinabove provided, an annexing municipality and any 
affected instrumentality of the State of Tennessee, such as, but not limited to, a utility district, 
sanitary district, school district, or any other public service district, shall attempt to reach agreement 
in writing for allocation and conveyance to the annexing municipality of any or all public functions, 
rights, duties, property, assets and liabilities of such state instrumentality that justice and reason may 
require in the circumstances. Provided, however, that any and all agreements entered into before  
March 8, 1955 relating to annexation shall be preserved. The annexing municipality, if and to the 
extent that it may choose, shall have the exclusive right to perform or provide municipal and utility 
functions and services in any territory which it annexes, notwithstanding Sec. 6-26-7 or any other 
statute, subject, however, to the provisions of this section with respect to electric cooperatives. 
Subject to such exclusive right any such matters upon which the respective parties are not in 
agreement in writing within sixty (60) days after the operative date of such annexation shall be 
settled by arbitration with the laws of arbitration of the state of Tennessee effective at the time of 
submission to the arbitrators and Subsection (2) of Sec. 23-501, shall not apply to any arbitration 
arising under Subsection 6-308--6-320. The award so rendered shall be transmitted to the chancery 
court of the county in which the annexing municipality is situated, and thereupon shall be subject to 
review in accordance with Subsection 23-513–23-515 and 23-518. T.C.A. 6-318. (Emphasis supplied)
 There are no court decisions construing this statute which are particularly helpful in dealing with the 
issues raised by this arbitration. The case of Whitt v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 360 (1956), simply upholds the 
constitutionality of the 1955 annexation law, of which this statute forms a part. In Hamilton County v. City 
of Chattanooga, 203 Tenn. 85 (1958), the court held that a county was an “affected instrumentality” within 
the meaning of the statute and, therefore, arbitration would be required. However, the court did not expand 
on the language of the statute to throw any light on what the result of the arbitration might be.
 No language in this statute suggests that the standard applied by the Board should be one of monetary 
compensation according to either the value or the cost of the properties taken. On the contrary, the statute 
recognizes that an annexation does not involve a simple transfer of property but results in an indivisible 
transfer of numerous “public functions, rights, duties, property, assets and liabilities” and, as we shall later 
discuss, we doubt that the statute authorizes a monetary award.
 The statute leaves the Board of Arbitration free to reach a decision which is fair to all agencies and 
all taxpayers and which takes into account the entire governmental reorganization which results from 
the changed boundaries. “Reason and justice” are the only measures by which the ultimate result is to 
be evaluated, and the word “compensation” does not appear in any place in the statute. The language of 
the statute, therefore, lends no support to the simplistic approach of the petitioners: an approach which 
assumes that monetary compensation must be paid and leaves as the only question for the Board the 
issue of “how much.”
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 In weighing the intent of this statute, it is also significant to note that the Chancery Court is 
designated as the reviewing body for this arbitration proceeding. This is the court where all considerations 
of general equity to the parties and taxpayers can be evaluated. If, as petitioners contend, the act was 
tantamount to a condemnation statute, it would have been more logical to designate the Circuit Court 
as the reviewing tribunal.
II.
THE COUNTY TAXPAYER HAS SUFFERED NO LOSS
AS A RESULT OF THE ANNEXATION OF SCHOOLS
IN THE WALKER HOMES AND WHITE HAVEN AREA
_______________________________________________
 In weighing the economic impact of annexation on the various groups of taxpayers involved, the 
Board has had the benefit of the testimony of Dr. Wilbur R. Thompson. Dr. Thompson is a pioneer in 
the field of urban economics and, in addition to his academic work, has had personal experience with 
various intergovernmental authorities. He is therefore, eminently, and perhaps uniquely, qualified to 
express an opinion with regard to the dictates of fairness and reason in the type of intergovernmental 
transfer of duties and properties which confronts this Board.
 At pages 218 through 224 of the record of the October 4th hearing, Dr. Thompson discussed his general 
opinion with respect to the transfer of property and responsibilities from one governmental agency to another. 
He pointed out that an annexation is not a taking of property from its owners but a taking of both the owners 
and their property into a new governmental jurisdiction. Applying this reasoning to an annexation of school 
properties, it is obvious that if the annexation takes both the school buildings and the children served by 
those schools, there has been on gain or less [“no gain or loss”] which would justify one group of taxpayers 
being compensated at the expense of another. Stated another way, the county held the school property which 
is the subject of this arbitration for the sole purpose of performing its responsibility of educating the children 
in the annexed areas. When the respondent relieves the county of this responsibility, the respondent is 
entitled to take charge of these properties and should not be required to pay additional compensation.
 Dr. Thompson’s opinion was based in part on the fact that a governmental agency is regarded, not as 
a private property owner, but as a trustee which holds property for the benefit of the citizens or taxpayers. 
At page 221, he carefully drew a distinction between condemnation proceeding in which the owner is divested 
of his property and an annexation, in which property and owners alike pass into the jurisdiction of a new 
governmental agency. This view of the transaction is not only supported by Dr. Thompson’s personal expertise, 
but has been confirmed by the Supreme Court of this state. In Prescott v. Town of Lennox, 100 Tenn. 591 
(1898), the Court held that the organization of a special school district for the town of Lennox divested 
title to the school in that town of the 18th school district of Shelby County and into the newly created 
municipality. The Court confirmed Dr. Thompson’s opinion by stating:
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 “In the present case it is evident that the property in question cannot now be used for school 
purposes, unless by the Board of Education, representing such uses within the limits of the new 
corporation, and if complainants were permitted to control at all, it would be only on the idea of 
an ownership which could alone be divested by grant or by express Legislative enactment. Such 
theory, however, would ignore the fact that the title to such property is only held in trust for the 
public, and that by the change of municipal conditions the cestui que trust has become that public 
constituting the new corporation of Lennox.” 100 Tenn. 594 (Emphasis added).
 Of course, as both the Court in Lennox and the City Board’s witnesses pointed out, an injustice would be 
worked in particular situations. This might occur if the annexed area did not include all of the school children 
served by the annexed schools, resulting in the county’s being obliged to construct new school buildings. 
T.C.A. 6-318 would allow a Board of Arbitration to make adjustments for such situations. In the present case, 
however, no such inequity exists. At page 372 of the hearing of June 7th, the petitioner’s witness, Mr. George 
Barnes, testified that the County Board had not been obliged to construct any additional school facilities as 
a result of the annexation. In fact, all of the proof at the hearing was to the effect that the children served 
by these schools had been taken into the city along with the school buildings.
 The witness, John P. Freeman, speaking with the benefit of vast experience in school finance and in the 
relationship of the City and County school systems in this community, confirmed Dr. Thompson’s testimony. 
Beginning on page 402 of the transcript of the hearing of June 7th, Mr. Freeman pointed out that those 
taxpayers remaining outside the city have suffered no loss as a result of these annexations. To illustrate 
this point, he showed that the taxpayers in Shelby County may be divided into three groups for purposes 
of this arbitration: (1) Taxpayers residing within the city of Memphis prior to the annexation, (2) taxpayers 
continuing to reside outside the city of Memphis, and (3) taxpayers residing in the annexed area. The 
taxpayers in Group (1), who live within the old boundaries of Memphis and who send their children to 
schools located within those boundaries, have not reaped any benefit from the fact that other schools located 
in the Whitehaven-Walker Homes areas are now under the jurisdiction of the City Board of Education. The 
taxpayers in Group (2), who have always sent their children to schools that remain outside the city and whose 
schools are still a part of the Shelby County system, have suffered no loss by the detachment of other schools 
from the system. The situation of these taxpayers is unchanged and there is no equity in the county’s property 
that the schools of these taxpayers should be subsidized by the remainder of the citizens of Shelby County. 
Taxpayers in Group (3), who have come into the city along with the annexation of their schools, are in the 
same position as they were when these schools were in the county. They have been taxed as county taxpayers 
to build the schools in question, and it would be a gross injustice to require them to be taxed again as city 
taxpayers to pay for the schools a second time.
 In terms of the analysis used by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Lennox, the taxpayers in Group 3 are 
the beneficial owners of the annexed schools and petitioners are their trustee. If petitioners’ theory of this 
arbitration were upheld, it would result in a legal absurdity: the requirement that a cestui que trust must 
purchase his own property from his trustee.
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 The validity of this analysis was further confirmed by Mr. Gary Head, a professional in the field 
of local government:
“In addition, I have a strong conviction that when one government Unit accepts the responsibility 
of another Governmental Unit, and, consequently the assets, that no payment should be required.” 
(Page 57, Hearing of September 13th)
 The petitioners themselves furnish no basis on which to challenge the conclusions of these witnesses. 
No loss or inequity was shown to exist by the petitioners, and no expert testimony in the field of 
governmental relations was presented to suggest that one agency of government should receive financial 
compensation for the mere process of turning over certain of its functions to another governmental agency. 
Moreover, when the petitioners’ witness, Mr. George Barnes, was invited on cross examination to give his 
opinion as to the requirements of “justice and reason” with regard to this transaction, he declined the 
opportunity. (See Page 344,et seq. Hearing of June 3rd). He also failed to indicate any financial loss which 
the petitioners would sustain in the course of turning over to the respondents the schools and education 
responsibilities in the annexed areas. In fact, to the extent that the County’s situation has changed at all, 
the remaining portion of the County School System has realized a net gain in this transaction. This is because 
non-severable assets of the petitioners have remained entirely in the hands of the County School Board. The 
County, for example, will now have a greater per capita amount of administrative and transportation facilities 
with which to serve the remaining students.
 Based on the facts set out above, respondents submit that justice and reason do not require any 
compensation whatsoever for the school properties in the annexed areas. These properties were acquired 
and held by petitioners in order to discharge their responsibility of educating the children living in those 
areas. Respondents, having relieved petitioners of that responsibility to the beneficial owners of the property, 
are entitled—as part of the overall transfer of governmental duties—to assume control of the properties 
used in the performance of these duties. To require respondents to go further and to pay the County for 
the privilege of taking over these functions would be manifestly unjust and unreasonable. It would require 
taxpayers living within the City limits to simply subsidize the operation of a school system in other parts 
of Shelby County.
III.
EVEN IF PAYMENT FOR THE SCHOOLS WERE REQUIRED,
THE INEQUITIES SUFFERED BY THE CITY TAXPAYER
HAVE MORE THAN OFFSET THE CLAIM OF PETITIONERS
________________________________________________
 Although, as discussed above, it is respondent’s position that neither law nor equity would require 
a payment for assets transferred between governmental bodies, the proof disclosed a number of areas in 
which the City taxpayer has already suffered inequities. These areas more than offset the entire claim of 
the County for compensation.
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 A. The Illegal Division of County School Funds
 Prior to the decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Shelby County, et al., 
207 Tenn. 330 (1960), bond proceeds and County school levies were divided on a fifty-fifty basis between the 
City and the County Boards of Education. Since more children attended the Memphis City School system, this 
resulted in an inequitable distribution of school funds, which was held by the Supreme Court to be illegal and 
unconstitutional. At page 398 of the Hearing of June 7th, Mr. John Freeman testified that the total amount 
of bond funds wrongfully withheld from the City Board as a result of this arrangement was approximately 
$13,000,000. It is the position of respondent that this amount should be offset against any claim which the 
City might otherwise be awarded. This was substantiated by the testimony of Mr. Harvey on pages 165-7 
(May 26th). He shows that the city received $17,950,000 from bond issues of l948-60. Based on the 
75-25 pupil population, the City Board should have received $32,175,000 of the $42,950,000 issued 
during these years.
 The petitioners seek to evade this issue by relying on the refusal of the Supreme Court to make a cash 
award in favor of the City Board. This overlooks the well-recognized principle that even a claim which has 
been barred so that it can no longer be the basis of an affirmative action may be raised as a defense. This 
is particularly true where the claim is in the nature of a recoupment arising out of the same transaction 
(51 A, Jr. 2d “Limitation of Action”, Sec. 77). Many of the site purchases and construction payments on 
which the County bases its claim were made out of these very school funds which over the years were illegally 
withheld from the City Board. The County’s claim, therefore, arises directly out of the same transaction as the 
barred claim of the City Board for the recovery of these funds. While the Supreme Court declined to award the 
City a recover for these past injustices, it does not follow that expenditures made of illegally-obtained money 
should be allowed as a basis of affirmative recovery of the County against the City Board. This would allow the 
County to take advantage of the past wrong-doing and to receive the illegal funds a second time.
 B. The Construction of the Shelby County Administration Building
 In the course of the present hearing, another example of illegal appropriation of funds to the County 
School Board came to light. The testimony of Mr. Ward Harvey showed that the new Administration Building of 
the Shelby County Board of Education was built with funds which had not been divided on an a/d/a basis with 
the City School system (Pages 226-8, Hearing of May 31st). This building is used entirely for school purposes 
by the County board and its construction, therefore, represents an expenditure of County funds for education 
purposes. Under the rule of Board of Education v. Shelby County et al., supra, the County was obligated to give 
the City Board an a/d/a share of any educational appropriations. The County expenditure on this building was 
$895,000.00. Based on a 3:1 a/d/a ratio, the County is obligated to pay the City $2,685,000 and this amount 
of money, which has not been received by the City of Memphis, should be offset against any County claim.
 C. The Physical Needs of the Annexed Buildings
 In addition to incurring the general liabilities and responsibilities associated with the duty of educating 
children in the annexed areas, the City Board has incurred various extraordinary expenses in maintaining and 
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improving the annexed schools. Mr. John Freeman testified to the pressing facility needs in these areas and 
to the regrettable state of most of the annexed buildings. Exhibits Number 1 and 2 to his testimony set out 
the extensive needs in the annexed areas. At page 410 of the Hearing of June 7th, Mr. Freeman testified that 
there were approximately $1,000,000 in maintenance costs required of these funds, of which $310,000.00 had 
already been committed. Capital needs in these areas were estimated at an additional $3,000,000.
 These expenses were over and above the normal expenditures incurred in extending the city school 
system, such as the increase in the amount of the supplement which is paid out of City property taxes. 
In the present year, for example, the City of Memphis has contributed $9,982,758.93 to the City Board’s 
budget, for an average contribution of $75.51 per pupil. This amount is raised purely from the City property 
tax. If this amount were capitalized at 8 percent, the result would be a capital outlay of $948.88 for each 
pupil taken into the City as a result of these annexations. This amount multiplied by the 8,406 pupils in 
the Westwood area would result in a capitalized expenditure of $7,934,255.38 and multiplied by the 
11,907 annexed students in Whitehaven would result in a capitalized expenditure of $11,238,779.16, or 
a total of $19,173,034.44. In light of these increased expenses incurred by the City Board with regard 
to capital expenditures and to increased operating expenses, it would be unreasonable, both legally and 
practically, to require the City Board to bear additional expenses resulting from this annexation.
 
 D. Overall Inequities Suffered By The City Taxpayer
 In addition to the above matters which relate directly to school expenditures, the respondent has 
shown that the City taxpayer is already subsidizing the general operation of county government to an 
inequitable degree. The principal proof on this issue was the Memphis-Shelby County Fiscal Relationship 
Study (Exhibit 2 to the testimony of Mr. Gary Head) and the supporting testimony of the witnesses, 
Messrs. Head and Thompson. This study covers the fiscal years of 1968, 1969 and 1970 and it is pointed 
out at Page 2 of the Study that during this period $17,000,000 in “spillover” benefits flowed from the City 
taxpayer to the County taxpayer. This phenomenon is the result of a system of double taxation by which 
the City resident pays 100 percent of the amount required to operate the City government and also pays 
approximately 85 percent of the property taxes required to operate the County government.
 The method used in the Fiscal Relationship Study was to determine the amount of benefits received by the 
City taxpayer as a result of each Shelby County program and to deduct from that amount the total costs of the 
proper paid for by the city taxpayer. If the cost of the City taxpayer exceeded the benefit of the program,  
the excess amount was noted as a “spillover” benefit from the City taxpayer to the County. It was noted at 
Page 3 of the Study that no County service produced a contrary spillover in the City’s favor while virtually 
every County function resulted in a spillover from the City taxpayer to the County.
 As described by Mr. Head, the Study adopted as its hypothetical theory the assumption that the benefits 
of most city and County services should be allocated equally among the taxpayers. Mr. Head pointed out that 
this basic method was a means of assuring absolute fairness to the County taxpayer, since the contrasting 
audit approach would have showed an increased spillover from the City taxpayer to the County (Pages 28-30, 
Hearing of September 13th).
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 A second area in which the Head study bent over backward to assure fairness to the County was the 
computation of the trade spillover. The fact that a preponderance of commercial property is located in the 
City was adjusted by allowing the County full credit for all commercial benefits which were not identifiable as 
stemming from City residents (Page 34, Hearing of September 13th). The study, therefore, shows the minimum 
amount of benefit spillover from the City resident to the County and, in Mr. Head’s opinion, the true amount 
of County benefit would exceed the $17,000,000 which was identified by the study (Pages 23-4, Hearing of 
September 13th).
 Although the County’s witness, Mr. John Thomas, indicated that various other studies on the City-County 
fiscal relationship had been conducted, the petitioners did not attempt to present any evidence which would 
refuse the findings of respondent’s analysis as reflected in the Head study. It can only be assumed from this 
that other studies would either support the respondent’s case or would not stand the scrutiny to which 
Mr. Head’s study was subjected. Mr. Thomas did suggest two different approaches which might be made in 
another study. The first suggestion was that an adult approach should be used. Such approach, however, 
would result in a showing of greater inequity in favor of the County taxpayer. This is true because such County 
services as the construction and maintenance of the road system and the operation of the sheriff’s department 
outside the city limits would then be attributed to non-city residents. Under the approach of Mr. Head’s study, 
these services, although performed outside the City limits, were attributed equally to all residents of Memphis 
and Shelby County. Thus, the first suggestion of Mr. Thomas would result in a finding of spillover benefits to 
the County government which would greatly exceed the $17,000,000 indicated by Mr. Head’s study.
 The second approach suggested by Mr. Thomas was the unique theory of removing the tax produced 
by commercial and other income-producing property from the amounts credited to the City taxpayer. This 
suggestion overlooks the fact that the concentration of commercial property in an urban area is offset by the 
greater need for services to the poor that exists in such area. Even more important, Mr. Thomas’ application of 
this principal was inconsistent if commercial and industrial assessments are to be excluded on the ground that 
they reflect a fortuitous distribution of income-producing property, since it would seem to naturally follow 
that farm properties which are also income producing, non-residential uses should be removed from the credits 
attributed to the non-city taxpayer. Thus, the consistent application of Mr. Thomas’ second suggestion would 
undoubtedly lead to the finding of additional spillover benefit in favor of the County.
 On the basis of the evidence, therefore, the $17,000,000 in spillover benefits identified by Mr. Head must 
be taken as the minimum amount of inequity suffered by the City taxpayer. The Board of Arbitration, which 
is charged with considering the full range of issues relating to the annexation, should take into account the 
existence of this inequity. Even though it falls outside the scope of school expenditures, it is a direct subsidy 
provided to the County by the same group of taxpayers who would bear the ultimate expense of any award 
which the petitioners might receive, and respondent submits that any award of this Board should attempt to 
deal equitably with all of the economic realities faced by the taxpayers involved.
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IV.
RESPONDENT SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED
TO ASSUME OUTSTANDING BONDED INDEBTEDNESS
ARISING FROM COUNTY-WIDE BOND ISSUES
________________________________________________
 Although there is superficial plausibility in the claim that the City Board should assume the obligation of 
retiring outstanding bonded indebtedness with respect to the annexed schools, a careful analysis would show 
that such action should not equitably be required for the reason that those bonds are being retired from tax 
levies imposed by the County on all County taxpayers.
 The County had authority under TCA 49-715 to issue bonds which would be retired solely from taxes levied 
on property from areas outside the City. Had this been done, it would clearly be equitable to require that 
the outstanding obligations of these bonds be assumed by the City upon the annexation of the schools. The 
County, however, chose to disregard this opportunity and to finance the schools by a bond issue which is to be 
retired from General County Funds. Since 1961, the proceeds of such bond issues have been divided equitably 
on a per capita basis for the benefit of the school children in the County. The bonds are retired by a tax levy 
which falls equally over all of the assessed property in the County, with the City taxpayer already retiring 
80 to 85 percent of these bonds. So long as the buildings and equipment which were purchased by these 
bond issues continue to be enjoyed upon an equitable and per capita basis by the citizens of the County, no 
inequity results even through control of particular schools may be transferred from one jurisdiction to another.
 The same reasoning applies to the County’s claim of cash payment for equipment in these school buildings. 
The funds used to purchase this equipment have been divided on a per capita basis among the school children 
through the County. If, for example, a particular tax levy was used to buy desks or books on an equal basis for 
all children in both school systems, there would be no equity in requiring annexed school children either to 
abandon their per capital share of these assets or to pay a part of their costs a second time.
 It should also be noted that TCA 6-318 not only fails to require that a cash award be made for annexed 
school property, but does not even authorize such an award. No clause of this statute confers on the Board 
of Arbitration any power to direct a cash award with respect to properties which have already been paid for 
by the County. The only refill which the statute would authorize the Board to give to the petitioners would be 
the allocation of “liabilities” to the City Board if such an allocation were acquired [required] by justice and 
reason. Based on the language of the statute, respondent submits that the maximum relief which could be 
granted the County would be the assumption of existing liabilities by the City Board although, as discussed 
above, this relief would not be appropriate in light of the county-wide nature of these liabilities.
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CONCLUSION
 The respondent, Board of Education of Memphis City Schools, therefore, submits to the Board of 
Arbitrators that it is not liable to reimburse the County in any amount whatsoever for the schools involved  
in this annexation. This is true for the following reasons:
 1. The entire process of annexation has resulted in no more than a transfer of trust in the annexed 
  schools together with their beneficial owners—the people of Whitehaven and Walker Homes areas— 
  from one governmental agency as Trustee to another.
 2. The claim of compensation has been more than offset by the numerous inequities suffered by the City 
  taxpayer and the City Board.
 
 3. The compensation sought by the petitioners is neither required nor authorized by the terms of 
  TCA 6-318, and no inequities have been suffered by the petitioners which would warrant a departure 
  from the Act.
          Respectfully submitted,
          EVANS, PETREE, COBB & EDWARDS
          By _____________________________
          Attorneys for Respondent
          Board of Education of the 
          Memphis City Schools
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
 Copy of the foregoing Memorandum of Points and Authorities served on Lee Winchester, Jr., Esq., 
Attorney for Petitioners, by forwarding same copy by United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to said 
attorney at this business address in Memphis, Tennessee, this the 7th day of January, 1972.
 
 
 Board Of Arbitration Award, Shelby County vs.
 Memphis Board of Education
________________________________________________
 SHELBY COUNTY AND
 THE SHELBY COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
 Petitioners
 and
 BOARD OF EDUCATION
 OF THE MEMPHIS CITY SCHOOLS
 Respondent
________________________________________________
 After a full hearing before the Board of Arbitration, duly impaneled pursuant to the provisions of 
TCA 6-318 and after consideration of all of the evidence presented to the Board, it is the finding and 
opinion of the majority of the Board of Arbitration that the Petitioner, Shelby County Board of Education, 
should be granted a total sum of $1,917,904.00 without interest thereon as a full and final settlement with 
respect to the school sites, school buildings, and other school properties passing to the Board of Education 
of the Memphis City Schools by reason of the 1969 and 1970 annexations.
 Payment of this amount shall be made by the Board of Education of the Memphis City Schools as follows: 
$127,296.00 shall be paid in cash with respect to the equipment and furnishings of the annexed schools. 
The balance of the award, or $1,790,608.00, shall be credited to the Shelby County Board of Education for 
use as future construction funds in the same manner as the credit prescribed in Item 3 of the Settlement 
Agreement previously entered into by the parties with respect to the school properties annexed in 1965, 
except that the Average Daily Attendance percentage used in that agreement shall be adjusted to reflect 
the Average Daily Attendance at 21.74 percent for the Shelby County Board of Education with regard to 
the funds awarded by reason of the 1969 annexations and 13.33 percent with regard to funds awarded 
by reason of the 1970 annexations.
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The computation of the above amount was made in the following manner:
 1. The total acquisition cost of each parcel of land was computed with respect to each of the annexed 
  areas. This amount was $143,187.00 with respect to the 1969 annexation and $397,866.00 with 
  respect to the 1970 annexation. 
  To this amount was added the cost of improvements depreciated over a thirty-year period. This 
  amount was $4,022,748.00 with respect to the 1969 annexation and $6,240,792.00 with respect 
  to the 1970 annexation.
  The content value of each of the annexed schools was then added less a depreciation figure of  
 50 percent, said 50 percent depreciation figure having been agreed to as reasonable by officials of 
 the respective Boards. This depreciated content value was $330,866.00 with respect to the 1969 
  annexation and $415,350.00 with respect to the 1970 annexation.
  2. The total thus obtained was $4,496,801.00 for the 1969 annexation and $7,054,088.00 for the 
  1970 annexation. This total was then multiplied by the percentage which the Average Daily Attendance 
  of pupils in the County School System bore with respect to the Average Daily Attendance of students  
  in Shelby County as a whole. The period used for the computation of the a/d/a was the period 
  immediately following the assumption of control of the annexed schools by the Board of Education 
  of the Memphis City Schools. With respect to the 1969 annexation, the percentage factor was 
  21.74 percent. With respect to the 1970 annexation, the percentage factor was 13.33 percent.
 3. The result thus obtained represented the final award which is set out above. The award consists of 
  a total award of $977,604.00 with respect to the 1969 annexation, including $71,930.00 for contents. 
  The award also consists of a total of $940,300.00 with respect to the 1970 annexation including 
  $55,666.00 for contents. Further itemization of these figures can be obtained by reference to the 
  computation sheet which is attached as an appendix to this award.
 IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED by the Board of Arbitration that this award would be submitted to the Chancery 
Court of Shelby County pursuant to the terms of TCA 6-318.
 The undersigned members of the Board of Arbitration concur in the foregoing finding and opinion, this  
the 15th day of March, 1972.
          /a/ George M. Houston, Chrm.      
          /a/ Walter P. Armstrong, Jr.       
 To the majority finding and opinion of the Board of Arbitration the Honorable Ed Gibbons respectively 
excepts and reserves the right to file a minority finding and opinion in the Chancery Court of Shelby County 
pursuant to TCA 6-318.
          /a/ Ed Gibbons           
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Chancellor’s Consent Order, Shelby County vs.
Memphis Board of Education
IN THE CHANCERY COURT OF SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE
SHELBY COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Complainant
vs.          No. 76380-3 R. D.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE MEMPHIS CITY SCHOOLS,
Defendant
_____________________________________________________________________
 CONSENT ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND
 DISMISSION CAUSE
_____________________________________________________________________
 This cause came on to be heard on the joint report of the parties to this lawsuit advising the Court 
that a settlement agreement heretofore filed as an exhibit to this report has been executed by all of 
the parties hereto.
 And it appearing that this settlement agreement concludes all of the matters in controversy between 
the parties, including the annexation of schools in two areas which were involved in the original arbitration 
and litigation.
 It further appears to the Court that the settlement agreement should be approved pursuant to the 
Tennessee Code Annotated 6-318; and that the trustee of Shelby County should be authorized and directed 
to carry out the terms of the settlement agreement; and that the provisions of the arbitration award should 
be completely set aside and superseded by the settlement agreement.
 IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the contract dated the ____ day of _____
_____________, 1974, between the Shelby County Board of Education and the Board of Education of the 
Memphis City Schools be, and the same is hereby, approved as a final settlement of all liability arising from 
the annexations covered therein, and the Trustee of Shelby County, Tennessee, the Chairman of the Shelby 
County Court and others charged with distributing funds to the Shelby County Board of Education and Board 
of Education of the Memphis City Schools are authorized to carry out the terms of the said contract.
 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the arbitration award heretofore filed in this cause 
is forever set aside and held for naught and is superseded by the aforesaid contract. The costs of this cause 
are assessed fifty (50%) percent against the defendant, Board of Education of the Memphis City Schools, and 
fifty (50%) percent against the plaintiff, Shelby County Board of Education.
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           ________________________________
           Chancellor
Approved:
_____________________________________
R. LEE WINCHESTER, JR.
Attorney for Plaintiff,
Shelby County Board of Education
EVANS, PETREE, COBB & EDWARDS
By___________________________________
Attorneys for Defendant,
Board of Education of the Memphis City Schools
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CONTRACT
 THIS INSTRUMENT entered into this 4th day of June, 1974, by and between the SHELBY COUNTY BOARD OF 
EDUCATION, party of the first part, hereinafter referred to as the “County Board of Education” and THE BOARD 
OF EDUCATION OF THE MEMPHIS CITY SCHOOLS, party of the second part, hereinafter referred to as the “City 
Board of Education.”
WITNESSETH
 WHEREAS, effective December 31, 1968, the City of Memphis annexed into its corporate boundaries 
additional territory containing the following schools owned by the County Board of Education: Ford Road 
School, Geeter School, Lakeview School, Levi School, Mitchell Road High School, Walker Elementary School, 
Weaver Elementary School, and Westwood High and Elementary School; and
 WHEREAS, effective December 31, 1969, the City of Memphis annexed into its corporate boundaries 
additional territory containing the following schools owned by the County Board of Education: Fairley 
Elementary and High School, Gardenview Elementary School, Graceland Elementary School, Graves Elementary 
School, Havenview Elementary School, Hillcrest High School, Oakshire Elementary School, Raineshaven 
Elementary School, Westhaven Elementary School, Whitehaven Elementary and High School and Winchester 
Elementary School; and 
 WHEREAS, effective December 31, 1971, the City of Memphis annexed into its corporate boundaries 
additional territory containing the following schools owned by the County Board of Education: Coro Lake 
Elementary School and White’s Chapel Elementary School; and 
 WHEREAS, effective December 31, 1972, the City of Memphis annexed into its corporate boundaries 
additional territory containing the following schools owned by the County Board of Education: Scenic Hills 
Elementary School, Raleigh-Bartlett Meadows Elementary School, and Coleman Elementary School.
 WHEREAS, in the case of each of the above annexations, the Shelby County Board of Education 
subsequently transferred the operation of the aforesaid schools to the City Board of Education and included 
in said transfer the furniture, fixtures and equipment located in and about the aforesaid properties; and 
 WHEREAS, being unable to agree upon the terms upon which the aforesaid school properties, furniture, 
fixtures and equipment are to be transferred to the City Board of Education, the parties have heretofore 
transmitted the matter to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of Section 6-318, etc., Tennessee Code 
Annotated, with respect to the 1968 and 1969 annexation resulting in an annexation award which has not 
been accepted and implemented by the parties and which has been appealed to the Chancery Court of Shelby 
County, Tennessee in case Number 76380-3; and 
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 WHEREAS, both Boards as a result of continued negotiations, subject to the ratification by the Shelby 
County Quarterly Court, have resolved their differences and reached agreement both as to the amount and 
method of payment by the City Board of Education of the County Board of Education for all school properties, 
furniture, fixtures and equipment contained in all four of the above listed annexations:
 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises of the parties and the further consideration as 
hereinafter set forth, it is agreed as follows:
  1. That the total amount of bond proceeds creditable to the County in the manner hereinafter set 
forth with respect to all school properties, furniture, fixtures and equipment contained in the 1968 
annexation shall be: $2,354,428.60;
   that the total amount of bond proceeds creditable to the County in the manner hereinafter set 
forth with respect to all school properties, furniture, fixtures and equipment contained in the 1969 
annexation shall be: $4,555,798.17;
   that the total amount of bond proceeds creditable to the County in the manner hereinafter set 
forth with respect to all school properties, furniture, fixtures and equipment contained in the 1972 
annexation shall be: $272,504.22; and
   that the total amount of bond proceeds creditable to the County in the manner hereinafter set 
forth with respect to all school properties, furniture, fixtures and equipment contained in the 1973 
annexation shall be: $1,031,037.02.
  2. It is agreed that the total balance of payments for these four annexations in the amount of 
$8,213,768.01 shall bear no interest and shall be credited to the County Board of Education by the 
City Board of Education only in the following manner: Shelby County or the Shelby County Board of 
Education shall have the right to issue County School Bonds or to use any other local funds subject 
to A.D.A. distribution as required by state laws for constructing purposes without participation by 
the City Board of Education in the proceeds until such time as the County Board shall have received 
$8,213,768.01 of the said bond issues or other capital improvement funds that would otherwise have 
been paid to the City Board of Education. In other words, Shelby County or the Shelby County Board of 
Education shall have the right to issue County School Boards [bonds] or to use any other local funds 
subject to A.D.A. distribution as required by state laws for capital improvement purposes without the 
necessity of making any average daily attendance distribution to the City Board of Education other 
than as a credit against the obligation established herein, until such time as the City Board’s A.D.A. 
share of such proceeds shall equal $8,213,768.01.
  3. The County Board agrees that, as the above credit is expended, it will promptly give notice to the City 
Board of the amount of bond credit and of the purpose for which it has been expended and of the 
source of County funds utilized whether they be bond or other county revenues.
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  4. Shelby County and the County Board of Education hereby agree that title to all school properties 
annexed by the City of Memphis shall be vested indefeasibly and in fee simple absolute in the Board 
of Education of the Memphis City Schools. Shelby County and the Shelby County Board of Education 
further agree that they will, upon request of the City Board, make formal conveyance of any or all of 
the said properties to the city Board by appropriate quit claim deed.
  5. It is further agreed that the amount of credit due for the anticipated annexation of the North Raleigh 
Area which includes Brownsville, Spring Hill, Raleigh Egypt Elementary and High School shall be 
determined by the basis used in establishing the amounts in this settlement.
  6. It is further agreed and understood by the parties that this contract is intended to supersede and 
supplant the arbitration award presently before the Chancery Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, in 
case Number 76380-3. Upon the conclusion of this agreement, that case shall be dismissed and the 
arbitration award therein set aside by consent of the parties. Shelby County, the Shelby County Board 
of Education, and the City Board of Education hereby mutually release each other from any further 
liability of any nature growing out of the four annexations covered by this agreement.
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the aforesaid parties, the Shelby County Board of Education and the Board of 
Education of the Memphis City Schools, have hereto set their hands by their duly authorized officers the day 
and year above written.
         SHELBY COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION




         BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE MEMPHIS CITY SCHOOLS
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TENNESSEE CODE
TITLE 6. CITIES AND TOWNS
MuNICIpAL GOvERNMENT GENERALLy
CHApTER 51. CHANGE OF MuNICIpAL BOuNDARIES
pART 1—ANNEXATION
§ 6-51-101. Definitions
As used in this part and § 6-51-301 unless the context indicates otherwise:
(1) “Larger” and “smaller” refer to population and not area;
(2) “Municipality” or “municipalities” means any incorporated city or cities, or town or towns, and does not 
include any utility district, sanitary district, school district, or other public service district, whether organized 
under public or private acts; and (3) “Notice” means publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the 
municipality at least seven (7) days in advance of a hearing. The notice, whether by ordinance as stipulated 
in § 6-51-102(a)(l) and (b) or by referendum as stipulated in § 6-51-104(b), shall be satisfied by inclusion of 
a map which includes a general delineation of the area or areas to be annexed by use of official road names 
and/or numbers, names of lakes and waterways, or other identifiable landmarks, as appropriate.
§ 6-51-102. Ordinance
(a)(l) A municipality, when petitioned by a majority of the residents and property owners of the affected 
territory, or upon its own initiative when it appears that the prosperity of such municipality and territory 
will be materially retarded and the safety and welfare of the inhabitants and property endangered, after 
notice and public hearing, by ordinance, may extend its corporate limits by annexation of such territory 
adjoining its existing boundaries as may be deemed necessary for the welfare of the residents and property 
owners of the affected territory as well as the municipality as a whole; provided, that the ordinance shall 
not become operative until thirty (30) days after final passage thereof.
(2)(A) If an annexation ordinance was not final on November 25, 1997, and if the municipality has not 
prepared a plan of services, the municipality shall have sixty (60) days to prepare a plan of services.
(B)(I) For any plan of services that is not final on May 19, 1998, or for any plan of services adopted after 
May 19, 1998, and before the approval of the growth plan by the committee, the county legislative body 
of the county where the territory subject to the plan of services is located may file a suit in the nature of 





2006 Session of the Tennessee General Assembly)
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(ii) If the county is petitioned by a majority of the property owners by parcel within the territory which is 
the subject of the plan of services to represent their interests, a county shall be deemed an aggrieved owner 
of property giving the county standing to contest the reasonableness of the plan of services. In determining 
a majority of property owners, a parcel of property with more than one (1) owner shall be counted only once 
and only if owners comprising a majority of the ownership interests in the parcel petition together as the 
owner of the particular parcel.
(iii) A petition by property owners under this section shall be presented to the county clerk, who shall 
forward a copy of such petition to the county executive, county assessor of property and the chair of the 
county legislative body. After examining the evidence of title based upon the county records, within fifteen 
(15) days of receiving the copy of the petition, the assessor of property shall report to the county executive 
and the chair of the county legislative body whether or not in the assessor’s opinion a majority of the 
property owners by parcel have petitioned the county according to this section.
(iv) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, a petition by property owners to the county under 
this section to contest the reasonableness of the plan of services shall be brought within sixty (60) days of 
the final adoption of the plan of services, and if the county legislative body adopts a resolution to contest 
the plan of services, the county shall file suit to contest the plan of services pursuant to this section within 
ninety (90) days of the final adoption of the plan of services.
(C) If the court finds the plan of services to be unreasonable, or to have been done by exercise of powers 
not conferred by law, an order shall be issued vacating the same, and the order shall require the municipality 
to submit a revised plan of services for the territory within thirty (30) days; provided, that by motion the 
municipality may request to abandon the plan of services, and in such case the municipality is prohibited 
from annexing by ordinance any part of such territory proposed for annexation for not less than twenty-four 
(24) months. In the absence of such finding, an order shall be issued sustaining the validity of such plan of 
services ordinance, which shall then become operative thirty-one (31) days after judgment is entered unless 
an abrogating appeal has been taken therefrom.
(D) If a municipal plan of services has been challenged in court under this section and if the court has 
rendered a decision adverse to the plan, then a municipality may not annex any other territory by ordinance 
until the court determines the municipality is in compliance.
(E) The provisions of subsection (a) which are in conflict with this subdivision do not apply to any county 
having a population of not less than three hundred nineteen thousand six hundred twenty-five (319,625) 
nor more than three hundred nineteen thousand seven hundred twenty-five (319,725) according to the 
1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census. In such county, if the proposal to extend the corporate 
limits by the annexation of territory adjoining the existing boundaries of a municipality is proposed by the 
municipality upon its own initiative by ordinance, the ordinance shall not become operative until an election 
is held at the expense of the proposing municipality for approval or disapproval of such annexation by the 
qualified voters who reside in the territory proposed for annexation. The operation of the ordinance shall be 
subject to approval of the voters who reside in such territory. The county election commission shall hold an 
election thereon, providing options to vote “For” or “Against” the ordinance, not less than forty-five (45) 
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days nor more than sixty (60) days after the receipt of a certified copy of such ordinance, and a majority 
vote of those voting in the election shall determine whether the ordinance is to be operative. A vote “For” 
the ordinance shall be a vote “For Annexation” and a vote “Against” the ordinance shall be a vote “Against 
Annexation.” If the vote is for the ordinance, the ordinance shall become operative thirty (30) days after the 
date that the county election commission makes its official canvass of the election returns; such ordinance 
shall not become operative before the expiration of one hundred twenty (120) days following the final passage 
of the annexation ordinance. If the ordinance is rejected, all relevant provisions in this chapter shall apply to 
the question of annexation in such county.
(3)(A) No municipality having a population greater than ten thousand (10,000), according to the 1970 federal 
census or any subsequent federal census shall, by means of annexation by ordinance upon its own initiative, 
increase the land area contained within its boundaries by more than twenty-five percent (25%) during any 
twenty-four-month period.
(B)(I) The provisions of subdivision (a)(3)(A) shall not apply to any municipality having a population of less 
than twelve thousand (12,000) according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census, and 
the charter of which is provided for by a private act of the general assembly, and not under the general law 
of this title.
(ii) The provisions of this subdivision (a)(3)(B) shall not apply to any municipality located in any county 
having a population of not less than thirty-four thousand one hundred (34,100) nor greater than thirty-four 
thousand two hundred (34,200), or located in any county having a population of not less than thirty-seven 
thousand (37,000) nor greater than thirty-seven thousand one hundred (37,100), or located in any county 
having a population of not less than forty-nine thousand four hundred (49,400) nor greater than forty-nine 
thousand five hundred (49,500), each according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census.
(b)(l) Before any territory may be annexed under this section by a municipality, the governing body shall 
adopt a plan of services establishing at least the services to be delivered and the projected timing of the 
services. The plan of services shall be reasonable with respect to the scope of services to be provided and 
the timing of the services.
(2) The plan of services shall include, but not be limited to: police protection, fire protection, water service, 
electrical service, sanitary sewer service, solid waste collection, road and street construction and repair, 
recreational facilities and programs, street lighting, and zoning services. The plan of services may exclude 
services which are being provided by another public agency or private company in the territory to be 
annexed other than those services provided by the county.
 
(3) The plan of services shall include a reasonable implementation schedule for the delivery of comparable 
services in the territory to be annexed with respect to the services delivered to all citizens of the municipality.
(4) Before a plan of services may be adopted, the municipality shall submit the plan of services to the local 
planning commission, if there is one, for study and a written report, to be rendered within ninety (90) days 
after such submission, unless by resolution of the governing body a longer period is allowed. Before the 
ANNEXATION HANDBOOK • MuNICIpAL TECHNICAL ADvISORy SERvICE 137
adoption of the plan of services, a municipality shall hold a public hearing. Notice of the time, place, and 
purpose of the public hearing shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality not 
less than fifteen (15) days before the hearing. The notice shall include the locations of a minimum of three 
(3) copies of the plan of services which the municipality shall provide for public inspection during all business 
hours from the date of notice until the public hearing.
(5) A municipality may not annex any other territory if the municipality is in default on any prior plan of 
services.
(6) If a municipality operates a school system, and if the municipality annexes territory during the school 
year, any student may continue to attend such student’s present school until the beginning of the next 
succeeding school year unless the respective boards of education have provided otherwise by agreement.
(c) Anything contained in this chapter to the contrary notwithstanding, a municipality in any county having 
a population of over sixty-six thousand (66,000) (except in those counties having a population of more than 
seven hundred thousand (700,000) according to the federal census of 1970 or any subsequent federal census; 
or in those counties which have the metropolitan form of government) shall have the supplemental right 
and authority to annex upon its own initiative by ordinance any territory without levying any municipal ad 
valorem taxes except for actual municipal services rendered, and that the residents of, and persons owning 
property in, annexed territory shall be entitled to rights and privileges of citizenship, in accordance with 
the provisions of the annexing municipality’s charter, immediately upon annexation as though such annexed 
territory had always been a part of the annexing municipality; and it shall be the duty of the governing body 
to put into effect with respect to an annexed area any charter provisions relating to representation on the 
governing body. Any municipality that exercises such right to annex is hereby authorized, required and shall 
levy separate ad valorem taxes for each municipal purpose and/or service within the existing limits of the 
city and shall levy only such taxes, if any, in any territory annexed hereunder when and if the municipal 
service or purpose for which such taxes have been imposed is actually being rendered; provided, that in 
the case of sanitary sewers, such sewers shall be furnished within thirty-six (36) months after ad valorem 
taxes become due.
(d) In counties having a population of more than seven hundred thousand (700,000), or having a population 
of not less than two hundred sixty thousand (260,000) nor more than two hundred eighty thousand (280,000) 
according to the United States census of 1970 or any subsequent federal census, or in those counties which 
have the metropolitan form of government, a smaller municipality may by ordinance, extend its corporate 
limits by annexation of any contiguous territory, when such territory within the corporate limits of a larger 
municipality is less than seventy-five (75) acres in area, is not populated, is separated from the larger 
municipality by a limited access express highway, its access ramps or service roads, and is not the site of 
industrial plant development. The provisions of this chapter relative to the adoption of a plan of service and 
the submission of same to a local planning commission, if there is such, shall not be required of the smaller 
municipality for such annexation.
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§ 6-51-103. Ordinance contest; suit in nature of quo warranto proceeding
(a)(l)(A) Any aggrieved owner of property which borders or lies within territory which is the subject of an 
annexation ordinance prior to the operative date thereof, may file a suit in the nature of a quo warranto 
proceeding in accordance with this part, § 6-51-301 and title 29, chapter 35 to contest the validity thereof 
on the ground that it reasonably may not be deemed necessary for the welfare of the residents and property 
owners of the affected territory and the municipality as a whole and so constitutes an exercise of power not 
conferred by law. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other section in this chapter, for purposes of this 
section, an “aggrieved owner of property” does not include any municipality or public corporation created 
and defined under title 7, chapter 82 which owns property bordering or lying within the territory which is the 
subject of an annexation ordinance requested by the remaining property owner or owners of the territory and 
whose property and services are to be allocated and conveyed in accordance with § 6-51-111, § 6- 51-112 or 
§ 6-51-301, or any contractual arrangement otherwise providing for such allocation and conveyance.
(B) The provisions of this subdivision (a)(l) do not apply to the counties covered by subdivision (a)(2).
(2)(A)Any aggrieved owner of property, lying within territory which is the subject of an annexation ordinance 
prior to the operative date thereof, may file a suit in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding in accordance 
with this part, § 6-51-301 and title 29, chapter 35 to contest the validity thereof on the ground that it 
reasonably may not be deemed necessary for the welfare of the residents and property owners of the affected 
territory and the municipality as a whole, and so constitutes an exercise of power not conferred by law.
(B) The provisions of this subdivision (a)(2) shall apply only in counties having a metropolitan form of 
government and in counties having populations of:











according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census, and in any county with a population 
of not less than two hundred eighty-five thousand (285,000) and not more than two- hundred ninety 
thousand (290,000) based upon the 1980 federal census.
(b) The municipality shall have the burden of proving that an annexation ordinance is reasonable for the 
overall well-being of the communities involved.
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(c) If more than one (1) suit is filed, all of them shall be consolidated and tried as one (1) in the first court 
of appropriate jurisdiction in which suit is filed. Suit or suits shall be tried on an issue to be made up there, 
and the question shall be whether the proposed annexation be or be not unreasonable in consideration of the 
health, safety and welfare of the citizens and property owners of the territory sought to be annexed and the 
citizens and property owners of the municipality. Should the court find the ordinance to be unreasonable, or 
to have been done by exercise of powers not conferred by law, an order shall be issued vacating the same and 
the municipality shall be prohibited from annexing, pursuant to the authority of § 6-51-102, any part of the 
territory proposed for annexation by such vacated ordinance for a period of at least twenty-four (24) months 
following the date of such order. In the absence of such finding, an order shall be issued sustaining the 
validity of such ordinance, which shall then become operative thirty-one (31) days after judgment is entered 
unless an abrogating appeal has been taken therefrom.
(d) If on appeal judgment shall be against the validity of such ordinance, an order shall be entered vacating 
the same and the municipality shall be prohibited from annexing, pursuant to the authority of § 6-51-102, 
any part of the territory proposed for annexation by such vacated ordinance for a period of at least twenty-
four (24) months following the date of such order. If judgment shall be in favor of the validity of such 
ordinance, it shall become operative forthwith by court order and shall not be subject to contest or attack in 
legal or equitable proceeding for any cause or reason, the judgment of the appellate court being final.
(e) Should the territory hereafter sought to be annexed be the site of substantial industrial plant 
development, a fact to be ascertained by the court, the municipality shall have the burden of proving that 
the annexation of the site of the industrial plant development is not unreasonable in consideration of the 
factors above mentioned, including the necessity for or use of municipal services by the industrial plant or 
plants, and the present ability and intent of the municipality to benefit the industrial plant development 
by rendering municipal services thereto when and as needed. The policy and purpose of this provision is to 
prevent annexation of industrial plants for the sole purpose of increasing municipal revenue, without the 
ability and intent to benefit the area annexed by rendering municipal services, when and as needed, and when 
such services are not used or required by the industrial plants.
(f) During the time that any annexation ordinance is being contested as provided herein, the annexing 
municipality and the county governing body (and/or any affected school, sanitary or utility district) may 
enter into an agreement to provide for new, expanded, and/or upgraded services and facilities (including, but 
not limited to, equipment, land and buildings), and capital expenditures (including sale of bonds) to finance 
such services and facilities, which agreement shall include an equitable division of the cost and liabilities of 
such capital expenditures between the annexing municipality and the county governing body (and/or affected 
school, sanitary, or utility district) upon final determination of such contested annexation ordinance.
(g) When territory is annexed that is located in a county other than one in which the city hall of the 
annexing municipality is then located, any suit filed pursuant to this section for the purpose of contesting the 
annexation ordinance shall be filed in the county where the city hall of the annexing municipality is located. 
The chancellor, however, shall change the venue to a county that is adjacent to either the county where the 
annexing municipality’s city hall is located or the county where the proposed annexation is located.
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§ 6-51-104. Resolution; notice
(a) A municipality, when petitioned by interested persons, or upon its own initiative, by resolution, may 
propose extension of its corporate limits by the annexation of territory adjoining to its existing boundaries.
(b) Such resolution, describing the territory proposed for annexation, shall be published by posting copies of 
it in at least three (3) public places in the territory proposed for annexation and in a like number of public 
places in the municipality proposing such annexation, and by publishing notice of such resolution at or about 
the same time, in a newspaper of general circulation, if there is one, in such territory and municipality.
§ 6-51-105. Election or referendum
(a) At least thirty (30) days and not more than sixty (60) days after the last of such publications, the 
proposed annexation of territory shall be submitted by the county election commission in an election held 
on the request and at the expense of the proposing municipality, for approval or disapproval of the qualified 
voters who reside in the territory proposed for annexation.
(b) The legislative body of the municipality affected may also at its option submit the questions involved to 
a referendum of the people residing within the municipality.
(c) In the election or elections to be held, the questions submitted to the qualified voters shall be “For 
Annexation” and “Against Annexation.”
(d) The county election commission shall promptly certify the results of the election or elections to 
the municipality.
(e) If a majority of all the qualified voters voting thereon in the territory proposed to be annexed, or in the 
event of two (2) elections as above stated, a majority of the voters voting thereon in the territory to be 
annexed and a majority of the voters voting thereon in the municipality approve the resolution, annexation 
as provided therein shall become effective thirty (30) days after the certification of the election or elections.
(f) The mode of annexation provided in this section is in addition to the mode provided in § 6-51-102.
§ 6-51-106. Abandonment resolution
Any annexation proceeding initiated under § 6-51-102 or § 6-51-104 may be abandoned and discontinued 
at any time by resolution of the governing body of the municipality.
§ 6-51-107. planning agency study
The governing body of a municipality shall, if its charter so provides, and otherwise may, refer any proposed 
annexation to the planning agency of the municipality for study of all pertinent matters relating thereto, and 
the planning agency expeditiously shall make such a study and report to the governing body.
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§ 6-51-108. Rights and privileges following annexation; plan of service progress report; publication
(a) Residents of, and persons owning property in, annexed territory shall be entitled to rights and privileges 
of citizenship, in accordance with the provisions of the annexing municipality’s charter, immediately upon 
annexation as though such annexed territory had always been a part of the annexing municipality. It shall 
be the duty of the governing body to put into effect with respect to an annexed area any charter provisions 
relating to representation on the governing body.
(b) Upon the expiration of six (6) months from the date any annexed territory for which a plan of service has 
been adopted becomes a part of the annexing municipality, and annually thereafter until services have been 
extended according to such plan, there shall be prepared and published in a newspaper of general circulation 
in the municipality a report of the progress made in the preceding year toward extension of services according 
to such plan, and any changes proposed therein. The governing body of the municipality shall publish 
notice of a public hearing on such progress reports and changes, and hold such hearing thereon. Any owner 
of property in an annexed area to which such plan and progress report are applicable may file a suit for 
mandamus to compel the governing body to comply with the requirements of this subsection.
(c) A municipality may amend a plan of services by resolution of the governing body only after a public 
hearing for which notice has been published at least fifteen (15) days in advance in a newspaper of general 
circulation in the municipality when:
(1) The amendment is reasonably necessary due to natural disaster, act of war, act of terrorism, or reasonably 
unforeseen circumstances beyond the control of the municipality;
(2) The amendment does not materially or substantially decrease the type or level of services or substantially 
delay the provision of services specified in the original plan; or
(3) The amendment:
(A) Proposes to materially and substantially decrease the type or level of services under the original plan or to 
substantially delay those services;
(B) Is not justified under subdivision (c)(l); and
(C) Has received the approval in writing of a majority of the property owners by parcel in the area annexed. 
In determining a majority of property owners, a parcel of property with more than one (1) owner shall be 
counted only once and only if owners comprising a majority of the ownership interests in the parcel petition 
together as the owner of the particular parcel.
(d) An aggrieved property owner in the annexed territory may bring an action in the appropriate court of 
equity jurisdiction to enforce the plan of services at any time after one hundred eighty (180) days after an 
annexation by ordinance takes effect and until the plan of services is fulfilled, and may bring an action to 
challenge the legality of an amendment to a plan of services if such action is brought within thirty (30) days 
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after the adoption of the amendment to the plan of services. If the court finds that the municipality has 
amended the plan of services in an unlawful manner, then the court shall decree the amendment null and 
void and shall reinstate the previous plan of services. If the court finds that the municipality has materially 
and substantially failed to comply with its plan of services for the territory in question, then the municipality 
shall be given the opportunity to show cause why the plan of services was not carried out. If the court finds 
that the municipality’s failure is due to natural disaster, act of war, act of terrorism, or reasonably unforeseen 
circumstances beyond the control of the municipality which materially and substantially impeded the ability 
of the municipality to carry out the plan of services, then the court shall alter the timetable of the plan 
of services so as to allow the municipality to comply with the plan of services in a reasonable time and 
manner. If the court finds that the municipality’s failure was not due to natural disaster, act of war, act of 
terrorism, or reasonably unforeseen circumstances beyond the control of the municipality which materially 
and substantially impeded the ability of the municipality to carry out the plan of services, then the court 
shall issue a writ of mandamus to compel the municipality to provide the services contained in the plan, 
shall establish a timetable for the provision of the services in question, and shall enjoin the municipality 
from any further annexations until the services subject to the court’s order have been provided to the 
court’s satisfaction, at which time the court shall dissolve its injunction. If the court determines that the 
municipality has failed without cause to comply with the plan of services or has unlawfully amended its plan 
of services, the court shall assess the costs of the suit against the municipality.
§ 6-51-109. Smaller municipalities; annexation
(a) Upon receipt of a petition in writing of twenty percent (20%) of the qualified voters of a smaller 
municipality, voting at the last general election, such petition to be filed with the chief executive officer of 
the smaller municipality who shall promptly submit the petition to the chief executive officer of the larger 
municipality, such larger municipality may by ordinance annex such portion of the territory of the smaller 
municipality described in the petition or the totality of such smaller municipality if so described in the 
petition only after a majority of the qualified voters voting in an election in such small municipality vote in 
favor of the annexation.
(b) The county election commission shall hold such an election on the request and at the expense of the 
larger municipality, the results of which shall be certified to each municipality.
(c) If a majority of the qualified voters voting in such election are in favor of annexation, the corporate 
existence of such small municipality shall end within thirty (30) days after the adoption of the ordinance 
by the larger municipality, and all of the choices in action, including the right to collect all uncollected 
taxes, and all other assets of every kind and description of the smaller municipality shall be taken over by 
and become the property of the larger municipality. All legally subsisting liabilities, including any bonded 
indebtedness, of the smaller municipality shall be assumed by the larger municipality, which shall thereafter 
have as full jurisdiction over the territory of the smaller municipality as over that lying within the existing 
corporate limits of the larger municipality.
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§ 6-51-110. priority between municipalities
(a) Nothing in this part and §6-51-301 shall be construed to authorize annexation proceedings by a smaller 
municipality with respect to territory within the corporate limits of a larger municipality nor, except in 
counties having a population of not less than sixty-five thousand (65,000) nor more than sixty-six thousand 
(66,000) and counties having a population of four hundred thousand (400,000) or more according to the 
federal census of 1970 or any subsequent federal census and except in counties having a metropolitan form 
of government, by a larger municipality with respect to territory within the corporate limits of a smaller 
municipality in existence for ten (10) or more years. Notwithstanding any provisions of this chapter to the 
contrary, in counties of this state having a population of not less than two hundred seventy-six thousand 
(276,000) nor more than two hundred seventy-seven thousand (277,000) according to the federal census 
of 1970 or any subsequent federal census, nothing in this part shall be construed to authorize annexation 
proceedings by a larger municipality with respect to territory within the corporate limits of any smaller 
municipality in existence at the time of the proposed annexation.
(b) If two (2) municipalities which were incorporated in the same county shall initiate annexation 
proceedings with respect to the same territory, the proceedings of the municipality having the larger 
population shall have precedence and the smaller municipality’s proceedings shall be held in abeyance 
pending the outcome of the proceedings of such larger municipality.
(c) If two (2) municipalities which were incorporated in different counties shall initiate annexation 
proceedings with respect to the same territory, the proceedings of the municipality which was incorporated 
in the same county in which the territory to be annexed is located shall have precedence and the other 
municipality’s proceedings shall be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the proceedings of the 
municipality which was incorporated in the same county as the territory to be annexed.
(d) Except in counties having a population of not less than sixty-five thousand (65,000) nor more than 
sixty-six thousand (66,000) and counties having a population of four hundred thousand (400,000) or more 
according to the federal census of 1970 or any subsequent federal census and except in counties having 
a metropolitan form of government, annexation proceedings shall be considered as initiated upon passage 
on first reading of an ordinance of annexation.
(e) If the ordinance of annexation of the larger municipality does not receive final approval within one 
hundred eighty (180) days after having passed its first reading, the proceeding shall be void and a smaller 
municipality shall have priority with respect to annexation of the territory; provided, that its annexation 
ordinance shall likewise be adopted upon final passage within one hundred eighty (180) days after having 
passed its first reading.
(f) When a larger municipality initiates annexation proceedings for a territory which could be subject 
to annexation by a smaller municipality, the smaller municipality shall have standing to challenge the 
proceedings in the chancery court of the county where the territory proposed to be annexed is located.
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(g) A smaller municipality may, by ordinance, extend its corporate limits by annexation of any contiguous 
territory, when such territory within the corporate limits of a larger municipality is less than seventy-five 
(75) acres in area, is not populated, is separated from the larger municipality by a limited access express 
highway, its access ramps or service roads, and is not the site of industrial plant development. The provisions 
of this chapter relative to the adoption of a plan of service and the submission of same to a local planning 
commission, if there be such, shall not be required of the smaller municipality for such annexation.
§ 6-51-111. Agreements with affected districts; arbitration; agreements between utility districts and 
private service providers
(a) Upon adoption of an annexation ordinance or upon referendum approval of an annexation resolution 
as herein above provided, an annexing municipality and any affected instrumentality of the state of 
Tennessee, including, but not limited to, a utility district, sanitary district, school district, or other public 
service district, shall attempt to reach agreement in writing for allocation and conveyance to the annexing 
municipality of any or all public functions, rights, duties, property, assets and liabilities of such state 
instrumentality that justice and reason may require in the circumstances. Any and all agreements entered 
into before March 8, 1955, relating to annexation shall be preserved. The annexing municipality, if and to the 
extent that it may choose, shall have the exclusive right to perform or provide municipal and utility functions 
and services in any territory which it annexes, notwithstanding § 7- 82-301 or any other statute, subject, 
however, to the provisions of this section with respect to electric cooperatives.
(b) Subject to such exclusive right, any such matters upon which the respective parties are not in agreement 
in writing within sixty (60) days after the operative date of such annexation shall be settled by arbitration 
with the laws of arbitration of the state of Tennessee effective at the time of submission to the arbitrators, 
and § 29-5-101(2) shall not apply to any arbitration arising under this part and § 6-51-301. The award so 
rendered shall be transmitted to the chancery court of the county in which the annexing municipality is 
situated, and thereupon shall be subject to review in accordance with §§ 29-5-113--29-5-115 and 29-5-118. 
(c)(1) If the annexed territory is then being provided with a utility service by a state instrumentality which 
has outstanding bonds or other obligations payable from the revenues derived from the sale of such utility 
service, the agreement or arbitration award referred to above shall also provide that:
(A) The municipality will operate the utility property in such territory and account for the revenues 
therefrom in such manner as not to impair the obligations of contract with reference to such bonds or 
other obligations; or
(B) The municipality will assume the operation of the entire utility system of such state instrumentality 
and the payment of such bonds or other obligations in accordance with their terms.
(2) Such agreement or arbitration award shall fully preserve and protect the contract rights vested in the 
holders of such outstanding bonds or other obligations.
(d)(l) Notwithstanding the provisions of any law to the contrary, if a private individual or business entity 
provides utility service within the boundaries of a municipality under the terms of a privilege, franchise, 
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license, or agreement granted or entered into by the municipality, and if the municipality annexes territory 
which includes the service area of a utility district, then such private individual or business entity and the 
utility district shall attempt to reach agreement in writing for allocation and conveyance to such private 
individual or business entity of any or all public functions, rights, duties, property, assets, and liabilities of 
such utility district that justice and reason may require in the circumstances. If an agreement is not reached, 
then notwithstanding the change of municipal boundaries, the service area of the utility district shall remain 
unchanged, and such private individual or business entity shall not provide utility service in the service area 
of the utility district.
(2) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to diminish the authority of any municipality to annex.
(e)(l) If at the time of annexation, the annexed territory is being provided with electric service by a municipal 
electric system or other state instrumentality, the annexing municipality shall, by delivering written notice 
of its election to the municipal electric system or other state instrumentality, have the right to purchase all 
or any part of the electric distribution system of the municipal electric system or other state instrumentality 
then providing electric service to the area being annexed that the annexing municipality has elected to serve 
under this section. The purchase price shall be the fair market value of the properties comprising the electric 
system, or part thereof, that is being acquired and payment of such purchase price shall be on terms agreed 
to by the parties. In the event the parties cannot agree on a purchase price, the acquiring municipality and 
the municipal electric system or other state instrumentality whose properties are being acquired shall each 
select a qualified appraiser and the fair market value of the properties being acquired shall be determined 
using the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and agreed upon by the two (2) qualified 
appraisers who are selected. In the event the two (2) qualified appraisers are unable to agree on the fair 
market value of the properties being acquired, they shall jointly select a third qualified appraiser whose 
determination of the fair market value of the properties being acquired shall be based on the aforementioned 
standards and shall control.
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, “qualified appraiser” means any individual having demonstrated 
experience in the appraisal of utility properties who has been certified by a nationally recognized appraisal or 
assessment association that is a member of The Appraisal Foundation.
(3) This subsection shall be the sole means to resolve a disagreement between the parties as to the purchase 
price paid by an annexing municipality to a municipal electric system or other state instrumentality for 
facilities acquired by the annexing municipality, but any issues other than price not agreed to by the parties 
shall be determined in accordance with subsection (b). In the absence of an agreement between the parties, 
the sole means by which an annexing municipality can acquire the facilities of a municipal electric system or 
other state instrumentality located in the annexed territory is by purchase at a price determined pursuant to 
this subsection.
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§ 6-51-112. Electric cooperatives; purchase offers or franchises
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other statute, if the annexing municipality owns and operates its 
own electric system, it shall either offer to purchase any electric distribution properties and service rights 
within the annexed area owned by any electric cooperative, or grant such cooperative a franchise to serve the 
annexed area, as hereinafter provided:
(1) The municipality shall notify the effected electric cooperative in writing of the boundaries of the annexed 
area and shall indicate such area on appropriate maps;
(2) The municipality shall offer to purchase the electric distribution properties of the cooperative located 
within the annexed area, together with all of the cooperative’s rights to serve within such area, for a cash 
consideration which shall consist of:
(A) The present-day reproduction cost, new, of the facilities being acquired, less depreciation computed on a 
straight-line basis; plus
(B) An amount equal to the cost of constructing any necessary facilities to reintegrate the system of the 
cooperative outside the annexed area after detaching the portion to be sold; plus
(C) An annual amount, payable each year for a period of ten (10) years, equal to the sum of:
(I) Twenty-five percent (25%) of the revenues received from power sales to consumers of electric power 
within the annexed area, except consumers with large industrial power loads greater than three hundred (300) 
kilowatts, during the last twelve (12) months preceding the date of the notice provided for in subdivision 
(a)(l); and
(ii) Fifty percent (50%) of the net revenues (gross power sales revenues less wholesale cost of power including 
facilities rental charge) received from power sales to consumers with large industrial power loads greater than 
three hundred (300) kilowatts within the annexed area during the last twelve (12) months preceding the date 
of the notice provided for in subdivision (a)(l);
(3) The electric cooperative, within ninety (90) days after receipt of an offer by the annexing municipality 
to purchase the cooperative’s electric distribution properties and service rights within the annexed area, 
shall signify in writing its acknowledgment of the offer, and the parties shall proceed to act. The annexing 
municipality shall then be obligated to buy and pay for, and the cooperative shall be obligated to sell to 
the municipality, such properties and rights free and clear of all mortgage liens and encumbrances for the 
aforementioned cash consideration computed and payable as provided in subdivision (a)(2);
(4) The annexing municipality, if it elects not to make the offer to purchase as provided for above, shall 
grant to the cooperative a franchise to serve within the annexed area, for a period of not less than five (5) 
years, and the municipality shall thereafter renew or extend the franchise or grant new franchises for similar 
subsequent periods; provided, that upon expiration of any such franchise, the municipality may elect instead 
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to make an offer to buy the cooperative’s electric distribution properties and service rights as they then 
exist in accordance with and subject to the provisions of subdivisions (a)(l) and (2); provided further, 
that, during the term of any such franchise, the annexing municipality shall be entitled to serve only such 
electric customers or locations within the annexed area as it served on the date when such annexation 
became effective;
(5) If any annexing municipality contracts its boundaries so as to exclude from its corporate limits any 
territory, the cooperative may elect within sixty (60) days thereafter to purchase from such municipality, 
and such municipality shall thereupon sell and convey to the cooperative, the electric distribution 
properties and service rights of the municipality in any part of the excluded area which the electric 
cooperative had previously served, upon the same procedures set forth in subdivisions (a)(l)-(4) for 
acquisitions by municipalities;
(6) Nothing contained herein shall prohibit municipalities and any cooperative from buying, selling, 
or exchanging electric distribution properties, service rights and other rights, property, and assets by 
mutual agreement;
(7) The territorial areas lying outside municipal boundaries served by municipal and cooperative electric 
systems will remain the same as generally established by power facilities already in place or legal agreements 
on March 6, 1968, and new consumers locating in any unserved areas between the respective power systems 
shall be served by the power system whose facilities were nearest on March 6, 1968, except to the extent that 
territorial areas are revised in accordance with the provisions of this section; and
(8) “Electric distribution properties,” as used in this section, means all electric lines and facilities used 
or useful in serving ultimate consumers, but does not include lines and facilities which are necessary for 
integration and operation of portions of a cooperative’s electric system which are located outside the 
annexed area.
(b) The above methods of allocation and conveyance of property and property rights of any electric 
cooperative to any annexing municipality shall be exclusively available to such annexing municipality and 
to such electric cooperative notwithstanding § 7-52-105 or any other title or section of the code in 
conflict or conflicting herewith.
§ 6-51-113. Other powers
Except as specifically provided in this part, the powers conferred by this part shall be in addition and 
supplemental to and the limitations imposed by this part shall not affect the powers conferred by any 
other general, special or local law.
§ 6-51-114. Special census
In the event any area is annexed to any municipality, the municipality may have a special census and in any 
county having a population of not less than two hundred seventy-six thousand (276,000) nor more than 
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two hundred seventy-seven thousand (277,000) according to the 1970 federal census or any subsequent 
federal census the municipality shall have such special census within the annexed area taken by the federal 
bureau of the census or in a manner directed by and satisfactory to the state planning office, in which case 
the population of such municipality shall be changed and revised so as to include the population of the 
annexed area as shown by such supplemental census. The population of such municipality as so changed 
and revised shall be its population for the purpose of computing such municipality’s share of all funds and 
moneys distributed by the state of Tennessee among the municipalities of the state on a population basis, 
and the population of such municipality as so revised shall be used in computing the aggregate population 
of all municipalities of the state, effective on the next July 1 following the certification of such supplemental 
census results to the commissioner of finance and administration.
§ 6-51-115. Tax revenues; receipt and distribution
(a) Notwithstanding any provisions of law to the contrary, whenever a municipality extends its boundaries by 
annexation, the county or counties in which the municipality is located shall continue to receive the revenue 
from all state and local taxes distributed on the basis of situs of collection, generated within the annexed 
area, until July 1 following the annexation, unless the annexation takes effect on July 1.
(1) If the annexation takes effect on July 1, then the municipality shall begin receiving revenue from such 
taxes generated within the annexed area for the period beginning July 1.
(2) Whenever a municipality extends its boundaries by annexation, the municipality shall notify the 
department of revenue of such annexation prior to the annexation becoming effective for the purpose of tax 
administration.
(3) Such taxes shall include the local sales tax authorized in § 67-6-702, the wholesale beer tax authorized 
in § 57-6-103, the income tax on dividends authorized in § 67-2-102, and all other such taxes distributed to 
counties and municipalities based on the situs of their collection.
(b) In addition to the preceding provisions of this section, when a municipality annexes territory in which 
there is retail or wholesale activity at the time the annexation takes effect or within three (3) months after 
the annexation date, the following shall apply:
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of § 57-6-103 or any other law to the contrary, for wholesale activity 
involving the sale of beer, the county shall continue to receive annually an amount equal to the amount 
received by the county in the twelve (12) months immediately preceding the effective date of the annexation 
for beer establishments in the annexed area that produced wholesale beer tax revenues during that entire 
twelve (12) months. For establishments that produced wholesale beer tax revenues for at least one (1) 
month but less than the entire twelve-month period, the county shall continue to receive an amount 
annually determined by averaging the amount of wholesale beer tax revenue produced during each full 
month the establishment was in business during that time and multiplying this average by twelve (12). For 
establishments which did not produce revenue before the annexation date but produced revenue within three 
(3) months after the annexation date, and for establishments which produced revenue for less than a full 
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month prior to annexation, the county shall continue to receive annually an amount determined by averaging 
the amount of wholesale beer tax revenue produced during the first three (3) months the establishment 
was in operation and multiplying this average by twelve (12). The provisions of this subdivision are subject 
to the exceptions in subsection (c). A municipality shall only pay the county the amount required by this 
subdivision, for a period of fifteen (15) years.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of § 67-6-712 or any other law to the contrary, for retail activity 
subject to the Local Option Revenue Act, the county shall continue to receive annually an amount equal 
to the amount of revenue the county received pursuant to § 67-6-712(a)(2)(A) in the twelve (12) months 
immediately preceding the effective date of the annexation for business establishments in the annexed 
area that produced Local Option Revenue Act revenue during that entire twelve (12) months. For business 
establishments that produced such revenues for more than a month but less than the full twelve (12) month 
period, the county shall continue to receive an amount annually determined by averaging the amount of local 
option revenue produced by the establishment and allocated to the county under § 67-6-712(a)(2)(A) during 
each full month the establishment was in business during that time and multiplying this average by twelve 
(12). For business establishments which did not produce revenue before the annexation date and produced 
revenue within three (3) months after the annexation date, and for establishments which produced revenue 
for less than a full month prior to annexation, the county shall continue to receive annually an amount 
determined by averaging the amount of Local Option Revenue produced and allocated to the county under  
§ 67-6-712(a)(2)(A) during the first three (3) months the establishment was in operation and multiplying  
this average by twelve (12). The provisions of this subdivision are subject to the exceptions in subsection (c). 
A municipality shall only pay the county the amount required by this subdivision, for a period of  
fifteen (15) years.
(c) Subsection (b) is subject to these exceptions:
(1) Subdivision (b)(l) ceases to apply as of the effective date of the repeal of the wholesale beer tax, should 
this occur;
(2) Subdivision (b)(2) ceases to apply as of the effective date of the repeal of the Local Option Revenue Act, 
should this occur;
(3) Should the general assembly reduce the amount of revenue from the Wholesale Beer Tax or the Local 
Option Revenue Act, accruing to municipalities by changing the distribution formula, the amount of revenue 
accruing to the county under subsection (b) will be reduced proportionally as of the effective date of the 
reduction;
(4) A county, by resolution of its legislative body, may waive its rights to receive all or part of the revenues 
provided by subsection (b). In these cases, the revenue shall be distributed as provided in §§ 57-6-103 
and 67-6-712 of the respective tax laws unless otherwise provided by agreement between the county and 
municipality; and
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(5) Annual revenues paid to a county by or on behalf of the annexing municipality are limited to the 
annual revenue amounts provided in subsection (b) and known as “annexation date revenue” as defined in 
subdivision (e)(2). Annual situs-based revenues in excess of the “annexation date revenue” allocated to 
one (1) or more counties shall accrue to the annexing municipality. Any decrease in the revenues from the 
situs-based taxes identified in subsection (b) shall not affect the amount remitted to the county or counties 
pursuant to subsection (b) except as otherwise provided in this subsection. Provided, a municipality may 
petition the department of revenue no more often than annually to adjust annexation date revenue as a 
result of the closure or relocation of a tax producing entity.
(d)(l) It is the responsibility of the county within which the annexed territory lies to certify and to provide 
to the department a list of all tax revenue producing entities within the proposed annexation area.
(2) The department shall determine the local share of revenue from each tax listed in this section 
generated within the annexed territory for the year before the annexation becomes effective, subject to 
the requirements of subsection (b). This revenue shall be known as the “annexation date revenue.”
(3) The department with respect to the revenues described in subdivision (b)(2), and the municipality 
with respect to the revenues described in subdivision (b)(l), shall annually distribute an amount equal 
to the annexation date revenue to the county of the annexed territory.
§ 6-51-116. Annexation in another county in different time zone
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, after December 31, 1992, it is unlawful for any 
municipality to annex, by ordinance upon its own initiative, territory in any county other than the county 
in which the city hall of the annexing municipality is located, if the two (2) counties involved are located in 
different time zones. 
§ 6-51-117. Regional airport commission property; consent to annexation
If three (3) or more municipalities and counties jointly create and participate in a regional airport 
commission and if the property of the regional airport commission is located outside the boundaries of 
the participating municipalities, then no municipality shall annex any property of the regional airport 
commission without the prior consent of the legislative bodies of the participating municipalities 
and counties.
§ 6-51-118. Applicability
No provision of Acts 1998, ch. 1101, applies to an annexation in any county with a metropolitan form 
of government in which any part of the general services district is annexed into the urban services district; 
provided, that any section of this part specifically referenced on May 19, 1998, in the charter of any 
county with a metropolitan form of government shall refer to the language of such sections in effect on 
January 1, 1998.
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